Essay Example on Stop and Frisk: Legal Exercise or Civil Rights Abuse?

Introduction

According to Mock, stop and frisk is a legal exercise of provisionally detaining, inquiring, and sometimes searching civilians on the street for different criminal offenses, including possession of illegal weapons (1). Section 140.50 of the state criminal procedure law contains the rules followed by police officers while performing the stop and frisk activities. New York provides the best example of cities in the United States that dominantly practice this program (Fradella and White 45). However, the execution of this policy faces multiple criticisms from numerous Americans despite its benefits, such as increasing safety and promoting security across the state of New York (Kiely 1). This paper provides a comprehensive description of the Terry v. Ohio case and how the New York City Police Department (NYPD) unconstitutionally executed the stop and frisk model. Also, the paper discusses why this execution was unconstitutional through a detailed review of related cases alongside arguing for the stop and frisk model by exploring its benefits.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

Save 25%

Case Description

According to Rudovsky and Rosenthal, Terry v. Ohio was a landmark ruling made on issued on June 10, 1968, by the U.S Supreme Court (118). The Supreme Court held that the decision of police officers to enact the stop and frisk policy on the street, without any probable cause to convict them, does not amount to the violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizure as outlined in the Fourth Amendment of the U.S constitution. However, the police officer in question must have a realistic suspicion that the suspected committed, is executing, or is planning and just about to commit an offense. Also, the police officer must have a rational belief that the suspect is an armed individual who presents a considerable danger to others. The landmark case began after the decision undertaken by Martin McFadden, who worked as a police detective in Cleveland (Goel, Rao, and Shroff 365), to conduct a search aimed at preventing a potential armed robbery.

Rudovsky and Rosenthal averred that the McFadden conducted an orchestrated search on three different men he suspected and believed that they were preparing to rob a store on October 31, 1963 (119). The detective found two of the suspects, Richard Chilton and John Terry, in possession of pistols. As a result, the court tried and convicted Chilton and Terry for being in possession and carrying concealed weapons. The two suspects, in turn, appealed the case claiming that the detective discovered the evidence used by the court to convict them during an illegal search (Kiely 1). However, the Supreme Court, in the state of Ohio, affirmed their conviction. The case became controversial to the extent that one of the convicts, Terry, forwarded it to the United States Supreme Court in 1967 (Fradella and White 47). Early Warren, the former United States Chief Justice, detailed the majority opinion after a long battle in court. The opinion held that McFadden had the legal right and authority to exercise the stop and frisk exercise because he saw the three suspects engaging in doubtful activities that required a police officer to conduct an immediate inquiry (NYCBA 1). Also, the Supreme Court held that stopping people for short inquiry and executing a pat-down search constituted a constitutional search as outlined in the Fourth Amendment.

Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that conducting stop and frisk programs did not breach the legal prohibition of implementing searches and seizures that are unreasonable (Kiely 1). The decision of the court also stopped short of establishing a distinct group of police actions that did not have to meet the legal standard of probable cause. The analysis made by the court on whether the police detective violated the constitutional right and protection of Terry against unreasonable searches and seizures focused on two different issues. First, the analysis sought to determine whether the actions of McFadden were logical at the beginning of the search and, secondly, whether they consistently remained reasonable concerning the conditions that led to the justification of the initial search (Rudovsky & Rosenthal 128). The Supreme Court judges also viewed the purpose of the stop and frisk policy as a strategy towards detecting concealed weapons on the suspect, which represented an immediate threat to the safety of the detective and others, rather than gathering evidence of the occurrence of the suspected crime.

Moreover, the Supreme Court declined the argument that conducting a pat-down is a typical form of petty indignity for the suspect subjected to the search process (Goel et al. 367). The court also recognized the potential adverse effect that the execution of this policy might have on police-community relationship. The court maintained its initial ruling insisting that police officers had the authority to search for weapons in case they suspect that an individual has them due to the danger that the suspect poses to the safety of others (Fallon 321). However, Justice William Douglas, who was the only dissenter in the case, argued that the Supreme Court offered the police officers with more legal authority to execute searches and seizures. Justice Douglas believed that such right was contrary to the need of judges to provide court orders that allow officers to conduct searches or seizures. The dissenting judge also contended that the court should be using the probable cause standard threshold to manage all forms of searches conducted by police officers (Rudovsky & Rosenthal 140). Lastly, Justice Douglas demonstrated his disbelieve in the implications that outwardly provided more authority and power to police officers at the expense of promoting the liberty of Americans.

