R v. Lucas: Defamation Suit Upholded by Supreme Court - Essay Sample

Introduction

The case is indexed as R v. Lucas. The case was decided on April 2, 1998, by the Supreme Court. The case had been appealed at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in 1996, which upheld the decision made in 1995 by the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench ruling on constitutional issues and convictions.

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Relevant Facts

The case is about a defamatory libel suit against the appellants' John David Lucas and Johanna Erna Lucas. The two were accused and convicted by lower courts for defamation against a police officer. The police were engaged in investigating sexual assault cases against three children. During his investigation, he established that one of the children had been sexually assaulting his two sisters. However, he still put all the three children together despite the threat posed by the brother to the siblings.

Mr. Lucas was in a group for Saskatoon prisoner's rights and obtained this information from some of the individuals who were part of the accused on the sexual assault case. The appellants assumed that the police officer had obtained this information, too, and did not intervene or take any legal action against the boy. Mrs. Lucas, during a protest, staged at the police headquarters where the officer worked, carried a placard with defamatory statements. The sign read: "Did [the officer] just allow or help with the rape/sodomy of an eight-year-old?" and on the other side: "If you admit it [officer], then you get help with your touching problem." She was arrested and charged with defamatory libel under sections 300 and 301 of the Criminal Code. Mr. Lucas carried the same sign the next day at the police headquarters, was arrested and charged under the same sections.

Section 300 of the Criminal Code states that "Everyone who publishes a defamatory libel that he knows is false is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years." Section 298 defines defamatory libel, and section 299 defines the modes of publication that constitute defamatory libel. Section 301 supports the prosecution of defamatory libel even if the information published is true.

The appellants argued the case during the trial on the basis of infringement of their freedom of expression, as stated in section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. They also applied for an order against the constitutionality of sections 300 and 301 of the Criminal Code. They also argued that sections 298 and 299 were too broad in their definitions of defamatory libel.

Legal Issues Raised

Some of the legal issues include:

• Whether sections 298, 299 or 300 of the Criminal Code violate section 2(b) of the Charter, combined or separately. Freedom of expression is an essential part of democracy.
• Whether the sections mentioned above, combined or separately, violate section 7 of the Charter. This section of the Charter talks about the rights to life, liberty, and security.
• Whether section 1 of the chapter can uphold sections 298, 299, and 300 of the Criminal Code.
• The criminal and civil law dichotomy. The appellants argued that provisions of civil law were adequate in dealing with the defamation issue and that there was no need for the punitive criminal sentences.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence on the appellants' subjective knowledge that the information they displayed on the placard was false.
• The men's rea requirement by section 300 only provides for knowledge of the falsity of the information and not the intention to defame.

Lower Court Decisions

Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench

Judge Hrabinsky, at the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench in 1995, noted the difference between sections 300 and 301 of the Criminal Code. Whereas section 300 requires proof that the defendants were aware that the information was false, under section 301, an individual can still be prosecuted for defamatory libel even if the information is found to be true. On the argument about the infringement of freedom of expression as per section 2(b) of the Charter, he noted that freedom of expression is not absolute and that if unrestricted, this freedom could interfere with the reputation and privacy of others. He stated the need for a balance between the freedom of expression and protecting the reputation of other people. On the argument on the broadness of sections 298 and 299 in defining defamatory libel, the judge quoted Gleaves v. Deakin, (1979), which observed that 'criminal sanctions for defamatory libel should be available for serious libels.' Hrabinsky observed that the information displayed on th placards by the defendants was false and that they should have known so. The court found both of them guilty, and they were sentenced to time in jail. Mr. Lucan was sentenced to two years less a day while Mrs. Lucas got 22months.

Saskatchewan Court of Appeal

The court of appeal, in 1996, affirmed the decisions by the lower court. The appellants presented two cases before this court. They contested the constitutionality of section 300 of the Criminal Code and whether the elements of the offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The ruling of the first issue was based on an earlier ruling by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in a 1995 case of R v. Stevens, which found the section to be constitutionally valid. The court of appeal was also of the view that the respondent had adequately proved the elements of the offense. The appeal against the convictions was dismissed. Their sentences were, however, reduced to 18 months for Mr. Lucas and 12 months for Mrs. Lucas.

Court's Decision and Reasons

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals with judges McLachlin and Major dissenting on the appeal of Mrs. Lucas.

The judges noted that the provisions on the Criminal Code regarding defamatory libel were not too vague to infringe on sections 1 and 7 of the Charter. They noted that 298 specified the matter, 299 restricted the liability to specific publishing, and all the sections provided adequate indication in the manner in which prosecutorial should be reached. The judges also upheld that criminal punishment was an appropriate response since the harm, as addressed in section 300, is 'grave and serious.'

On the issue of men's rea, section 300 only requires the knowledge of the falsity of. It does not expressly require that the intention to defame be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeal upheld the judgment despite the error made by the judge in the lower court of establishing whether there was men's rea to defame. The provision, therefore, placed an onerous burden on the Court to make this provision minimally intrusive, to avoid violating sections in the Charter.

Regarding the issue of infringement on the freedom of expression, the Supreme Court noted that defamatory libel does not merit protection on this basis. They noted that the provisions on defamatory libel and their effects on protecting the reputations of individuals outweighed any negative impacts on the freedom of expression, as stated in section 2(b) of the Charter. Despite the argument on the overbroad interpretation of sections 298 and 299, the judges noted that the placards that the appellants had fallen within the valid constitutional parts of these sections. The messages were displayed in public, and they were likely to injure the reputation of the officer mentioned.

Any Dissenting Judgment

There was no evidence that Mrs. Lucas knew that the information in the placard was false. He got the information from her husband and is likely to have believed him. The lower court did not provide evidence that she was aware of the falsity of the information. The dissenting judges noted that it was possible that Mrs. Lucas was not aware that the information was false. They wanted her conviction to be set aside, and if the Crown would not proceed with the trial, then an acquittal should be directed.

Legal Principle(S) Established or Clarified by the Case

This case clarified that the portion in section 299(c) stating that a defamatory statement ought to be delivered 'with the intent that it should be read or seen by the person whom it defames' is too broad, cannot be justified and therefore should be severed. It should instead read 'with the intent that it should be read or seen by any other person.' In this case, 'any other person' excludes the person defamed.