Essay Sample on Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions': Criticisms and Clarifications

Introduction

In his Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR), Thomas Kuhn explained the way or path in which science progresses. Philosophers criticize his approach that science progresses in three stages, and likens his account to relativism. Several critics have claimed that his work reduces science to more of mob psychology rather than one that follows objective, rational criteria (Lenman, 2015). Kuhn, on the other hand, understood these criticisms as a misunderstanding and set out several criteria for theory choice to clear the misinterpretations of his account of the scientific revolution. He presented his defense in his "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice." This paper addresses concerns regarding Kuhn's criteria of theory choice, Longino's view of social science and theory choice, and Feyerabend's view of theory choice.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

Save 25%

To start with, we explain Kuhn's account of the criteria for theory choice. He selected five criteria on which to base the choice of theory. According to him, accuracy, simplicity, consistency, broad scope, and fruitfulness form the standard constraints that a scientific theory must meet if it has to be selected as a good theory. The first criterion, accuracy, requires that a theory must be adequate in itself such that conclusions or consequences deduced from the theory must agree with the experiments and observations involved in the process of research (Morreau, 2015). Secondly, the simplicity criterion uncovers that a good scientific theory should contain the simplest explanation. It must bring together and order the elements within it, such that if not for the theory, such phenomena would appear isolated and unorganized. The theory should easily connect the different concepts within it in a simple manner that makes the connection traceable (Morreau, 2015). In other words, the criterion coincides with Occam's razor phrase that "The simplest solution is most likely the right one."

The third condition is that of consistency. Kuhn argued that whatever arguments a scientific theory contains, they must agree (internal consistency) and that the theory must be in line with the other theories that have been accepted and cover phenomena related to the theory in question. Further, Kuhn concluded that a good scientific theory should have a broad scope by explaining issues outside its scope. In other words, good theory entails assertions, explanations, sub-theories, laws, and observations that extend beyond the confines of the theory in which they are contained (Morreau, 2015). Lastly, Kuhn noted that if a theory uncovers new grounds for experimentation and discovery of new relationships among phenomena, then such theory is accepted as a good scientific theory.

Secondly, Kuhn thinks his work is a matter of objective and subjective factors. Still, not a case of anything goes mob psychology because, according to him, the criteria are relative to individual scientists. He argues that scientists may use the same sets of criteria to evaluate the adequacy of theory but still reach different conclusions (Morreau, 2015). The scientist's preference of theory A to B can happen because the scientists may prefer one criterion to another based on its value or the scientist's selfish reasons. Therefore, according to Kuhn, there is objectivity in that there are standard criteria of evaluation, but the conclusions and choice of theories may vary depending on scientists' preference (subjectivity).

In her Science as Social Knowledge, Helen Longino appeals to the use of social values as a way of securing objectivity by presenting the role of social values in scientific research. Her 'Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry' in her text exposes that rules on which scientific theories are based are constructed from social values and norms, which have been set according to the goals of scientific investigation. According to Longino (1990), individuals perceive criteria such as scope, consistency, and truth differently, amounting to different decisions on the adequacy of theories. Longino (1990) calls for freedom of scientific inspection from personal or individual (subjective) influence, insisting that at times, scientific scrutiny should be set free from what the society, culture, and individuals perceive as sound reasoning. However, she concludes that constitutive (scientific values and rules) and contextual (social) values and norms must interact to bring the best scientific research into practice.

Longino's account of the social aspect can successfully secure the objectivity of scientific inquiry rather than mob psychology. Her expression of the interaction of social and cultural values (contextual values) with constitutive guidelines is a tool aimed at wiping out the subjective judgment of what scientific method is good or bad (Longino, 1990). A combination of social values such as truth, morality, and ethics with scientific criteria of scope, simplicity, accuracy, and fruitfulness, can result in the most comprehensive scientific theories, hence addressing the necessity of impartiality. With social norms and scientific values incorporated, there will be no room for subjective judgment in choosing the best scientific methods.

