US Special Forces' Battle for Tora Bora: 2001 Hunt for Bin Laden - Research Paper

Introduction

The Battle of Tora Bora happened in 2001 where the United States military led an attack on the White Mountains in Afghanistan. It was believed that Osama bin Laden was hiding in the caves, and this attack was initiated as a result of the September 11 attacks. The United States was confident as they had an idea exactly where bin Laden was hiding and was so determined to capture or kill him. Three dozen special forces troops under Gen. Tommy Franks from the United States arrived at the caves and took advantage of the war that was going on between Afghan Militias under Hajji Zaman and the Al Qaeda to assist, advise and call for airstrikes. More than two hundred of Osama bin Laden's followers were killed in the attack, but bin Laden is believed to have escaped the caves during the assault. His escape is proof that the Battle of Tora Bora was not successful, and it was evident that without the total cooperation of Pakistan, the United States was never going to eliminate Osama bin Laden.

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Was it Successful?

That the United States was unable to eliminate al Qaeda's leader and several other leaders at the Tora Bora attack shows that the operation was not successful. America missed one open opportunity to kill the number one public enemy, as referenced by President Bush (Krause, 2008, pp. 644-684). The U.S. government made a mistake by not sending ground troops to follow and eliminate Osama bin Laden. Ground troops would have been able to follow the group and plan an ambush with the airstrikes after locating where bin Laden was after the escape. Another reason why the operation failed is that the United States acted slowly, yet they had the necessary equipment stronger than the equipment that was used by Afghan militias. The Afghan militias and the al Qaeda were at a war when the American Forces infiltrated the caves.

Al Qaeda outnumbered the Afghan militias, and the caves acted as an added advantage for Osama bin Laden and his troops. The caves were the main reason why this operation failed (Krause, 2008, pp. 644-684). The Tora Bora white mountains were made up of reinforced complex caves that were modified using different machinery and technology that was hard to bypass. The caves were also known by a few people who made navigating through them for anyone who has not acquainted with them an impossible task. The militia couldn't penetrate any of the entrances to the caves, which made them stay in the cold, hungry, and fighting each other instead. After endless trials to take control of the caves and realizing that the al Qaeda members were ready to die rather than surrender to Hajji Zaman, he called off the fight.

If the American troops had attacked the early days when they first arrived, they would have cleared all entrances of the caves, and the Afghan militia would have gotten a chance to attack and finish off bin Laden and other leaders of the Islamist group (Woerner, 2013, pp. 76-86). Another reason why the operation failed is that, in a desperate attempt to finish off al Qaeda and its leader after Hajji Zaman withdrew his troop from the entrances of the caves, the airforce troops of America started bombing the cave aimlessly. This led to the death of many al Qaeda members and leaders, but it gave bin Laden a chance to escape the cave.

Immediate and Longer-Term Consequences

The failure of America to capture Osama bin Laden at the Tora Bora attack had consequences, which were both quick and some long term with effects being felt many years later. Winning or eliminating bin Laden would not have ended al Qaeda group, but it would have had a significant impact in their activities and finances, which would have minimized the threat that this terrorist group has all over the world (Woerner, 2013, pp. 76-86). The failure to eliminate Osama bin Laden in this attack led to an escape of al Qaeda and Taliban operatives into Pakistan with minimal effort. The government officials of America started blaming each other for the failure, and this pointing fingers at each other led to various conflicts as different individuals responsible took to media to justify their actions. More U.S. troops died in the continued war, and they continue to die in a war that could have been mitigated in 2001.

Long Term Consequences

Seven years after the attack, bin Laden continued to offer guidance to thousands of his followers and millions of sympathizers across the world, which created more threats to America. This move saw that his influence of terrorism spread to almost sixty countries, with many of his followers forming terrorist groups (Gellman and Ricks, 2002, pp. 1-5). Bin Laden recovered from the loss of his hideout in Tora Bora, and this made him retaliate in different countries with more impact than before. Pakistan became the primary receiving end of the failure to kill Osama during the attack with al Qaeda extremists bringing war directly to the government. This brought the Pakistan government to the verge of instability. The terrorist group was responsible for the system bombings in London in 2005. American taxpayers have also been on the receiving end since this failure because the group grew stronger and spread, causing them to spend more on the financial costs of the war against al Qaeda.

