Essay Sample on Stuxnet: The First Weaponized Cyber Attack

Introduction

Occurring for the first time in June 2010, Stuxnet was a weaponized cyber-attack in the form of a malicious computer worm targeting an industrial control system (Kushner, 2013). The attack exploded for the first time in Iran and is believed to be responsible for initiating extensive damage to Iran's nuclear program. The Stuxnet worm, which comprised of less than a megabyte computer worm infected and destroyed the functioning of more than 14 Iranian industrial sites, together with a plant for uranium-enrichment (Kushner, 2013).

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What Does the Threat Do?

Initially targeting Iran's nuclear facilities, Stuxnet is a computer worm that cautiously infected computers running on the Windows operating system (Kushner, 2013). The malicious worm infected both offline computers and those connected to the internet. After infecting the computers, the worm deploys various propagation mechanisms to gain privilege in other machines within the network. Once the worm infiltrates these machines, it begins to replicate itself within the network devices.

When a system user sticks a removable drive into a compromised computer, the next machine that reads that the USB drive gets infected with Stuxnet, this provides a mechanism for the worm to get into the network and devices that may not even be connected to the Internet (Kushner, 2013). The virus first analyzes the intended network and computer system. The Stuxnet worm does nothing on the infected computers (normally running on Windows) because they are not the actual targeted components. After infecting a computer system, the worm then modifies the programmable logic controllers (PLC) programming, and quickly damages or destroys delicate industrial control system equipment in the process (Kushner, 2013).

After locating a programmable logic-controlled computer, the malware then attacks, uses the internet to update its code, and begins sending damage-induced commands to the equipment the computer is controlling (Schneier, 2010). A PLCs refers to how computers manage and interact with computerized industrial machines. Automated processes in industrial control systems attacked by the Stuxnet cyber threat include manufacturing procedures in nuclear power plants, factory floors cleaning in chemical plants, and so on. Two or more Stuxnet infections compare versions to ensure they are operating in the most recent version once they encounter each other.

The effects of Stuxnet are not possible to predict, especially if one does not know the programming of the PLC. Based on the application, PLC programming is unique. While the centrifuges destroy themselves, the PLCs send feedback to the controlling computer indicating that processes are smoothly working, which makes it difficult to diagnose or detect thee Stuxnets damaging methods (Schneier, 2010). Besides the various system vulnerabilities exploited by the Stuxnet, it sets up its drivers into the Windows-based compromised computer. Although this process requires signing on to the network, Stuxnet uses stolen genuine certificates. One factor that allows Stuxnet to be more dangerous as compared to other cyber-attacks is that it doesn't perform like a malicious worm. Stuxnet does not threaten, and it does not steal account login credentials or credit card information; instead, it uses several unpatched vulnerabilities. Anyone monitoring the attacked equipment would find no problem indication until the equipment begins to destroy itself.

How Did Stuxnet Change the Game?

Stuxnet is mainly referred to as a "game-changer" in the cybersecurity sector since it was the first cybercrime attack targeted an industrial control system (ICS). An "industrial control" system is an integration of network connectivity with software and hardware to support critical operations within an organization (Knapp & Langill, 2014). Technologies within the industrial control system include control servers, remote terminal units (RTU), programmable automation controllers (PAC), programmable logic controllers (PLC), industrial automation and control systems (IACS), intelligent electronic devices (IED), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), and distributed control systems (DCS). A majority of industrial control systems manage critical infrastructures and composite industrial manufacturing processes that deliver water, manufacturing, transport, power, and other vital services.

The most perilous assumption proved wrong by the Stuxnet is that cybersecurity attacks are not limited to servers and PCs. Targeted cyber-attacks amongst ICSs by cybercriminals pose a risk to several nations and organizations. Considering that these systems are mostly from the healthcare, distribution, manufacturing, and chemical engineering sectors, they are least expected to be a target by malicious hackers and cyber terrorists. However, this marks a turning point in geopolitical conflicts. Politically motivated attacks mainly focus on causing operational disruption or physical damage, while attacks targeted on industrial control systems are more targeted on damaging or stealing Intellectual Property (IP) (Knapp & Langill, 2014). Before Stuxnet happened, industrial systems, due to the isolation and obscurity of the systems, were assumed to be either not being targeted by hackers or invulnerable to cybercrime or other cyber threats.

While several mechanisms were deployed by Stuxnet to penetrate and exploit systems-based Windows operating systems, it was also proof that alteration in an automation process could be initiated by malware (Knapp & Langill, 2014). Hence this could be by hiding its actions from being monitored, overwriting logic processes inside a controller, and infecting systems within the ICS. Today, most industrial control systems in operation connect to the internet indirectly or directly. The infiltration or downtime of a network within an industrial control system could result in hundreds of thousands of obstructed users, massive outages, and even nationwide problem. And this leaves them vulnerable, like other systems connected to the internet. Industrial control systems that rely on automated procedures, including chemical manufacturing factories, nuclear power plants, transport industries, and oil refinery pipelines, are of interest to malicious attackers, and their systems could be both vulnerable and accessible.

References

Knapp, E. D., & Langill, J. T. (2014). Industrial Network Security. Syngress.

Kushner, D. (2013). The real story of Stuxnet - IEEE Journals & Magazine. Ieeexplore.ieee.org. Retrieved 14 April 2020, from https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6471059.

Schneier, B. (2010). The story behind the Stuxnet virus. Forbes.com. https://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/iran-nuclear-computer-technology-security-stuxnet-worm.html#6b8abe2b51e8