Research Paper on 1967 Arab-Israel War: Clash of Two Sides

Introduction

This war, also known as the Israel-Arab War, was fought between date 5 and 10 June 1967 involving two sides; Israel and three Arab neighbor countries-Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. After the Arab Israel war of 1948, the relationship between Israel and these Arab countries remained sour. The two sides were always at constant war, especially Israel and Egypt. The aftermath of the 1947-1949 war alias Israel war of independence concluded with the 1949 Armistice peace agreements signed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. This agreement established the green line, which defined lines between these two adversaries. Even with this agreement, the relationship between these two sides did not hold a peaceable future Syria, Egypt, and Jordan constantly perpetrated Fedayeen guerrilla wars against Israel civilians and soldiers, which prompted the reaction of Israel Defense Forces between the 1950s-1960s.

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Israel also participated in the 1956 military attack on Egypt, which was carried out by Britain and France to occupy the Sinai Peninsula and take control of the Suez Canal. The Six-Day War in this discussion became part of the 1967-1970 War of attrition, in which Israel military fought against Egyptian, Jordan, Syria, and Palestine forces. Egypt was the primary propagator of this war as it tried to recapture and control Sinai. Since these wars, Israel and these three Arab sides were always on the alert of invasion by the other. These adversaries have never fully cemented to-date

The War

The countries involved had prepared adequately for this war with the best weapons of the era and active military troops. The guns used were aircraft, artillery, helicopters, infantry weapons, mobile anti-aircraft cannons, among others. Israel had a total of 264,000 soldiers, among which between 250-300 were combat aircraft and 800 tankers. Egypt had 240,000 troops while Syria, Jordan, and Iraq combined to add up to 307, 000 soldiers, out of which 957 were combat aircraft and over 2,500 tankers. Out of Israel's 264,000 troops, only 100,000 were deployed during the six-day war. The Arab side deployed 240,000 troops out of their possible 547,000. The battle was fought on different fronts as each country positioned its military forces in the best-attaching locations.

The Air Attack Fighting Front

Israel threw the first blow of the war by launching a very heavy airstrike on the Egyptian airfields in the early morning of June 5, 1967. Its airstrikes were the most impactful of all the troops. Out of its 200 ready-to-operate jets, at least 188 fired missiles into the poorly protected Egyptian warplanes. Egypt could not respond to these attacks, as they were afraid that the Egyptian rebels could fire on the government planes as they ferried the Field Marshall and the air force troops. Israel used a mixed strategy during their attacks on Egyptian airfields. They struck planes using air missiles and bombs that it had developed in conjunction with France. The weapons were so powerful that any surviving airplanes could not take off.

The Israel air force was keen to fly low over the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea to avoid the radar. In the same move, they went over Egyptian fields, unleashed their missiles, and hovered back in low tones to relaunch another attack. Further, Egyptian forces had both command and communication difficulties; hence, the warning messages dispatched by the Jordanian radar did not reach them. In this operation, Israel destroyed most of the Egyptian airfields, only sparing the Arish airfield since it wanted to use if as their military airport after the war was over. For the rest of the war, the Arab air forces and the Egyptians did not attend to participate in the War as Israel aircrafts strolled their airplanes and prevented their activity. The result was an indication of Israel's air supremacy.

The Northern Israel Division Front

The war on this front was fought from the first day, from 7.30 in the morning. This front consisted of three battalions, all led by one of the most decorated commanders in the Israel troops, Major General Israel Tal. He wanted to launch a surprise attack on the Egyptians. The Egyptians had four regiments around the area of El-Qantarah, El-Sharqiyya, and Suez Canal. The troops also set up minefields and pillboxes to strengthen these garrisons. They also had in place underground bomb shelters, ditches, and collocation planting positions for guns. The Israel three battalions on this front crossed the border at opposite Nahal Oz and south of Khan Yunis, with utmost silence to maintain their cover. They first came across Rafah Gap, which they destroyed and proceeded to the area where they believed the Egyptian troops were concentrated.

Israel strategized that Colonel Shmuel Gonen and Colonel Menachem Aviram would support Tal's brigades and attack the Egyptians from all possible positions. Gonen led the 7th Armored unit, which would approach the war zone from north of Khan Yunis. On the other side, Colonel Aviram, the leader of the 60th platoon, would proceed to form the south of Khan Yunis. These two squadrons met up and encircled Khan Yunis. The paratroopers seized Rafah while Gonen saw the battalions pull threw successfully. The Egyptians in this area were intelligent enough to realize these moves were diversionary from the main attack, and hence Israel legions found themselves in a trap.