How NYPD Implemented the Stop and Frisk Model and Why it is Unconstitutional

According to Goldstein, how NYPD implements the stop and frisk policy is a significant subject of discussion in contemporary legal jurisdictions (1). Numerous researchers and law specialists continue to highlight and criticize how NYPD unconstitutionally implemented the stop and risk model. Shira Scheindlin, a former United States federal judge, also ruled against the stop and frisk policy, emphasizing that the tactics employed by NYPD while implementing it infringed on the legal rights of minority groups in New York City (Kiely 1). Scheindlin insisted that NYPD resorted to a patriarchal approach, sophisticated racial profiling, that mainly targets minority communities while delivering her verdict in Floyd v. the City of New York. As a result, this approach inspires police officers in the city to routinely stop Hispanics and blacks while avoiding whites. Scheindlin concluded that New York City was liable for violating the rights of the plaintiff as provided by the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (Goldstein 1). Hence, NYPD conducted stops and freaks that were unconstitutional and discriminative by indicting minority groups at the benefit of the whites.

Mock ascertained that bias-based profiling takes place when police officers target a predetermined group of individuals due to different demographic attributes without establishing the existence of reasonable suspicion of engaging in criminal activities (1). Some of the qualities that NYPD relied on while conducting their stop and frisks included ethnicity, race, and gender. The data collected by Scheindlin highlights the flaws of this patriarchal system. For instance, the number of stops made by NYPD from 2004 to 2012 amounted to 4.4 million, with only 6% of the individuals stopped convicted for different crimes (Goel et al. 370). However, 88% of these stops did not culminate in any form of law enforcement decision. Also, 83% of the suspects stopped were either Hispanic or black as opposed to 10% whites (Levey 1). These findings made showed that police officers often executed frisks for specific weapons and searched the pockets of the suspects for contrabands, such as drugs without any form of legal justifications (Mock 1). Among those pursued, whites were more likely to have a weapon or contraband as opposed to their black and Hispanic counterparts.

As a result, Floyd v. the City of New York remains a landmark ruling against the decision of New York City through its police unit to enact illegal stop and frisk legislations while reiterating the contention for bias-based policing as well as incidents of racial profiling (Fallon 323). Another case that extended the Terry doctrine was Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada. The Supreme Court held that a state law demanding all suspects to identify themselves during a stop and frisk exercise does not substantially infringe their rights as provided in the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments. The Fourth Amendments prohibit police officers from conducting all forms of unfair searches and seizures, while the Fifth Amendment gives suspects of criminal offenses the privilege against all sorts of self-incrimination (Fradella and White 50). However, a comprehensive analysis of the ruling made in the above case shows that the issue of having suspects identify themselves by names is discriminative. Identifying oneself by name is an act that could amount to self-incrimination, especially if suspects believe that the information they provide would act against them.

Moreover, the controversy of the ruling made by the court Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada case also lies in its failure to legalize the issue of having suspects reveal their names across all the states (Levey 1). The Supreme Court decided to leave the responsibility of passing such a vital law to the individual states. Therefore, the policy may remain discriminative, especially if police officers require suspects to identify themselves by names in one city as opposed to the rest, especially when traveling. Currently, only 24 states enacted self-identification laws. In another landmark ruling, Rodriguez v. the United States, the Supreme Court held that any time of police stop that exceeds the time required to handle the issue that warranted the stop and frisk decision also violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizure (Frogge 1). Comparative studies established that most of the NYPD police officers violate this constitutional protection, particularly when manning traffics. In Rodriguez v. the United States, the police officer violated the right of the plaintiff by taking longer to complete his Terry Stop and then allowed a dog to sniff-search him (Fallon 324). The Supreme Court ruled that conducting the sniff search was a direct violation of the Fourth Amendment as it was extended past the time reasonably needed to complete the Terry Stop.

Pros and Cons of the Stop and Frisk Policy

The stop and frisk approach has different advantages and disadvantages. First, the stop and frisk program it as a proactive response, which is highly effective for reducing crimes when implemented appropriately. For instance, effective implementation of the program played a vital role in reducing crime in New York City from 1999 to 2009 to a value below the national average (NYCBA 13). Secondly, the program helps the state to promote the safety and security of its people by shifting from reacting to crime to ensuring that police are more proactive by dealing with every crime in the community (Frogge 1). Lastly, many criminals in the states implementing the stop and frisk program fear the associated impacts of conviction for possessing weapons and contrabands and in turn, stop from participating in illegal activities (Fallon 327). However, the stop and frisk program has far-reaching di...