Introduction
On the 21st of September, 2013, four disguised terrorists attacked the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya. Part of the building collapsed due to a fire that began during the attack, making it unclear the exact number of casualties. However, the Kenyan government reported a total of 71 deaths that comprised of 62 civilians, five Kenyan Defense Forces personnel, and the four terrorists (Anzalone, p. 13). About 200 individuals suffered from various injuries. Al-Shabaab terror organization claimed responsibility for the attack, described as a vengeance for the Kenyan military operation in Somalia. The terror group had issued retaliation admonitions to the Kenyan government's involvement in Somalia, in which the Kenya Defense Forces and Somalia Armed Forces deployed to flash out Al-Shabaab in operation dubbed 'Operation Linda Nchi' from 2011 (Cannon & Dominic, pp. 836-852).
The terrorist group executed the last victim before special Kenyan security forces could enter the mall to neutralize the gunmen. The joint operation by Kenyan security forces lasted several hours before the mall got affirmed protected on the 24th of September, 2013. A month after the United Nations cautioned the Kenyan government of a potential attack from Al-Shabaab, and a week before the violence, Kenyan police reported to have interrupted a significant terror attack in its final aspect of scheming (Al Jazeera). The Kenya police detained two personalities with AK-47 guns, grenades, and suicide vests stuffed with ball comportments. The assailants were well trained since Al-Shabaab is an affiliate terror group of Al-Qaeda that has carried out several terrorist attacks across the globe. The terrorist group well-planned the attacks in advance since they had previously issued a retaliatory warning to the Kenyan government.
The terrorist group had planned a siege that involved mass shooting of civilians at the mall. Besides, many Kenyans and foreigners shop at the mall, making it attractive to terrorists to carry out and send their desired message of horror to the whole world. The terrorist's plan worked since several people died, while numerous others obtained serious gun wounds and injuries (Anzalone, p. 13). Furthermore, it took Kenyan forces several hours before securing the premise and killing the gunmen. The intention of the terror organization involved warning the Kenyan government to stop its military operation in Somalia. Albeit, the message got delivered, the Kenyan government refused to withdraw its troops from Somalia and remained adamant in its action against Al-Shabaab.
Other Terrorist Attacks by Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab has, for several years, launched an attack on Kenyan non-Muslim civilians. In April 2015, the terrorist organization launched an attack on Kenya's Garissa University College that killed about 147 students (Anderson, pp. 51-62). In January 2016, Al-Shabaab attacked and killed over 100 soldiers at a Kenyan AMISOM military base in one of the high-profile surprise assaults with the objective of compelling foreign troops out of Somalia, mainly the Kenyan Defense Forces. On 15th of January, 2019, Al-Shabaab again attacked a five-star hotel, DusitD2, in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack resulted in over 21 casualties (Fleming, pp. 66-83). The terrorists used guns and explosives to carry out the attacks.
Besides, the militants have targeted non-Muslim teachers in the Northeastern part of Kenya, resulting in the withdrawal of non-local teachers from the region and closure of several schools within the area in recent months. Moreover, Al-Shabaab attacks and kills non-Muslim passengers traveling to or from the Northeastern part of Kenya in their new strategic form of violence in past months. On the 13th of January, 2020, the militants attacked a village in Garissa, Kenya attacked and murdered three non-local teachers and demolished a telecommunication mast. Over 500 individuals killed in October 2017 in Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, by twin bomb detonations that the Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility (The Guardian).
Although the terror groups have changed its strategy of focusing on shopping malls and five-star hotels, buildings that house several shops, offices, and financial institutions remain under threat from a possible attack from Al-Shabaab in Kenya. The organization continues to target civilians in schools, on the highways, and trading or recreational places (Cannon & Dominic, pp. 836-852). Al-Shabaab's area of operation includes Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Yemen.
Effectiveness of Security Measures
Initial architectural designs of shopping malls involved developing some system of the public environment and harmonious connection between leisure, shopping, and revenues. In the modern world, aspects of shopping mall blueprints have a reviewed intent of integrating the model of security. In reaction to the prevalent terrorism discourse, anti-terrorism actions, surveillance, and safety have become essential to the general shopping mall construction and plan (Fleming, pp. 66-83). Most recreational and shopping buildings had little or no incorporation of security systems, making them vulnerable to terror attacks.
Westgate mall's security methods could not anticipate the assailants' attack. The mall's cautiously fashioned auditory signals, architectonics, and arrangements of flow planned to govern the movement of the general public were rendered unworkable by the vicious ease of the terrorists' utilization of handheld weapons. Most governments and security agencies provide drills and pieces of advice on numerous protective measures that the public can deploy depending on the assault scenario, mainly if it involves explosives and other hazardous devices (Fleming, pp. 66-83). However, the attackers exploited the fact that weapons attack, such as the one witnessed at Westgate shopping mall is hard to envisage, regulate, or evade.
Lack of preparedness of the security agencies even after receiving warnings of imminent attack from Al-Shabaab slowed response that resulted in more casualties. Lack of proper advice from the government on security measures for shopping malls also contributed to the deaths of many Kenyans (Anderson, pp. 51-62). Security measures missing at the time of the attack at Westgate shopping mall included military equipment, facial recognition systems, and progressive video analytics. Observing the mall's patrons from a hidden and yet all-seeing location, the security tool befits a programmed system that not only detects but also archives and preserves data for instant or forthcoming usage.
Suggestions to Improve Security Measures
It is prudent to develop law enforcement capabilities in the fields of border security, investigations, and emergency response. Besides, governments should strengthen their institutionalization of counterterrorism deterrence and response capacities. Furthermore, private ventures must focus their investment in and employ complete individual security systems (Gluck, pp. 297-321). The security sector has become a profitable global business; thus, privatization of security enhances the militarization of shopping malls to enact safeguards and protection against extremists and other dangers.
Another suggestion involves the integration of security systems in the architecture of the building, from the planning and design phase, before construction to include a multi-disciplinary system that discourages criminal conduct through environmental strategy. The strategy comprises of natural admittance regulation, regular surveillance, territoriality, and conservation (Gluck, pp. 297-321). Besides, shopping malls designed in such a manner that combines security requirements with architectural design for profit maximization, such as a careful lack of seating zones, helps in keeping shoppers moving and minimizes the risk of someone planting an explosive under the seats.
Works Cited
Al Jazeera. "Al-Shabaab News-the Latest from Al Jazeera." Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/topics/organizations/al-shabaab-141016044250785.html
Anderson, Noel. "Why Victories in Battle Have not yet finished the War against Al-Shabaab." Survival 58.4 (2016): 51-62. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207947
Anzalone, Christopher. "The Resilience of Al-Shabaab." CTC Sentinel 9.4 (2016): 13. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/download/45080239/The_Resilience_of_al-Shabaab_CTC_Sentinel__April_2016.pdf
Cannon, Brendon J., and Dominic Ruto Pkalya. "Why Al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm." Terrorism and political violence 31.4 (2019): 836-852. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2017.1290607
Fleming, David H. "Unethical Morality in" Documenting" Terrorism: Terror at the Mall, Nowhere to Run, Wolves of Westgate." SubStance 45.3 (2016): 66-83. Retrieved from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/634219/summary
Gluck, Zoltan. "Security Urbanism and the Counterterror State in Kenya." Anthropological Theory 17.3 (2017): 297-321. Retrieved from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1463499617729295
The Guardian. "Al-Shabaab." Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/al-shabaab
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