Crash at Blue Grass Airport: One Survivor of 50 Passengers - Research Paper

Introduction

In August 2006, a routine commuter flight to Atlanta failed to become airborne during departure at the Blue Grass Airport in Lexington, Kentucky ('Aviation Accident Report AAR-07-05,' n.d.). The flight taxied towards the end of the runway, lifted, and smashed onto trees and a fence. Later, the plane broke apart and slid to a field where it was consumed with flames. The jet was destroyed, but police officers managed to find a survivor who was alive but poorly injured. Of all the 50 persons on board, 49 people lost their lives ('Aviation Accident Report AAR-07-05,' n.d.). Eventually, discoveries showed that the plane had taken off on the wrong runway, a mistake that no one even the NTSB (National Transport Safety Board) could explain. Therefore, this paper analyzes the events that led to the crash of the Comair 5191 flight, probable cause, role of the crew and management, and the recommendations and measures to avert such crashes in the future.

Timeline of the Accident

The flight crew attendants checked in at about 0515 hours (Nelson, 2008). The members casually conversed with each other, and they collected the paperwork for the release of the flight. The information included information pertinent to weather, flight safety, flight pan, and tail number. During the preflight and flight activities, the air traffic control tower had one controller concerned with flight positions. The voice recorded of the cockpit began at 0536 hours when the flight crews were conducting preflight operations (Nelson, 2008). The pilots were informed severally that they were supposed to use the runway 22. The pilot repeated the commands hence acknowledging the arrival of the information. However, the pilot took over runway 26, where the flight encountered an accident.

Causes of the Accident

The NTSB resoluted that the plausible trigger of the accident was the fact that the flight crewmembers failed to use the right indications and aids. Thus, they could not identify the location of the plane during the taxi process. Besides, they failed to counter-check to verify that the airplane was using the assigned runway. The non-essential chat of the flight members during taxi may have contributed to the loss of position awareness. Another contributing factor was the existence of one air traffic controller authorized by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Importantly, FAA failed to require all the runway crossings to be endorsed by specific air traffic control clearance. All these factors may have been probable causes for the accident.

The Role of the Crew in the Accident

The flight crew, which consists of the pilots, had a role to play in contributing to the accident. The team failed to select the correct runway that they would use for takeoff. Such a mistake, as Hauser and Urbina (2006) indicated, cannot be excused. After the accident, inspections were conducted to try to enable investigators to understand why the pilots chose to move the flight to the wrong runway. The indications showed that the track contained markings and signs that told the pilots that they were taxiing in the wrong direction. From this analysis, one can see that pilot error was one of the factors that contributed to the accident.

Consequently, Air Traffic Control (ATC) played a part in contributing to the accident. The controllers failed to identify the mistake made by the crewmembers of taxiing to the wrong runway. The FAA did not provide the ATCs with a second controller, as stipulated in its procedures. A second controller, as Hauser and Urbina (2006) indicated, may have enabled controllers to fulfill their duty of scanning runways for safety purposes as designated in the air traffic control.

Role of the Management in the Accident

The airport management was also at fault. Importantly, the runways lacked adequate signage and barriers that should have helped the crew to taxi to the right track. Considering that the airport design had changed, signage and barricades would have been effective in ensuring that the crew taxi to the correct runway. The airport charts used by the flight crew did not depict the airfield as it was accurately including the taxiways. As such, the pilot error resulted where they used the wrong runway hence contributing to the accident.

Further, manufacturers of the aircraft contributed to the increased hazardous effects of the accident. Most of the people who succumbed from the crash died due to an explosion. It was unclear whether the passengers aboard the plane survived the crash but died due to the fire that resulted. The manufacturers ought to have designed the aircraft in a way that allows survivors to evacuate quickly in the event of crash hence preventing extreme deaths.

Lessons Learned From the Accident

The first lesson learned from the crash is that an airplane that is about to cross-intervene the runways for it to taxi to the exit runway should have clearance by the ATC ('Lessons Learned,' n.d.). The authorization constitutes the identification of all the tracks that could be crossed and the selection of the identification of the departure runway. In the accident in question, the taxi clearances provided approval to taxi to a particular destination at the airport. However, it failed to provide the required information that specific runways would be crossed when a flight is en route to the final taxi destination before takeoff.

