Free Paper on Desire in Philosophy: Enhancing Cognition & Action Dispositions

Introduction

Desire in philosophy refers to a particular state of mind. In the process of enhancing cognition concerning desire, an individual has to be familiar with the theories of desire as well as the existing varieties of desire (Smith). Possession of action dispositions inclines as the guiding principle of the conservative approach of desire in philosophy. Personality is established as the essential feature of desire, which constitutes a significant tendency to influence an individual's feelings in a particular manner (Smith). For instance, if a person displays a willingness of sex is because such individuals have dispositions of having sex and thus thinking positively about having sex. Consequently, a varied number of competitors appear to be available in the conservative theory, and each is established to provide an emphasis on something in different forms (Smith). The varied nature of the conventional approach also induces different natures of dispositions to action. Several philosophers have attempted to provide explanations to enhance understanding of the concept of desire in philosophy. This write-up, a remarkable display of the essence of and the purpose of desire enhances as well as how desire is wielded according to the following philosophers; Aristotle and Desire, Epictetus and Seneca and Desire, Epicurus and Desire, Baruch Spinoza and Desire, Immanuel Kant and Desire, and GWF Hegel and Desire.

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Aristotle and Desire

Aristotle provides an account of the concept of desire in his works correlated with ethical, biological, and psychological treatises. The results of Aristotle established to significant lack a systematic display of the idea of desire thus leading few commentators to incline focus on desire itself (Pearson 184). Consequently, the direction of the commentators ascertains to evaluate the role played by the aspects of passion in the philosophical works of Aristotle. The focus on the object of desire is presented in Pearson's book. In the book, the Aristotelian corpus appears to be scattered significantly (Pearson 184). Therefore, to evaluate the texts efficiently, Pearson ascertained to perform remarkable detective work in a wide range of texts. From the analysis of the texts, the result was established as Aristotle's compelling account of desire.

The book is divided into three parts, which establish to evaluate various features of the philosophy of desire as presented by Aristotle. Part one explicates the orexis, which refers to the general form of the word "desire," as suggested by Aristotle (Pearson 187). The second part inclines the productive examination of three types of orexis in various works of Aristotle, which include; boulesis, thumos, and epithumia. The first two parts' presentations and aim correlated with the ancient philosophical specialists establish effectively CITATION Pea \p 188 \l 1033 (Pearson 188). A third of the production inclines emphasis on contemporary philosophers. In the display of the contribution of Aristotle to the philosophy of desire, Pearson establishes to put Aristotle into dialogue with philosophers such as Thomas Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, and G.F Schuler CITATION Pea \p 192 \l 1033 (Pearson 192). Moreover, Pearson's composition ends with displaying Aristotle's moral philosophy concerning virtue and non-rational desire.

The first part commences the analysis of Aristotle's insinuations correlated with the philosophy of desire by displaying orexis's scope. In showing the content, Aristotle shows associates humans to move into action through the perception of the object of desire (Vakirtzis 75). Consequently, Pearson inclined a remarkable analysis of Aristotle's statement to evaluate human grasping's nature and how we grasp the object of desire. Pearson came into the conclusion that whatever is established to be held by human beings has to move the afflicted individuals into action. Thus the object of desire cannot be merely regarded as a particular state of affairs in which we accord our desires. For instance, an individual's thinking about taking a walk cannot translate into such action, but also such a person has to consider whether taking a walk will be pleasant (Vakirtzis 78). Pearson displayed an imperative argument in which he showed the fact of all desire's evaluative nature when we take a particular example of desire in Aristotle into the evaluation. Besides, the cognition attained from the analysis of the models of desire in Aristotle does not readily translate into action. Therefore, Pearson argued that an individual has to facilitate grasping the prospect of performing something pleasant to realize an effort. Moreover, an individual also is necessitated to propel an envisage of the benefits or pleasure to receive the appropriate manner to perform an action prompted by desire (Vakirtzis 79). From the analysis of Aristotle's works relating to desire, Pearson came with a conclusion divulging that all desire requires Phantasia, a phenomenon deemed to be controversial to the concept connected with the claim. Furthermore, some passages of De Anima displayed that perception alone is enough to propel the desire of something in a person. However, Aristotle has argued that individuals have to be in touch with the prospect correlated with the object of desire that cannot be attained by applying perception alone because displaying perception to be tied to the present (Vakirtzis 86). Thus, the concept of Phantasia divulges to be necessary for the desire to perpetrate effectively.

