Essay Sample on 2008 War Between Georgia & Russia: The Five-Day Battle

The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, famously known as the five-day war was a deadly encounter between these two nations. The battle was fought over Georgia's separatist region in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August of the same year. At the beginning of August 2008, the then Georgia President Saakashvili approved military operations in South Ossetia, a part of the country that was rebelling. Russia, in support of the region, came in to defend the separatists in the province, leading to a deadly five-day long conflict. By the end of the war, Russian troops were within striking distance of Georgia's capital of Tbilisi. The conflict between these two nations dates back to the dissolution of USSR, which led to the independence of the two states. After the disbanding of USSR, a civil war erupted in Georgia, and the two provinces of Ossetia and Abkhazia sought their independence. Throughout her history of war, Russia has more than once used propaganda and disinformation techniques to advance her interests. Nowhere is the use of propaganda and disinformation evident like the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia. During the five-day battle, Georgia also perfected the art of disinformation warfare to counter Russia's measure forcing the nation to rethink the strategy.

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For Russian authorities in Moscow, the war between Kremlin and Georgia was an attempt by the former to establish a new international position. The 2008 conflict, according to Iasiello (2017), was to propagate an opinion that Russia was a significant player in international military since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. To successfully carry out the operation, Moscow engaged in a number of propaganda campaign in the media to support the effort made by the government. The battles were coordinated and carried out on a grand scale with an extremely aggressive approach to convince not only the locals but also international observers. The task of Moscow's media, before the war, was to portray the country as rebirthed as a powerful nation ready for a full-fledged war. The nation's media did not fail to depict Moscow as strong and assertive with a defined interest not, only in the region but also internationally. Propaganda was also used before the conflict to illustrate weaknesses associated with Western culture, especially democracy in Georgia. Moscow portrayed Georgia as a failed pro-West sympathizer. The success of media propaganda during the time was in part due to the control Kremlin had over popular TV stations watched by most Russians.

Russian government's primary goal of a media propaganda campaign, as pointed out by Thomas (2009), was, before and after the conflict, make Russia look like a powerful and assertive nation with sharp and clearly defined regional and international interest. To achieve this positive international image, the government had to use military activities and media presentation. First, Moscow's media made the conflict between Russia and Georgia look like war challenging the global dominance of the US and its Western allies. This claim is evident in the request made by the nation that Russia was opposed to those of the United States. An example of propaganda to show how Russia was an emerging power featured pieces of the interview on Vesti, a state-owned TV station, which aired various interviews after the European Union summit on 1st September. The station selectively sampled few EU members opposed to the bloc's sanctions on Russia. The selection of foreign opinion was biased to favor the government's stand.

Before the war, Russia had a temporary goal of discrediting Georgia in Russia and also in Moscow. Moscow's propaganda presented Georgia as Western serving the interest of the United States. When the five-day war began, the media in Moscow portrayed the Georgian government and its various policies on a negative light. With time, the propaganda shifted from blaming the entire nation to accusing the head of government and political corpse, as the then Russian president called him, Saakashvili. The propaganda depicting the then head of state of Georgia as US puppet worked during the war since the intention of Russia was to abolish Saakashvili's government in Tbilisi.

As the five-day conflict draws nearer, Russia intensified its information psychological war. Moscow intentionally engaged in a concurrent information-psychological battle to convince the globe of its operations, Georgia. Some of the tactics used in information-psychology are disinformation campaign, information control, and propaganda. According to Russia, the aggressors of the five-days war was Georgia and the then-president Mikheil Saakashvili. The theme of aggressors was the main message Russia wanted to pass to the international community. Moscow was convinced that the US or its Western Allies should not meddle in the issue of defending its citizens. Russia ensured that it made available television footage together with some daily interviews with the nation's military spokesman so that Kremlin controls information reaching the international media. The military spokesman spread propaganda on the atrocities committed by Georgian authority to legitimize their operations in the country. An assessment of both Russian and Western media, made by Rogoza and Dubas (2008), depict the then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev as a non-aggressor compared to his counterpart in Georgia.

