Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Paper Example

Introduction

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AQIM is a jihadist militant group designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO), whose principal operations are in the Sahel and Sahara. The provenance of the group usually traced back to the 1990s civil war in Algeria, and in the last ten years pledged allegiance with the al-Qaeda having regional ambitions. AQIM poses international terror threat in the West and North Africa; however, according to the US security officials, the terror group is unlikely to conduct its operations in the Europe and United States. There have been concerns about the increasing number of militants crossing from the West and North Africa into Iraq and Syria who join the international terror group.

Therefore, the following is a report to identify and evaluate al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, focusing on various elements of the organization which includes the history, ideology, objectives, geographical areas of operation, and the impact on the West. These elements form the basis of assessment of the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

History

The origin of AQIM usually traced back to the Islamist guerilla movement, the Armed Islamic Group. The group is known to violently oppose the then Algeria secular leadership in the year 1990s (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2015). In the year 1992, the Algeria military with the backing of the French Army canceled the parliamentary elections amid increasing fears the Islamic Salvation Front poised to emerge victoriously. The impact of election cancellation by Algeria's French-backed army led to the insurrection of the Armed Islamic Group. In the year 1998, the Armed Islamic Group became concerned about their backward tactics, for instance, beheading rebels, as it alienated them from the citizens. Hence, their group resulted in breaking away, leading to the formation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Consequently, the Armed Islamic Group became dysfunctional, hence delisted by the US as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in the year 2010 (Grobbelaar & Solomon, 2015).

The support and rapid growth of GSPC were facilitated with their newly found ideology of rebellion without beheading civilians. However, in the early 2000s, a counterterrorism campaign by the government was broken through the amnesty program. Consequently, the group became an al-Qaeda affiliate with the view of staging high-profile terror attacks, increase recruitment, and fundraising among other joint operations. The union of GSPC and al-Qaeda was announced on September 11, 2006, by an al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later on, in January 2007, there was the rebranding of GSPC back to AQIM. The rebranding of the group broadened its aspirations, for instance, targeting not only Algeria but also the West. Moreover, rebranding enhanced the legitimacy of the group which resulted in increased recruitment of militants (Laub & Masters, 2015). Furthermore, the al-Qaeda were able to polish its credentials internationally by accessing a region close to Europe geographically.

Ideology and Beliefs

The philosophical doctrine behind AQIM's operations includes staging assassinations, guerilla-style ambushes, and suicide bombings of government, military, and civilians. Moreover, the group usually conducts kidnapping and execution of tourists, multinational corporations' employees, aid workers, and diplomats among other target groups. According to the US State Department, the group manages to raise funds through a tactic described as Kidnap for Ransom (KFR), and trafficking of persons, firearms, and cigarettes. Moreover, the philosophy of kidnapping facilitates prisoner exchanges and discouraging foreign investment in the region (Laub & Masters, 2015). According to the US Treasury, Kidnapping for Ransom is considered as the vital source of finance for the terrorists today. AQIM also capitalizes on other criminal acts such as smuggling to finance their operations, for instance, smuggling narcotics through providing a vital way station between the suppliers and the market, via the Sahel.

Moreover, AQIM works to influence their audience of choice psychologically to win the vital support required concerning militants and financial support. For instance, Droukdel, one of the vital leadership figure, lures the recruits by psychologically manipulating them to join forces against 'oppressors' bringing division into the Muslim lands. Thereby, being able to rescue their country from the shackles of those betraying the Muslim religion (Laub & Masters, 2015).

Goals

As per the West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, the goals of AQIM include ridding the Western influence out of North Africa, overthrowing apostate governments in the region, and implementing radical regimes based on sharia law (Laub & Masters, 2015). Whereas Maghreb and Sahel states remain the group's local enemies, AQIM is keen to attack France and Spain because of their involvement in peace conquest in the region. For instance, France is at the frontline to rid the region off AQIM terror group by providing military and political support to the local governments. Therefore, AQIM objectively seeks to stage terror attacks in France to send a message of rebellion.