The second lesson was that the flight crews should confirm that a plane is heading to the right runway before takeoff commences. Before taxiing, the flight crew aligned their indicators to show the direction the flight would taxi into. The team should have thus realized that the plane was heading towards the wrong direction ('Lessons Learned,' n.d.). Thirdly, visual monitoring of a flight as it takeoffs and lands could be a form of protection aimed at reducing the risk of navigation errors. When the accident happened, the air traffic controller has only one controller performing several duties. Although controllers do not monitor takeoffs and landings consistently, the NTSB argued that if the controller observed the traffic keenly, the staff would have noticed that the flight is heading to the wrong runway; hence the accident might have been prevented.

Fourthly, pilots should refrain from conversations that are not duty-related during takeoff, takeoff preparation, landing, or landing preparations. The conversations that the pilots had during takeoff may have led to their lack of awareness of the exact position of the plan during the takeoff process. If the crew maintained proper discipline at the cockpit, they would have been aware that they were heading to the wrong runway, and the accident would have subsequently been prevented. From this, one can see some four crucial lessons learned from the misfortune of the Comair 5191 flight.

Recommendations and Measures

The first recommendation undertaken by the NTSB after the plane crash was the need for all the crew members on a flight to positive confirms and crosscheck the location of a plane at the departure runway before takeoff. If the recommendation were in place before the accident, the crew members would have known that they were on the wrong track (Ortiz et al., 2006). Takeoff would have been avoided and the entire accident as well. Although similar solutions were recommended prior, the NTSB mandated the FAA to move beyond the provision of non-compulsory information to become more aggressive in implementing this measure. Thus, the FAA was required to enact the rules and regulations as part of a mandatory routine for all crewmembers and pilots.

Secondly, the NTSB claimed that the FAA should have the mandate of regulating air activities and encouraging passenger traffic. Their role is to ensure that all flights are safe. From this, one can see the need for the FAA to have two control towers to monitor the exact location and movement of a flight (Ortiz et al., 2006). The measure will help to ensure that they inform the crewmembers when they notice that a plane is en route to the wrong direction. NTSB also discovered that airlines had inconsistent rules on runway lighting. In this case, the pilots did not notice any anomalies when the lights on the runway were off when the right track is often well lit. The NTSB proposed that all crewmembers should consult with the people at the controller towers when they notice that there is inadequate lighting on the runway (Ortiz et al., 2006). The board also proposed that airports should always maintain visibility since it allows the crew to identify the runway surface and retain control of the direction.

Conclusion

The crash of the Comair 5191 would have been prevented considering that it occurred after crewmembers taxied the plane on the wrong runway., other anomalies that contributed to the crash was that the track they used was not well lit. When taking off, the flight crashed on a fence, and 49 of the 50 passengers aboard lost their lives. Various lessons were learned from the crash that included the need for having a second air controller tower to monitor the movement of a flight and the need for crewmembers to be keen and avoid unnecessary conversations during takeoffs and landings. The conclusion derived from the analysis is that the crash would have been prevented if specific measures such as mandatory lighting in the runways and stricter rules existed.

References

Aviation Accident Report AAR-07-05. (n.d.). Www.Ntsb.Gov. https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/AAR0705.aspx

Hauser, C., & Urbina, I. (2006). 49 Killed in Airplane Crash in Kentucky. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/27/us/27cnd-crash.html

Lessons Learned. (n.d.). Lessonslearned.Faa.Gov. https://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=54&LLTypeID=12

Nelson, S. P. (2008). A stamp analysis of the LEX Comair 5191 accident. Lund University Sweden. http://sunnyday.mit.edu/papers/nelson-thesis.pdf

Ortiz, B., Warren, J., & Blackford, L. (2006). NTSB makes safety recommendations. Kentucky; Lexington Herald Leader. https://www.kentucky.com/news/special-reports/crash-of-comair-flight-5191/article43965675.html