Secondly, Longino (1990) believes that the interaction of contextual values and the content of science is critical for logical, moral, and cognitive inquiry in the process of the scientific probe. The ability to complement each of these sets of values with the other is a step towards the achievement of an impartial approach to the concept of scientific quest (Laudan & Laudan, 2016). The two sets of values are integral parts of each other as scientific autonomy fails to propel scientific inquiry by itself, as Longino (1990) explains. Besides, if we mix social values with scientific research, scientists will be at liberty to explain the relationship between science and values because they will because the feeling that their moral integrity is being questioned will be inexistent.

Further, integrating social values with scientific principles guides scientific research that society should adopt. The government, for instance, assesses the scientific projects to fund by evaluating its socio-economic values and benefits to the community (Longino, 1990). Individual opinions do not guide the process of such choices as the government and institutions seek to maximize the welfare of the whole society. Therefore, Longino's idea of integrating social values with constitutive values might avoid theory choice being a matter of mob psychology.

Paul Feyerabend argues against Kuhn's criteria of theory choice by categorically asserting that the presence of such criteria constrains the work of scientists hence hindering scientific progress (Treiblmaier et al., 2018). In his Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, he argues against objectivity by explaining that if methodological rules are set to guide scientists, the strength and growth of science will reduce swiftly. He proposes a subjective or anarchic approach to scientific quest since he believes that will create room for scientific freedom and continuity in scientific developments. He specifically criticizes the consistency criterion, expressing that if new scientific theories aligned with other theories, it would mean that such new theories give credit to the already existent theories (Treiblmaier et al., 2018). According to him, science does not progress without freedom and diversity of thought. Feyerabend also opposes the falsification rule, which requires that a theory that does not agree with familiar facts should be dismissed. He supports that theory that conforms to all the known facts is not exciting and does not present a mark of scientific progress (Treiblmaier et al., 2018).

If Feyerabend's view of theory choice were anything to go by, it would imply that anything qualifies for selection as a scientific theory, including non-scientific stories and myths. From how Feyerabend expresses it, accepting non-scientific works as scientific theories will mean scientific progress (Treiblmaier et al., 2018). On the contrary, if we take everything as a scientific theory without standards of evaluation, then the scientific research will bear no meaning in the face of scientific discovery and progress. Furthermore, it will render philosophy worthless because Feyerabend's approach leaves no role for philosophy in regulating science.

Lastly, I think Kuhn and Longino's views that theory choice should have objectivity criteria are the most accurate compared to Feyerabend's view that no scientific methodology should guide scientific theory. Feyerabend's argument has a partial sense that without criteria of theory selection, anyone will be at liberty to discover and design his or her theory. However, everything good must be accompanied by a restraining rule that allows the choice of only the best out of the many available options. Kuhn was, therefore, right to suggest several criteria for which adequacy of a scientific theory would be evaluated before such theory is accepted and adopted.

Unlike Feyerabend's advocated scientific anarchism, Kuhn and Longino's objectivity of scientific quest allows for the achievement of high quality, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate scientific theories that present the real world of science. Besides, theories are chosen for use in society, and there is no order in a society ran without rules. Therefore, institutions use scientific and social criteria to determine which scientific projects in which they should invest. Without such criteria, it would be difficult to accept, adopt, or fund scientific programs.

References

Laudan, L., & Laudan, R. (2016). The re-emergence of hyphenated history-and-philosophy-of-science and the testing of theories of scientific change. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 59, 74-77. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0039368116300267

Lenman, J. (2015). Moral Inquiry and Mob Psychology. In The Palgrave Handbook of Philosophical Methods (pp. 637-651). Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_26

Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton University Press.Morreau, M. (2015). Theory choice and social choice: Kuhn vindicated. Mind, 124 (493), 239-262. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273302408_Theory_Choice_and_Social_Choice_Kuhn_Vindicated

Treiblmaier, H., Burton-Jones, A., Gregor, S., Hirschheim, R., Myers, M., & Stafford, T. (2018). Against Method and Anything Goes? A Critical Discussion Based on the Strange Ideas from Paul Feyerabend on whether Epistemological Anarchy Can Benefit IS Research. https://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2018/panel/Presentations/2/