In the third chapter of the book, Pearson displays an analysis of the objects of desire, as presented in the works of Aristotle. Consequently, Aristotle inclines the idea of "real or apparent good" to Orexis (Helder). The perception of the meaning related to the term "good," as presented by Aristotle, is established as the determinant of the nature of Orexis's cognition. In the process of figuring out what was meant by Aristotle, Pearson pointed out two impeccable constraints. The first constraint displays animals and humans capable of grasping "good" since both can be subject to orexis as expressed by Aristotle (Helder). Therefore, the grasp of sound does not necessitate the inclination of belief or reason because animals cannot perpetuate both concepts. The second constraint divulges “good” related with orexis to be different with "good" connected with boules. Boulesis displayed as the orexis species and thus incapable of sharing precisely the same object (Helder). With the cognition of the two constraints, Pearson inclines “good” to be understood through the visualization of desire for pleasure (referred to as epithumia), willingness to retaliation (directed to as thumos) as well as desire as something we rationally grasp as good (Helder). Moreover, displaying the distinction of the narrow and broad conception of good establish to provides a practical overview of how animals can be said to perpetuate the desire for something as good. Furthermore, the orexis' concept achieves differentiation from the object of boulesis that pleasant also attains a consideration as also being useful.

In the second part, Pearson inclines analysis to the species of desire, as presented in the works of Aristotle. Consequently, Pearson's study begins with the concept of epithumia, which effectively relates our desire with what is considered pleasant (Helder). Pearson presents a claim relating Aristotle to use the idea of epithumia in two ways, which is narrowly and broadly. Aristotle utilizes the concept of epithumia narrowly to explicate various bodily pleasures attained through food, drinks, and sex. In presenting the narrow nature of epithumia as used by Aristotle, minimal controversial insinuations establish to emerge (Helder). Besides, Pearson displays Aristotle to utilize the concept of epithumia in a broader perspective to explicate desires, such as the ones attained through learning. Pearson shifts the analytical measures of willingness to evaluate the idea of thumos. In the explanations, Pearson rejects the concept relating thumos with the desire for kalon (meaning “noble” or “fine”). Pearson argues that thumos constitute a synonymous meaning with orge, displayed by Aristotle to refer to the desire for retaliation. In the final species of fascination, boulesis, which refers to the good's desire, Pearson inclines remarkable explanations concerning Aristotle's arguments (Helder). Many commentators have displayed to relate the concept of boulesis with eudaimonia, which refers to "flourishing" or "happiness." However, Pearson inclines eudaimonia as one of the pluralities associated with the “goods” we ascertain to desire.

In the explanations, Pearson points out Aristotle uses the terms orge and thumos interchangeably thus divulging the fact showing the two words are synonymous. However, there are passages in which the two terms evaluate not being similar, thus leading to interpretation (Pearson 198). For instance, in a few cases, Aristotle appears to describe orge to refer to thumoeides (thumos capacity) and thus inclining orge not similar to thumos but as an actualization of the concept of thumoeides. Aristotle appears to relate thumos to possess considerable capabilities in producing friendly feelings. However, Pearson contradicts Aristotle's arguments by implicating that retaliation cannot realize pleasant feelings (Pearson 198). However, Pearson's statements can be said to accrue problems from his inclination of the concept of thumos to refer to the desire for retaliation.

If we perceive thumos to constitute a similar meaning to the term orge, then the explications of Aristotle orge to correlate with thumoeides and thus implying thumos to be an actualization of the faculty of thumos (Pearson 198). To avoid the triviality evident in the explanations, Pearson insinuates that there is one more way of understanding the phrase that "x is in y." Consequently, Pearson points out Aristotle to refer that fear also attains inclusion in thumoeides. According to the arguments of Pearson, fear cannot be an actualization of thumoeides. Thus there must be another explanation to enhance an individual's understanding of the concept correlated with thumoeides (Pearson 199). If there is one more way of perceiving the phrase that "x is in y," then Aristotle establishes to set up a contrast in which different methodologies can be inclined to associate emotions with accruing inclusion in thumoeides (Pearson 199). Some emotions such as anger establish to be an actualization of thumoeides, whereas emotions such as fear deem to be in thumoeides.

Epictetus and Seneca and Desire

According to the ideas presented by Epictetus and Seneca, the considerable need for the study of both the sustainable manner and breviarium, which incline as the fundamental points related to the philosophy of desire established to be essential (Macgillivray). In the explanation presented in the two philosophers' works, learning is deemed to perpetrate in the first approach, and we attain reminding by the second occasion. Consequently, the insinuation ascertains to be dominant in the two works presented by Epictetus and Arrian, who was a brilliant student of Epictetus (Macgillivray).