Issues

Before the fight began, the CIA leader requested that enough troops be deployed to attack the caves as well as block all possible escape routes for the terrorists. He also pleaded with the U.S. Central Command to send all one thousand two hundred marines that were assigned at Kandahar to go to Tora Bora (Gellman and Ricks, 2002, pp. 1-5). His request was rejected, and only three dozen troops were sent to Tora Bora. The U.S. Central Command issued a narrative as to why they refused to send the large number of troops as requested by the CIA leader. The deputy commander argued that the roads that the soldiers would have used passed through different villages that were loyal to al Qaeda, which would have made deployment of large troops impossible. He also gave a narrative of the weather being unconducive, which made it hard for them to be airlifted to Tora Bora. The commander explained that deploying large troops from America would have interfered with the good relations America had with Afghan allies (Kerry, 2009, pp. 1 -43). Different authorities pointed fingers at each other blaming separate parties for the escape of bin Laden. Even Joseph Collins, who was the official in charge of defense during Bush's administration, stated that the lack of expert infantry made it easy for Osama to escape unchallenged at Tora Bora.

Tommy Franks ignored the request to add the number of troops attacking the area with an argument that the model which was used to push the Taliban away from Afghanistan would be useful in making the Tora Bora mission a success. This showed a failure of policy and that the general was misguided by the civilian leadership (Kerry, 2009, pp. 1 -43). Three top officials at the defense department argued that there was no need turning all attention to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as they were a small part of the terrorist association. President Bush and the defense secretary failed to get direct contact with the troops in operation, which was most important between U.S. and Afganistan governments. It is unbelievable how these two individuals left the battle to Afghan rebels and a small number of American troops.

Strategic and Tactical Factors

Strategic Factors

The American troops mainly relied on the Afghan militia to continue with the war against al Qaeda so that they could secretly spy the al Qaeda and inform the air troops to launch attacks. The forces also captured several of the leaders associated with bin Laden and questioned them regarding the whereabouts of Osama and his strategic moves (Brady, 2017, pp. 1 -10). Different American officers expected the Taliban members to withdraw from Tora Bora like they had done at different other stations after several bombings. The American government approached Khalis, a leader who Osama bin Laden took as his father, and asked him to support them in the quest of capturing bin Laden but Khalis argued that he was retired and could not help.

The al Qaeda group used thousands of feet on the mountains to their advantage. As the Afghan militia shivered in the cold and fought amongst themselves due to different disagreements of their leaders, the al Qaeda group stood firm and united and protected all entrances to the caves (Brady, 2017, pp. 1 -10). The American troops arrived three days after the war between these two groups began, and they expected that the war would act in their advantage. The al Qaeda also had the benefit of the hot and cozy modified caves

Tactical Factors

The al Qaeda used one of their former allies, who was a local warlord in the area. He disguised himself as joining the Afghan militia who attacked the al Qaeda in the caves. Instead of leading the war to finish the al Qaeda, he employed different tactics in the camps that caused the militia to be separated and fight against each other (Waterman, 2019, pp. 1 -2). This tactic proved successful because, rather than the Afghan militia focusing on the task ahead, they were always fighting and shooting each other. Haji Zaman, the local warlord in support of al Qaeda, at long last put an end to the fight by calling the al Qaeda leaders and calling for surrender negotiations. This was a well-planned tactic for Osama and the terrorists to escape the caves as the American troops frowned and got confused by this unexpected call. The failure of this operation was also contributed by al Qaeda using the physical terrain of the mountains to their advantage. This tactic was useful because it was hard for either the American troops or the Afghan militia to access the caves without being noticed.

Lessons Learned

America did not adequately plan the mission to kill Osama bin Laden. if the American troops had come up with a good plan, they would have made a move against the al Qaeda while protecting all possible routes of escape to trap Osama in the caves and kill him. America also lacked enough intelligence and the size of its forces, which made it possible for Osama to escape without being followed by anyone (Joyce, 2015, pp. 1 -2). From this failed operation, it is evident that without the support of the Afghanistan government and different traitors of the al Qaeda group, America couldn't kill the influential and dangerous leader. Various political competitors should stop blaming the American government that was in power at that time for sending a small group of U.S. troops. A large force is not a guarantee that the mission would have been a success. Instead, well-planned strategies and action plans would have played a significant role in ensuring that Osama never escaped the two week attack and reappear on a videotape on December 27 the same year.

Conclusion

The American troops went into the mission blindly, and this led to the mission's failure. They did not have any human intelligence that would have aided them to get any information regarding the whereabouts of bin Laden or any of his activities. The U.S. government made a mistake by not sending ground troops to follow and eliminate Osama bin Laden. Despite the many criticisms to the administration that ruled then, the Pashtuns in Afghanistan viewed bin Laden with so much profile, which would make it impossible for them to give him up. Even after the death of the al Qaeda members in the battle, many people appeared to pay their respects at their graves, which showed how loyal they were. The Tora Bora battle of 2001 was a failure whose results would have been changed if a different approach had been taken.

References

Brady, K.R., 2017. Framing and Assessing the Counter-Terrorism Efforts of the United State...