Joe Doe v. Russell County School Board: Lawsuit Over Sexual Abuse - Essay Sample

Background

Joe Doe is a minor who sued Russell County School Board and its two employees Phillip Henley and Kimberly Hooker (after this School Defenders), by his next friend Reella Watson. Doe Lebanon Elementary School (LES), where Henley and Kimberly had been, at one time or another, principals. He was sexually abused by Bobby Gobble, who pleaded guilty for sexually abusing Doe and several other young boys who attended the school. The state of Virginia brought multiple state charges against Gobble for these offenses, resulting in his conviction and sentencing to a long-term jail term. Doe moved the Court for summary judgment against Mr. Gobble over the abuse he experienced from Gobble. He argued that the school board and its co-defendants acted with indifference to Gobble's crimes through its inactions. In particular, he claimed the School Defenders had failed to take necessary measures to prevent past and future harassment, including training, counseling, punishing, or changing applicable policies. As a result, Doe contended that the School Defenders were deliberately indifferent to Gobble's wrongdoing and to his psychological suffering, which amounts to discrimination in violation of Title IX.

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Procedural Posture

The Virginia Western District Court partly granted and partly denied summary judgment to the School Defendants' Motions to Dismiss.

Issue

The case had multiple issues. However, the primary ones were whether Doe had the locus standi to institute the suit with Watson, a third party who is not related to Doe, acting as Doe's next friend. There was also the issue of whether Doe had pleaded claims upon which the Court could grant relief. Additionally, there was the issue whether the School Defendants actions or inactions, including failing to take remedial measures to prevent harassment as well as acting deliberately indifferent to the crime Gobble Committed by failing to implement corrective measures to prevent future harassment or rehabilitate Doe for the psychological harm he suffered violated Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 USC. 1681-1688.

Ruling

The Court partly granted and partly dismissed the motions for summary dismissal of the claim. In particular, it rejected all the School Defendants' motions to dismiss bar as to Counts VI, VII, IX, X, XII, XIII, and XIV.

Rationale

The Court dismissed the School Defendants' argument that the claimant had no standing to sue as Watson was an inappropriate next friend and that he had not established any claim on which relief would depend. The Court referred to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(1) that provides the issue of capacity to sue is one for the law of domicile. Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) recognizes that minors or incompetent persons without a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by guardian ad litem. Although the Va. Code Ann. 8.01-8 provides minors can sue by either or both parents, the Supreme Court of Virginia had decided that this provision does not overrule the common law in Herndon v. St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 587 S.E.2d 567, 569-70 (Va. 2003). Further, in Wilson v. Smith, 63 Va. 493, 504-05 (1872), the Court had stated any person might institute a suit on behalf of a minor as the minor's next friend, and the Court must recognize that person as the next friend. If the person is not suitable, the Court may dismiss the Court without prejudice or appoint another person. Given the above precedents and statutes, the Court held that Doe was a resident of Virginia. Therefore, he fulfills the domicile requirement. As for Watson, the Court regarded all the circumstances surrounding the case, including that Watson was an experienced attorney with a Virginian law office, Watson had accepted to act as a next friend with the consent of both Doe and her indisposed mother (who is now 15-years-old and has since made acquittance with Watson). As such, Watson was suitable to act as Doe's next friend. The Court dismissed the argument by the School Defenders alleging that since Doe was in foster care, his foster parents were more appropriate next friend. The Court held the foster arrangement was temporary and concluded that the governing statute does not prohibit unrelated third parties from acting as next friend. At the same time, common law allows any person to serve as a next friend, concluding that Watson was an appropriate next of friend.

On the issue that the claimant had not stated the claims upon which relief may arise, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court directed that in Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) the Court held the Rule exists to "test the sufficiency of a complaint." However, in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US 544, 570 (2007), the Court had held that the Rule does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Additionally, the Rule does not apply to resolves disputes regarding facts, the merit of a claim, or whether the defenses are applicable (Republican Party of NC. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)). Further, the Court directed that according to Erickson v. Pardus, 551 US 89, 94 (2007), it must regard all the factual claims in the Plaintiff's as true, and as held in Christopher v. Harbury, 536 US 403, 406 (2002) the Court must view those facts in a manner more favorable to the Plaintiff.

On the issue of whether the School Defendants' actions or inactions had been indifferent to the crimes Gobble committed and the welfare of the Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the School Defendants' argument that the claim was unwarranted due to lack of actual or constructive knowledge. The School Defenders' also contended that the knowledge of a principal could not be imputed on the School Board as principal in Virginia cannot hire or fire employees and do not act as the Board's proxies. Finally, they argued that, in any case, what the principals knew was consistent with "Gobble's role as Doe's caretaker and did not create actual knowledge of abuse" (10). The Court held that according to Title IX, no one should be discriminated against for reason of their sex. According to 1681(a) four requirements for establishing a claim under Title IX are that (1) The Plaintiff was a student at an education facility that receives Federal funds, (2) the Plaintiff was subjected to harassment based on their sex, (3) the abuse was severe or pervasive it created a hostile (or abusive) environment in an educational facility or activity (4) there is ground for imputing liability to the institution (Jennings v. Univ. of NC, 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007)).

In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 US 274, 277 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the district school is held liable of students harassment by teachers if "an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to the teacher's misconduct" (12). The Court relied on the Rule since Title IX remedial scheme hinges on an appropriate person having notice of a violation and the opportunity to rectify it. Further, Gebser does not limit the "corrective measures" to firing, transferring, or suspending employees who commit abuse. Besides, in Warren ex rel. Good v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d 163, 173 (3d Cir. 2002), an authority to supervise a teacher or investigate misconduct infers the power to institute corrective measures.

Further, although the 11th Circuit had held that the question as to whom the powers to initiate corrective measures lies to be one of fact, the majority of circuits have found principals as appropriate parties to impute authority upon school boards (KB v. Daleville City Bd. of Educ., 536 F. App'x 959, 962-63 (11th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)). The Court further held that Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 238 (4th Cir. 2001), which dismissed a case for lack of actual knowledge despite acknowledging the complaints had merit, was no longer good law regarding the title. As such, the Court held that principals in LES had "plausible" authority to take "corrective measures such as conducting an independent investigation or reporting Gobble's conduct to the School Board or law enforcement" (15). Also, as people with the top supervisory and administration duties at LES, they could have taken measures to inhibit Gobble access to Doe and other students in the school's premises as well as limit the time Gobble spent in the school after hours. Consequently, Doe had alleged enough to satisfies both Gebser and Jennings. Also, 1983 requirement requires either actual or constructive knowledge, the inadequacy of corrective measures to show indifference, and causal link between the suffering and the inactions. In Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163, 175 (4th Cir. 2014). Constructive knowledge is that one can gain by taking reasonable care and diligence, and by law, it rests with a specific individual. In any case, the Court held the question for lack of actual or constructive knowledge was a matter for a trier of fact to decide later. Therefore, for the motion to dismiss, the Court found the complaint had sufficiently alleged actual or constructive knowledge. Additionally, it found that the lack of authority to terminate or transfer did not limit the principals' ability to take other corrective measures. Thus, the inaction was deliberate indifference.

Implications

Even though Virginia Principals have no authority to terminate or transfer school employees on behalf of the school board, they have the administrative and supervisory powers over employees, which subsequently implies they can institute other corrective measures. Therefore, an allegation for failure to take remedial measures over alleged abuse of students can impute liability on the district school board.