Research Paper on The Concorde: Shaping Aviation History in Under 4 Hours

Introduction

Being able to fly to New York City from Paris in less than four hours sounds impossible. The Concorde, in the course of its operations, reduced the duration of a flight across the Atlantic by half. This commercial jet got retired in 2000 as a result of the crash. The plane was en route to John F Kennedy in New York. The fatal accident accelerated the exit of the jet from the aviation business, and this forms a crucial part of the aviation industry history, and this continues to shape various decisions undertaken in the current. More significant lessons get drawn from the experience about what could have gone wrong, and more advancement has been made since the fatal accident. The final flight of the Concorde is, therefore, crucial in aviation history and remains vital in aviation history. The 2000 Concorde crash was the result of a combination of tech and human-related errors. These notably include Air France's failure to follow manufacturer maintenance guidelines and the loss of the pilot's professionalism. The pertinent question answered is, what are the underlying factors that caused the crash that got left out in the BEA report?

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July 25TH 2000, is the fateful day that marked the end of the Concorde. Flight 4590 crashed into the Paris suburb in Gonese, barely two minutes after takeoff. The plane went into flames, killing five people on the ground and 109 passengers on board, and the official investigation report blamed the accident on a "single cause" focusing on the fire (BEA, 2000). The investigating body noted that the fire started when the Concorde ran over a metal strip present on the runway. As a result, one of the tires burst, a massive piece of rubber got infused into one of the fuel tanks currently located in the wing (Filburn, 2019). The jet fuel pouring out of the hole got ignited. The engines faltered as a result of the hot gases. The captain, Christian Marty, tried his best to steer the plane, but once the plane lost thrust, the crashing became inevitable. Several avoidable mishaps contributed to the occurrence of this disastrous accident. The fatal accident was not caused by a single cause but by a combination of technology-related factors and human errors (Cusick et al. 2017).

A court in Paris ruled that the airline was criminally responsible for the fatal crash of the Concorde. The Airline got fined a total of 200 000 euros. The airline received court orders to pay an additional 1, 000, 000 euros to Air France, the jet's operator. Besides, a mechanic working for Continental got suspended for 15 months during this duration; he was in prison. John Taylor was found guilty over the accident. The court upheld that Mr. Taylor should never have used titanium when doing repairs. Titanium is known to be very dangerous to tires of airplanes. Mr. Taylor should have made use of a softer metal, preferably aluminum. Continental disagreed with the interpretation, noting that the plane was in flames even before it had hit the piece of titanium on the runway.

The Civil Aviation Authority decided to ground seven Concords owned by British Airways three weeks later. The "single cause" reason informed their decision. The Chairman of Civil Aviation stated that it was clear to all members of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) that a bursting of a tire alone cannot lead to a loss of an aircraft used for public transport. However, for this specific incident, tire debris was concluded to have caused the fateful accident (Filburn, 2019).

The Guardian conducted an investigation that revealed that the truth is a lot more complicated. The results of the investigation conducted by The Guardian had negative implications for Air France (The Guardian, 2000). The pilot should have been in a position to land the plane since the fire alone was survivable safely. The reason the pilot could not is a result of a dangerous combination of negligence and operational safety (The Guardian, 2000). It is eminent that the crash was contributed by more than a single factor. Most of these other factors were avoidable.

Marty pulled the control column back, raising the nose, and the plane took off. This process is known as rotation. Pilot work for British Airways confirmed to the Guardian the airspeed was at 188 knots. It was eleven knots less than the minimum allowed velocity for such a maneuver. Marty did not have a choice. The plane was in the course of abandoning the tarmac; it would have bumped into the grass by the side. The Concorde would have exploded if it were left to overturn. His other alternative was bleak since plane 747 was parked straight ahead (The Guardian, 2000). Marty opted to take to the air, he was aware the plane's speed was too low, and it would slim the damaged Concorde's survival chances.