Geographical footprint

A successful campaign by the Algerian military pushed out AQIM from Mediterranean and Sahel operational base. The operational base included Mauritanian, Mali, and Niger where the AQIM had established stable footholds. According to the State Department, the group has approximately 1000 members in Algeria, with the numbers decreasing towards the Sahel region, for instance, Mauritania, Chad, and Mali. Moreover, the group brags about terror cells in Tunisia, Libya, and Nigeria (Smith, 2009).

AQIM has not claimed responsibility for attacks in the US or Europe; however, individuals suspected to be affiliated to the group were arrested in the Netherlands, UK, Portugal, Italy, and Germany. According to the UN Security Council sanctions committee, the AQIM obtains its funding from the European terror cells (Smith, 2009). In the year 2010, a report by the US State Department, established coordination between AQIM and other terror groups in the African region, for instance, al-Shabab in Somali, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and AQAP in Yemen.

Key Leadership Figures

The leadership of AQIM usually believed to be associated with various Arab volunteers, for instance, Osama bin Laden. The terror group is divided into brigades operating in independent cells (Laremont, 2011). The independence in operations believed to be as a result of rivalry or the relative autonomy. However, the different brigades tend to come together under one leadership when it is convenient for them, enabling them to get stronger, hence advancing their goals.

Since 2004, AQIM has been led by Abdelmalek Droukdel who is an Algerian-born. The leader is also referred to as Abou Mossab Abdelwadoud and considered a trained explosives expert and engineer. After declaring France as its primary target, Droukdel was sentenced to death, in February 2015, amongst other militia leaders, in their absentia.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, considered as another AQIM's founding member whose responsibility was to lead a militant battalion of the Mali-Algeria border. However, he created his organization known as al-Mulathamun Battalion after breaking away from the group in the year 2012. Belmokhtar is believed to plan the hostage crisis at a facility of natural gas in Algeria on January 2013. In December 2013, John Kerry the US Secretary of State listed al-Mulathamun as a Foreign Threat Organization. The move to designate the terror group as an FTO enhanced the prestige and profile of Mokhtar Belmokhtar (Laremont, 2011).

Impact of AQIM on the West

The continuity and resilience of AQIM prompted the UN Security Council to authorize a military mission focused on promoting peace in Mali. The mission labeled MINUSA, ensured the Economic Community of West African States donate troops to facilitate the mission (Bencherif, 2017). However, the insufficient troops and advancement of AQIM southwards called for immediate assistance by the French forces who pushed the militants northwards and regained control of vital regions. The US State Department resulted in supplementing the regional governments to counteract the violent extremism taking place. In 2005, the US government under the administration of George W. Bush facilitated the establishment of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership to counter violent extremism. Under the pact, the US provided military and civilian assistance to partner countries in the Sahel and Maghreb amounting to USD 44.3 million.

Conclusion

AQIM has continued to experience challenges since the onset of local and international multi-corporation assistance; however, their domination is still felt in the region. The intervention by the Western countries have fractured the dominance of the jihadist group, but personal connections with a certain group of civilians and militants continue to grant AQIM influence in the Salafi-jihadist groups. The reintegration of Belmokhtar into the vital leadership of AQIM significantly contributes to the tactical capability of AQIM in conducting its operations. The increase terror attacks on various hotels offer a deadly technique targeting the western interests and other civilians in general.

References

Bencherif, A. (2017). From Resilience to Fragmentation: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Jihadist Group Modularity. Terrorism And Political Violence, 1-19. doi: 10.1080/09546553.2017.1351956

Grobbelaar, A., & Solomon, H. (2015). The origins, ideology, and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Africa Review, 7(2), 149-161. doi: 10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870

Laremont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, 4(4), 242-268. doi: 10.1080/19392206.2011.628630

Laub, Z., & Masters, J. (2015). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb

Smith, G. (2009). Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. Journal Of Strategic Security, 2(2). doi: 10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.2