Annotated Bibliography on Mexican Drug Cartels: Thriving Despite Security Measures

Introduction

Over the years, Mexican drug cartels headed by different drug lords had been thriving despite the efforts by security forces to mitigate the trade. These Mexican cartels include Beltran Leyva, La Familia Michoacana, and the Sinaloa Cartel (Beittel 14-15). Mexico has been an ideal cradle land for the drug trade. This attractiveness results from, not only the high demand for Cannabis Sativa and opium poppy by the United States but also as a result of its (Mexico's) ideal location as a transit point for drugs originating from the Western Hemisphere as it is the connection between North America, Central America, and the Caribbean (Beittel 1). This paper summarizes content from seven different articles detailing the history of the formation and development of the Mexican drug cartels and the resultant drug wars. The chosen articles explain the efforts of the Mexican government, in collaboration with other states, to control the use and distribution of illicit drugs.

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"Mexican Cartels: A Century of Defying U.S. Drug Policy"

The article titled "Mexican Cartels: A Century of Defying U.S. Drug Policy" written by Ioan Grillo documents the history of the illegal drug trade in Mexico. According to Grillo, the drug traffickers of Mexico's Sinaloa state are revered and admired to the extent of being referred to as the brave ones (254). The restriction of the growth and smuggle of opium poppies by the Harrisons Narcotics Tax Act of 1914 did not deter the Sinaloans from engaging in the trade. It is from the inception of this Act that the Sinaloans began taking advantage of the rising U.S black market to sell opium (Grillo 254).

In the late 19th Century, Chinese migrants arrived in Sinaloa for the construction of railroads as well as working in the mines. Eventually, the descendants of these migrants became the first individuals to engage in opium smuggling. Evidence to this is detailed in a U.S investigation of 1916, as well as police records, where convicts had Spanish Christian names and Chinese surnames (Grillo 254). The racial violence of the 1930s saw to it that Mexican gangsters took over the opium business from their Chinese counterparts (Grillo 255). Organized crime figures funded anti-migrant groups enabling their (migrants) capture and exportation out of Sinaloa and Mexico. Otherwise, the Chinese rivals were murdered in cold blood (Grillo 255).

Further, Grillo indicates that a significant increase in opium production marked the 1940s, allegedly with the aid of the U.S government (255). This assertion is backed by the fact that the U.S needed morphine for the treatment of its bleeding troops. These soldiers were, at the time, fighting the Germans and the Japanese. As such, America sourced for opium from the Mexicans since the traditional supplier, Turkey, had been compromised by the German U-Boats (Grillo 255). Despite the director of the U.S Federal Bureau of Narcotics' vehement refutation to these assertions, the opium profits channeled into Mexican borders was a dependable source of income for its mountainous villages. The poor communities of these regions, including Santiago, had every reason to celebrate the growth and production of opium since this was regarded as the quickest route out of poverty (Grillo 255).

Acording to Grillo, the 1906s and 1970s saw an explosion of the consumption of drugs in America. The demand for marijuana hit new highs prompting dealers to explore the Rio Grande in search of the drug since Sinaloa could hardly meet this demand (256). Cocaine cartels such as Guadalajara Cartel of Mexico and Medellin Cartel of Columbia began to gain popularity (Grillo 256). Eventually, Mexican traffickers became more aggressive and intent on taking over the Colombians' businesses. Colombians yielded to pressure from the Mexicans as well as the U.S law enforcement's efforts to block the drug trafficking route from Colombia to Florida through the Caribbean Sea. The latter party forced the Colombians to shift most of their products to Mexico for trafficking, inherently allowing Mexicans to dominate their (Colombians) profits. Consequently, the Mexican billionaire cartels were birthed.

Grillo documents that drug wars in Mexico began with President Calderon's ascent into power. He launched a national offensive against drug traffickers resulted in the skyrocketing of homicides (Grillo 258). The explosion of violence is attributed to the large amount of money that is channeled to the cartels. In turn, this money is used to buy guns, corrupt politicians and police, and hire assassins. Further, the power shift from one-party rule to a multi-party system contributed to the unprecedented explosions (Grillo 259). The National Action Party became interested in waging war with drug cartels, unlike the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which turned a nearly deaf ear to cartels.

Further, Grillo points out that the drug wars in Mexico may have been fuelled by the rise in the number of soldiers, police officers, and marines who defected from serving the nation to joining leadership positions in cartels (259). The militarization of conflict was fostered by cartels such as the Zetas, which was headed by Miguel Angel Trevino Morales. This organization recruited former comrades and police officers who were trained to become an ultraviolent paramilitary force (Grillo 259). As the war on drug cartels and their leaders intensified, individuals retaliated, and this resulted in heightened levels of violence. Replacement cartel leaders became more violent than their predecessors to prove their strength and invincibility. Resultantly, instead of the citizens appreciating the efforts by the offensive to combat drug trafficking, they (citizens) feared for their lives owing to the intensity of the gun battles between cartel shooters and security forces (Grillo 261). Eventually, Calderon's initiative was a failure since it neither negatively impacted the cartels' ability to traffic drugs nor brought a sense of security to the Mexicans.