The interim report by the BEA (2000) noted that a cockpit voice recorder that the co-pilot scream "watch out," the moment before Marty's decision to rotate. The co-pilot seated at the cockpit was about to witness the Concorde plunging into the 747. It is a reasonable explanation for his exclamation. The big question is, why was the plane in this dangerous position? Emerging evidence explains that the reason is, the Concorde had was not adequately maintained. The ground staff had failed to replace the spacer, an essential component in the landing gear. The spacer keeps the wheels properly aligned. The plane had been serviced four days before the accident. However, the BEA does not agree; the evidence is compelling that the missing spacer may have contributed to the plane's skewing off the runway, forcing Marty to take off prematurely.

Besides, the plane was in operation, contrary to its certified weight limits. The total weight was in excess by six tones, from the acceptable weight for takeoff. As a result, the center of gravity got pushed back to the plane's rear end (The Guardian, 2000). It was a violation of safety standards, even before the flight took off. Perhaps, Marty would have gotten away with the overloading, if the plane had not run over the metal strip. Marty faced an emergency, the aircraft was flying below the recommended speed, and this compromised his options. Another contributing factor is the design of the landing gears of Concorde planes (Conway, 2005). Any stress applied to the landing gear is severe. Unlike the conventional aircraft, the Concorde's wings do not generate any lift till the pilot pulls the nose up, and the plane is pitched at 18 degrees angle upwards. At the rotation point. Before that happens, the bogeys and wheels bear the weight of the aircraft (185 tones).

The procedure lay down by British Airways and Air France for the ground crew is a reflection of the impending danger if anything goes wrong. Several components of the plane must get replaced regularly. The bogeys got dismantled then assembled again following a stringent formula. The flight must then get rigorous assessment and inspection (Conway, 2005).

In the days preceding the accident, the plane had flown to New York twice. The bushes in load-bearing stayed in their correct positions. However, every time that the flight took off, landing gear got retracted inside the wing. The Guardian (2000) uncovered that the landing gear slipped down to the gap that should have been occupied by a spacer. It had moved seven inches by the day of the accident until the washers were close to touching. The wheels and beams were shaking, yet they should always be firm(The guardian, 2000). Nothing could restrain the front wheels in the undercarriage the moment the plane started on the runway. It is uncertain the moment when the supermarket trolley jammed. The common belief is that the undercarriage was unaligned the moment the plane began to descend the track.

Something was slowing down the aircraft since it was unusually slow at takeoff. It got speculated to be the friction in the undercarriage (Conway, 2000). The plane should be supposed to take off at 1,694 meters without encountering the metal strip. BEA does not agree with these findings. The authority insists that the plane's acceleration was usual up to the moment a tire burst. The body maintains that the absent spacer was insignificant. The truth is that the moment one of the tires burst, the three remaining ones were faced with an uneven load, making them dangerously twist. The skid marks visible on the runway the photographs taken by BEA confirms this (Filburn, 2019). The pilot's laxity in responding to the emergency leaves a lot to speculate. Besides, an employee of Continental served 15 months in jail for using titanium instead of aluminum. Evidence from primary sources and the ruling by the Paris Court. Point to the fact that this accident got caused by a combination of human and technology-related factors.

References

Bureau Enquetes-Accidents. (2000). Accident on 25 July 2000 at La Patte d'Oiein Gonesse (95) to the Concorde registered F-BTS Cooperated by Air France

Conway, E. (2005). High-speed dreams: NASA and the technopolitics of supersonic transportation, 1945-1999. JHU Press.

Cusick, S. K., Cortes, A. I., & Rodrigues, C. C. (2017). Commercial Aviation Safety. McGraw Hill Professional

Filburn, T. (2019). Commercial Aviation in the Jet Era and the Systems that Make it Possible. Springer.

The Guardian. (2000). First the Smoke, then just a huge fireball. Eyewitnesses describe how the supersonic airliner fell from the sky. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jul/26/concorde.nickhopkins