Essay Example on Clausewitz: Military Theorist, Prussian General, Hegelian Dialectician

Carl Von Clausewitz was known to be a military theorist and he also became a general for the Prussians. He more so used to stress the moral and political aspects of war. The thinking of Clausewitz involved the use of dialectical method hence the description of Hegelian. He left Prussia in the year 1812 so as to join the Russian army and resist Napoleon. However, before he left, he wrote an essay on the war which he named as "Principles of War". It was through the dialectical analytical framework where the world could be seen in the abstract through a lens of reasoning based on pure logic or practical experience. As Clausewitz stated "Defense is stronger than Offense"; during the Vietnam War, the Vietcong showed just how true that was.

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Clausewitz delimits a narrow account of the war which he says it is a purely military action where the objective of the military takes the place of the political aim. The focus of the war is on the military objective that is, only when the objective is satisfied does the political objective come to force. He states that if one wants to overcome the enemy, they need to watch their effort against the power of resistance.

Clausewitz was for the argument that defence was stronger than attack. It was to mean that during the wartime, they could praise the dynamism of the offensive and use surprise as a means to overcome the adversary's strength. Through this initiative, the way that they would win victory in the battle would be through visionary generalship.

Defence, on the other hand, is said to be passive and reactive and not a common trait praised by military commanders or the strategists. However, Clausewitz described it as a leading feature. Being passive in the face of the enemy is not a remark or a feature of martial prowess. Even when attacks are underway the defensive force used to remain in the back foot as they react to events instead of shaping them decisively.

The defensive force had the responsibility to endure blows of the assaulting armies. Clausewitz indicated that the true spirit of defence is prudence, courage and confidence. The advantage of the decisive point was a general principle of the war that Clausewitz tried to shape. His theory described how one may gain a preponderance of the physical forces and material advantages through the point.

Clausewitz helped to teach people to calculate moral factors such as the likely mistakes of the enemy, their own desperation and the impression created by a daring action. The art of war as per Clausewitz's theory was simple and as a result of a reasonable reflection on possible situations that one would encounter during the war. This way, in defence, the army needed to keep their troops covered for as long as they could.

There was a need to be defensive because they were always open to attack except when they were attacking themselves. This way, they needed to place their forces undercover to the extent of their possibility. Another principle was that they were not to bring all their troops into combat all at once. If they acted in this manner, all their wisdom in conducting the battle would disappear.

Clausewitz discusses that the army needs to be least concerned about the extent of their front. It is in itself unimportant because when the army extends to the front, it limits the depth of the information especially about the number of units lined up. When the army puts troops in the rear, they are made easily available. They could be used to renew combat or carry the fight to the other neighboring points.

There is a specific principle that Clausewitz wanted the people to know concerning the enemy. As they attack one section of the front, the enemy seeks to outflank and envelop them at the same time. The units in the background are thus able to meet the attempt and ensure more support that they get from obstacles in the terrain. It becomes easy for the enemy to outflank them.

If the army contains quite a number of troops that they could hold some in reserve, it is only a part of them that needs to directly stand behind the front. The rest of the troops should be behind. In this particular position, they can then attack the flank of the enemy columns that envelop them.

Clausewitz offers some large practical explanations for defence dominance. These are inclusive of the short internal lines of communication for the defender, the capacity to wait, and the choice of the time and place to offer the battle as well as the ability to shape one's disposition ahead of any invasion. It is, however, possible to find that defence is dominating at a moment and that at another, it is offence even when there are the same forces involved, which include disparity in quality.

In the Great War, there was dominating of defence until later when it could not be used any more. It is a fundamental principle that troops need not remain completely passive. They need to attack the enemy from the front as well as from the flanks even when they are attacking them. Armies should defend themselves on a given front so that they induce the enemy to deploy his forces when attacking the front. This way, they could in turn attack with the troops at the back.

The Viet Cong used this tactic during the Vietnam War. They were supporters of the Communist National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. They sought to conquer the south and create a unified communist state. They ensured increased efficiency during the Vietnam War. They started off as a loose grouping of guerilla fighters but with time, they increased in their professionalism and numbers over the course of war. They employed brutal tactics where they took rice from the villagers at gunpoint and assassinated people who were in support of the Vietnamese government.

Clausewitz stated "Defense is stronger than Offense"; during the Vietnam War, the Vietcong showed just how true that was. These are inclusive of the short internal lines of communication for the defender, the capacity to wait, and the choice of the time and place to offer the battle as well as the ability to shape one's disposition ahead of any invasion. Clausewitz discusses that the army needs to be least concerned about the extent of their front. It is in itself unimportant because when the army extends to the front, it limits the depth of the information especially about the number of units lined up.

References

Kallie Szczepanski. Who were the Viet Cong and how did they affect the war? August 10, 2019. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/the-viet-cong-the-vietnam-war-195432

Kenneth Payne. Prospect theory and the defence in Clausewitz's On War. 16 March 2016. Retrieved from http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/Atlanta%202016/Archive/968b741d-130c-4912-a4ee-997345a57ce1.pdf

Simpson, Emile. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict." Parameters 47, no. 4 (2018): 7-18. Retrieved from https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2017-18/4_Simpson.pdf

Von Clausewitz, Carl, and Hans Wilhelm Gatzke. Principles of war. Courier Corporation, 2003. Retrieved from http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/principlesofwar.htm