Hitler, Stalin & the 1939 Non-Aggression Pact: A Comparative Analysis Essay

Introduction

Defined as the Molotov and Ribbentrop pact, the Non-aggression Treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1939, was a significant intervention given that the involved personalities had opposed ideas. In different ways, the pact between Hitler and Stalin is associated with the development of World War II, whereby questions are raised concerning Stalin's or Hitler's involvement in the World War. However, this paper will compare and contrast two articles authored by Raack RC and Heinrich Schwendemann, respectively. Also, the different points concerning the pact between Stalin and Hitler will be discussed.

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Comparison Between Raack's and Schwendemann's Articles

Within the article, "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II," Raack delivered arguments based on other researchers about the involvement of Stalin in World War II. Raack begins by providing information concerning Viktor Suvorov, an ex-intelligence officer who wrote a novel on Stalin's war plans, which, when looked into at a depth, would have changed history as we know it (Raack, p. 198). Raack talks of a second author called Watt, whose writing has a title almost as parallel to that of Viktor, "How War came" (Raack, p. 198). Raack argues that Suvorov and Watt differ whereby Suvorov is considerably shallow in that he only focuses on the war plans of Stalin while Watt provides an expansive view as he takes the traditional long report approach. Comparatively, Schwendemann's article concerns the economic relations that happened between Germany and the Soviet Union during the Stalin-Hitler Pact. Schwendemann argues that between 1939 and the 1941 German assault, financial ties between the Soviet Union and Germany expanded phenomenally based on the understanding of the 1939 pact and the two commercial agreements between 1940 and January 1941(Schwendemann, p. 161).

In both articles, it has been outlined that there is disregarded information on the pact between Stalin and Hitler. In Raack's argument, Viktor suggests that the 1939 treaty was an intervention that Stalin had in mind during the scheming of the attack on Poland (Raack, p. 198). German was also to be an ally in the attack on Poland. Watt, however, does not mention any attack whatsoever about the pact between Stalin and Hitler. The treaty was to ultimately cause war in Europe as the British supported Poland, while German and Soviet Union were on the other frontier. Raack remarks that besides Watt, many authors ignored the fact that Hitler might have been the cause of war. Stalin's ideologies matched with Leninist theory in that Leninist believed conflicts were inevitable, and there was a need for colonial revolutions (Raack, p.198). According to Schwendemann, he argues that the German-Soviet financial relations have shockingly not been mulled over by worldwide research, disregarding the way that they made up the primary substance of the particular links and that there was a large number of dealings and business contacts at the administrative level (Schwendemann, p. 162).

Furthermore, the articles by Raack and Schwendemann provide a record of related information on the pact about Hitler and Staling. Raack continues to express the contents of Viktor's book by writing that according to the conventional story as per historians is that Stalin did not trust the democracies of countries in the West, France, and Great Britain (Raack, p. 199). The mistrust pushed him to withdraw his support from the Czech Republic's president, then Benes. The withdrawal was as per the conditions stipulated by Hitler before the pact. The support of Stalin was made in 1938 when a defense link was formed between the Czech, Soviet Union, and France (Raack, p. 199). Stalin lost faith in democracies after they allowed Hitler to Annex parts of Czech that were German populated. After Nazi Germany's annexation of Czech, the course of action that Britain would take next was to be predetermined by the degree that Hitler would continue with German expansion (Raack, p.199). Official Chamberlain made it plain that Britain would be obliged to go to the guide of Poland in the event of German interruption. The significant power adequately tremendous to stop Hitler, and with an individual stake in doing this, was the Soviet Union. Besides, Poland's pioneers were not energized with the probability of Russia transforming into its watchman; to them, it was fundamentally occupation by another immense framework. When the Western Allies proclaimed war on the Reich in September 1939, the Soviet Association had in Stalin's view an incredibly ideal position (Raack, p. 200). In the conditions of the August-September 1939 pact, Hitler had yielded previous domains of tsarist Russia as remuneration for the key back spread from the USSR. These regions included Bessarabia, Finland, Eastern Poland, and the Baltic States (Raack, p. 201).

Both articles show the involvement of Hitler and the impact of the pact between the two countries. To the extent that Hitler is concerned, the Non-Aggression Pact had the character of a strategically decided and incidentally restricted game plan from the earliest starting point. The choice to assault the Soviet Union, which was made following the attacks on France, shows that he had never surrendered the official position of his approach since 1933 (Schwendemann, p. 164). After his consent to the Non-Aggression Pact, Hitler surrendered Germany's arrangement toward Russia.

Contrast Between Raack's and Schwendemann's Articles

Even though both articles provide details concerning the involvement of Stalin and Hitler at the beginning of World War II, there are contrasts based on how each piece portrays both Stalin and Hitler. For instance, Raack argues that Hitler must have been the cause of World War II. In the article, Raack provides details from Colonel Gor'kov's report delivering that Soviet assault towards the West was German's way to prepare for Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union rather than an effort to develop a reactive attack (Raack, p. 207).

On the other hand, Schwendemann's article attempts to balance both sides perceiving Hitler and Stalin responsible for the World War. However, Schwendemann provides more details concerning Stalin's radicalization. Schwendemann argues that Stalin's goal to help Germany financially during the long military battle was expected since Stalin believed the German Reich to be monetarily flimsier than England and France. In the meantime, the USSR could go on untouched with her very own constrained financial and military advancement. Stalin didn't alter his perspective after the destruction of France. Stalin's off course clarification of Hitler's objectives is a direct result of the marvel that two novel kinds of one-party rule faced each other.

On the Soviet side, the power structures were united out and out around Stalin (Schwendemann, p. 169). Due to the reason that the relationship to Berlin had become the most critical issue of Soviet global procedure, the methodology, Stalin controlled the German policy and proceeded his decisions clearly to the mollifying representatives of the German Reich. On the German side, the power structures were exceptional (Schwendemann, p. 169). Despite the impression that the National Socialist oppression made apparently world, there were no stable structures of decision. Although Hitler moved the major centers himself and reliably landed at his focuses finally, Hitler consistently left a couple of districts of universal methodology and outside money related course of action to others who could act independently, as long as they knew Hitler was the one in charge (Schwendemann, p. 170).

Conclusion

Both Raack and Schwendemann have conducted research that shows us the events before the build-up, during, and after the pact. Stalin and Hitler were both dictators who wanted to gain from the treaty then later attack each other. Raack and Schwendemann have shown the ideologies of both leaders and what they gained from the pact. Also, they provide particular details concerning how each character was involved in the treaty based on the fact that they were dictators. Despite appearances, both Stalin and Hitler were playing their political ambitions.

Works Cited

Raack, R. C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History." World Affairs 158.4 (1996): 198-211.

Schwendemann, Heinrich. "German-Soviet economic relations at the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact, 1939-1941." Cahiers du Monde Russe 36.1 (1995): 161-178. doi:10.3406/cmr.1995.2425