"Cocaine Incorporated"

The article "Cocaine Incorporated" by Patrick Radden Keefe indicates that Sinaloa is well known for the production and exportation of marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin (1). Keefe writes that the Sinaloa cartel can buy a kilo of cocaine from Peru or Colombia for around $2000 (1). In Mexico, the Sinaloa cartel can sell the kilo at more than $10000. When it crosses into the U.S territory, the same kilo retails at $30000 (Keefe 1). Keefe writes that Sinaloa is a crucial player in the global black market (12). He postulates that the Sinaloa has a market share of 40-60% of all the gross revenue made by the Mexican cartels from the importation of drugs into the U.S. Further, Keefe writes that the Sinaloa cartel runs a global operation (2). Its complexity enabled the cartel to not only survive the recession but also contributed to its success over the years. The history of this cartel is incomplete without the mention of its C.E.O Joaquin Guzman' commonly known as Chapo (Keefe 2). Chapo's association with the airplane pilot Miguel Angel Martinez contributed to Sinaloa's success. Martinez acted as an air traffic controller who guided cocaine flights from South America to Mexico where they landed on secret runways (Keefe 3). By 1990, Keefe writes that Chapo's organization progressed from controlling one smuggling route to moving three tones of cocaine each month over the border and through to Los Angeles (4). The source of capital for the illegal cocaine business is, according to Keefe, marijuana (4).

Additionally, Keefe indicates that the methamphetamine trade in Sinaloa has been booming for the longest time (5). It was produced as cheaply in Sinaloa as it was easily smuggled across the U.S borders. When the demand for methamphetamine in the U.S grew, the Sinaloa cartel commissioned the construction of super labs that were capable of churning considerable methamphetamine amounts meant for commercial consumption (Keefe 5). Today, cocaine and heroin are expensive, not because of the high cost of production, but since all the individuals in the chain of distribution must be compensated (Keefe 6). Keefe documents that the Mexican cartels have, from time immemorial, had to dole out bribes to keep law enforcers at bay (7). The beneficiaries of these kickbacks include federal police, prosecutors, and mayors, among others (Keefe 8). The American guards at the U.S borders do little to help the situation since they wave on cocaine-loaded cars through their checkpoints for a few thousand dollars (Keefe 8).

"The New Cocaine Cowboys- How to Defeat Mexico's Drug Cartels"

Robert Bonner's "The New Cocaine Cowboys- How to Defeat Mexico's Drug Cartels" documents the history of the rise to power by the Mexican drug cartels. In the article, Bonner states that the last two decades have seen the cartels' acquisition of unprecedented power (36). This invincibility, according to Bonner, is associated with weak law enforcement institutions that are unable to counter the vice, preexisting corruption, and the demand for illegal drugs in the U.S (36). Bonner notes that the unlawful trafficking of Marijuana across the Mexican border was in existence before the 1980s (36). Notably, before 1984, very little or no cocaine was illegally traded through Mexico and into America. However, when the U.S stopped the direct flow of cocaine into the Bahamas and Southern Florida, the association between the Colombian cartels and significant Mexican trafficking organizations was cultivated (Bonner 36). According to Bonner, the Mexicans agreed to smuggle Colombian cocaine into the U.S at a fee of $1000 per kilogram of cocaine (36).

Bonner further indicates that the Mexican-Colombian relationship saw to it that Colombian propeller planes began landing in remote airstrips in Northern Mexico. Aboard these were 600-800 kilograms of cocaine per flight (37). Resultantly, major Mexican trafficking organizations added much to their revenues (Bonner 37). According to Bonner, the Mexican cartels, at that time, were merely conduit pipes for the transportation of drugs from Colombia (37). However, when in the 1990s, the Colombian cartels began paying the Mexicans in terms of powder cocaine; the latter began forming distribution networks in Mexico and the U. S (Bonner 37). Consequently, the Colombian influence was eclipsed. According to Bonner, it has taken decades for the Mexican drug cartels to evolve into multinational criminal groups that are headquartered in Mexico (37). These criminal groups now have distribution channels in over 200 cities in America, Guatemala, and other North American nations (Bonner 37).

Bonner mentions Calderon's initiative to eradicate the illegal drug trade in Mexico (40). Despite his efforts, there became an increase in drug-related homicides (Bonner 40). By 2009, Bonner's article indicates that a section of people thought that Mexico was becoming a failed state owing to the increase in drug-related criminal activities (40). However, Bonner opines that the opposite is exact: that these homicides signify progress (41). Bonner writes that the government has managed to destabilize drug cartels hence they (cartels) are turning against each other. Bonner suggests that Mexico's fight against drugs can be informed by Colombia's approach to ending the drug trade (42). According to Bonner, Mexico must consider waging a multinational war against drug trafficking (42). Additionally, Mexico's goal must be clear; that is, to destroy large Mexican cartels (Bonner 42). It is achievable, according to Bonner, through the divide-and-conquer strategy (42).

"Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations"

June Beittel's "Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations" focuses on the formation of various drug cartels fo...