The media activities by Russia, before and during the five-day war with Georgia, were aimed at achieving two ends, propaganda for domestic and international consumption. For the message reaching the global media, Moscow wanted to prove to the rest of the world that Georgia contravened international law. Any action taken by Kremlin, therefore, was consistent with the international law, the same as global activities by the NATO-like the bombing of Kosovo. Through media disinformation, Russia politicians convinced the whole world by the use of global legal terminologies as "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" to paint Georgia in bad taste. On their part, Moscow applied terms such as "peace enforcement" and "humanitarian catastrophe" to describe the situation in Georgia (Beehner, Collins, Ferenzi, Person & Brantly, 2018). Among Russians, the state created an emotional message highlighting humanitarian concerns going on in the border province. It was common to come across pictures of individuals suffering from "aggression by Georgia" in every news bulletin. Every speech by the state representative at the time highlighted the "dire" humanitarian conditions in the separatists' provinces.

In the midst of the ongoing disinformation by Russian authorities, Georgian leaders did no concede the information war. Led by President Saakashvili, the nation embarked on a relentless counter-information campaign by applying their mechanism of disinformation. To win this information war that Moscow was way leading in, Georgian authorities hired local and international public relations professionals to help the nation promote propaganda and counter Russian coverage. The then Georgia President, together with his ministers, made close to forty appearances in Western media to explain their effort to defend Tbilisi. In an article featured Washington Post the then-president talks about his administration's attempt to reach out to Kremlin to solve the impasse but the leaders frustrated the efforts. Saakashvili made the same announcements days later on national television stating opposing his earlier claim that the nation did not contact Moscow. The president again changed his stand a few days later to claim that the country has been in constant contact with Russia for a ceasefire to appeal to the emotions of the people. The other open propaganda by Georgia targeting Russia in the renewed information war was tried to explain the number of armored vehicles and tanks Moscow had in place before the war. According to claims by Georgian authorities, Russia had planned for the fight and only waited for provocation from Georgia to also attack. The official statement from Georgia stated that Russia used one thousand two hundred tanks and armored personnel. In an interview, the president said that Russian troops were bombarding Georgian towns with close to 500 tanks within the country's territory.

To win this information war, Iasiello (2017) states that Georgia greatly exaggerated the events going on in some Georgian towns. Most observers say that the reported atrocities by the Russian troops in the Georgian cities were blown out of proportion. The then-president Saakashvili himself describes the Russian attack as brutal invading on Washington Post. In the same post, president Saakashvili states that Georgian troops willingly withdrew from South Ossetia province to avoid more casualties. To further gain international sympathy, the president talks about how Kremlin downplayed their appeal before the attack stating the countless number of times their efforts were turned down by the Russian government. Aside from the counter-disinformation by the president, most interviewed ministers from Georgia revealed to the global media how Russian troops intentionally destroyed residences, killing ethnic Georgians and bringing down infrastructure.

Domestically, the Georgian government misinformed the citizens. For instance, not a single TV station in Georgia showed Russia capturing Tskhinvali. To counter the claim of victory by Russia, Georgian authorities reported that Moscow was distorting information to emerge victoriously and the extent of damage was not as detailed. It was also published in the local stations that Russian troops were almost reaching Georgian capital of Tbilisi with the intention of toppling the legitimate government in favor of their government. International press in the City did not report any possible toppling by the Russian government, but the general population was convinced over the same issue.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the 2008's five-day war between Russia and Georgia was marked with a lot of propaganda, disinformation, and intentional misinformation to paint one side of the divide on the wrong side. Russia began the spread of propaganda before, during, and after the war as reported in the study. To counter this move, Georgian authorities, in collaboration with local and international public relation houses came up with a countering move to appeal to the public and international observers about the atrocities of the Moscow. In the long run, it is Georgia that emerged the winner after an appeal to the heart and mind of the locals and international communities. The physical battle was won by Russia who did everything within their reach, including disinformation to lay the ground for the attack, but Georgia won the information war against Moscow. Georgian authorities exposed Kremlin as an expansionist state that will stop at nothing to achieve an end.

References

Beehner, L., Collins, L., Ferenzi, S., Person, R., & Brantly, A. F. (2018). Analyzing the Russian Way of War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia. Analyzing the Russian War of War: Evidence from the 2008 Conflict with Georgia. Retrieved From http://hdl.handle.net/10919/82532

Iasiello, E. J. (2017). Russia's Improved Information Operations: From Georgia to Crimea. Parameters, 47(2). Retrieved From https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Summer_2017/8_Iasiello_RussiasImprovedInformationOperations.pdf

Rogoza, J., & Dubas, A. (2008). Russian propaganda war: media as a long-and short-range weapon. CES Commentary, (9), 3.

Thomas, T. L. (2009). The bear went through the mountain: Russia appraises its five-day war in South Ossetia. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22(1), 31-67. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040802695241