To start with, Colonel Gonen's 7th battalion, which was the lead-line of the attack, found itself under massive attack and lost most of its men. Dunes were also a big challenge for these cohorts, and the sand swallowed their men occasionally. The paratroopers did not have an easy time walking on the dunes, too, but the troops pressured on and in the end, cleared the Egyptian brigades. It took the Israel brigades four hours and a few minutes to get to the junction of Khan Yunis railway. Israel incurred heavy losses on this operation. Colonel Gonen led his contingents towards Rafah in two columns. Gonen and his men fought against the two Egyptians (Sheikh Zuweid's) brigades that protected Rafah. Despite the small number and inferior weaponry, these two brigades had experience in maneuver and camouflage. The Israel platoons would have been defeated if airstrike support did not come to their aid. The airstrikes murdered most commanders of the Egyptian side, leading to surrender and retreat of the Egyptian battalions.

The platoon led by Colonel Aviram fought well and victorious until they fell to Egyptians' trap. Aviram's brigades had the aid of tankers, with which they broke through the protective defense of the Egyptians, causing massive assaults on the Egyptian troops. However, Aviram misconstrued the Egyptians' wings, and the Egyptians pressed them hard, constraining them between two Egyptian strongholds. They were rescued after several hours. By the end of the first day, the Israelites were done cleaning up Egyptian troops on this front, leaving no potential resistance for the remaining five days of the war. While Israel won on this front, it lost many soldiers and tankers at the Rafah to heavy fire and cannon strikes from the Egyptian forces. On the other hand, Egypt lost 2,000 men and 40 tanks on this front.

Theoretical Causes of Six Days of War 1967

Theories of war are underdeveloped or absent in the international relations theories, which, notwithstanding the popular belief, it undercuts the explanatory command of most theoretical hypotheses. Among the theories that can be linked to Six Days of War 1967 include the Bargaining Model of War, the Theory of International Politics, and Just War Theory.

Bargaining Model of War

The theory state that wars end not because the nations that are at war are incapable of fighting further, but because these nations agree to halt their fighting. Wars are well-thought-out to be a chunk of the bargaining process that results in a negotiated settlement. According to this theory, war erupts when countries bargaining over an inevitable conflict of interest misses the mark of reaching an agreement little of war. These countries fail to reach a predetermined agreement because of the issue of indivisibility, commitment problems, and private information problems. For instance, in the Six-Day of War, the tension build-up between Israel and his adversaries since the 1940s was the main factor. Despite the agreement pacts signed between Israel and the Arab countries in the 1950s, every peace agreement was followed by an attack, mainly prompted by Egypt, Syria, or Jordan. Since 1963, a dispute over who should exploit the waters of River Jordan and Lake Kinneret surfaced, leading to an escalation of military attacks by Syria and Palestine on Israel. The 1949 Armistice Agreements meant to ensure good relationships between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and Jordan resulted in a demilitarized war front along the Israel-Syria border. Israel, Jordan, and Syria shared the waters of the Yarmuk River, which became a source of conflict between these three countries. The 1949 agreement had addressed such conflicts, but Syria and Jordan defied the pact. In 1953, Syria fired at an Israel construction site in which the Jewish side had started making a National Water Career at Jordan Bridge, north of Sea of Galilee. Israel was not impressed by the act, but it resolved to shift its construction to another site but still at the Sea of Galilee. The United Nations Security Council supported Israel's bid, a move that USSR did not take well, and so did Syria. These events also fueled the Six-Day War in question as it prompted further hatred between the two sides. Furthermore, natural resources like water and minerals were some of the significant reasons countries fought and still fight to-date. Hence, the Bargaining Model of War can be attributed to the cause of the Six-Day of War.

Theory of International Politics

This theory is concerning political order and organized violence on the global level. The most critical aspect of the assumption under this theory is anarchy. Lawlessness is interlocking bargains with an ever-changing shape structure of our international system depended on the following bargains; between militaries and states, between societies and countries, and between states in the system. With these systems, issues such as trade, democracy, or other relevant institutions can provide incentives for states to go to war. For instance, in this war, given that River Jordan runs through the borders of Jordan, Palestinian West Bank, Israel, and Southwest Syria, then it must have been a high point of interest for all the three Arab countries involved in the Six-Day War. River Jordan would be a good source of seafood, water transport, and water for irrigation, and a source of electric power. Lake Kinneret, located in the Sea of Galilee, was not by any means less critical to whoever would have control of its resources. Therefore, Syria and Jordan had to fight for its share of these two sources of their daily livelihoods hence the theory of international politics.

Just War Theory

This a theory in which many countries make it as their basis to morally and legally justified to seek for a war. Not many countries concern themselves with the said justifications. Theirs exist traditional categories that should be met for just wars and include; just authority, cause, intention, and last resort. How the said criteria are interpreted and achieved is an ongoing issue of discussion among its military planners, politicians, and philosophers. Regardless of the historical conventions put in place, the majority of just war theorists claim that lack of adequate rules to war and the lack of asymmetrical morality that exists between belligerents ought to be denounced. That, all the ru...