Accidental Statesman: Mission Command in Mosul, Iraq - Essay Sample

Introduction

This paper explains how the main character had to make a command decision in re-establishing operation sustainability to the Iraqi people. Steps that aid his achievement in his visualization operation process were developing situational understanding, analyzing operational and mission variables.

In April 2003, the 101st Airborne Division under Major General David Petraeus conquered Mosul, the northern city of Iraq. Due to General Petraeus's understanding of Mission Command, it helped him visualize the mental process (Selhorst, 2014). Developing the situational understanding and analyzing operational variables and mission variables helped him visualize as well. By this time, the attack of Iraq was already in progress, and the Airborne Division was making a significant success of the mission and overall operation in Mosul. The General's unique grasp of understanding of the Art of War/Science enabled his subordinate commanders to gain a shared understanding of the vision of the Common Operational Picture (COP). All-knowing, Mosul was the center of gravity in reassuring the mission was a success (Selhorst, 2014). He had to make a command decision in reestablishing operation sustainability to the Iraqi people. Steps that aid his achievement in his visualization operation process were developing situational understanding, analyzing operational and mission variables.

Nature and Design of the Operation/Visualization

According to The Operation Process (2012), visualization is defined as the intellectual procedure of creating a situational understanding, establishing a desired mission objective, and predicting a practical approach through which troops will accomplish the projected goal (Chesham, Clarke & Nugent, 2017). During mission execution, visualization assists the mission commander in determining when, if and what to select as the forces acclimate to the changing mission conditions. The visualization consists of the art of war and science, nature and design of the operation, Common Operational Picture, principles of conflict, tenets, experience, estimates, military conditions, and end state. Also, when considering visualization, the general commander must understand available inputs from other commanders, decisive points, Center of Gravity (COG), and mission objectives. Moreover, there must adequate understanding of Operational lines, operational reach, culminating location, pauses and approach, sequential and simultaneous operations, nonlinear, and linear processes.

Lastly, the mission, targeted enemy, mission tempo, terrains, and impending weather changes, available troops, support, time, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC) must be well-considered and analyzed. General Petraeus applied the visualization technique by using Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC) before he entered the city of Mosul. Major General Petraeus's mission was to take control of the Nineveh Province. The sector for which Petraeus would be responsible stretched from the Syrian border in the west to Kurdish territory in the north and east-an area measuring 75,000 square kilometers. (The Accidental Statesman,2006). He did not know his enemy situation at the time. Some he sent Colonel Anderson to survey Mosul and give a situation report.

METT-TC

General Petraeus was successful using the METT-TC, operational approach, and end state and military conditions before he entered the city of Mosul (Chesham, Clarke & Nugent, 2017). General Petraeus's mission was to take control of the Nineveh Province. The sector for which Petraeus would be responsible stretched from the Syrian border in the west to Kurdish territory in the north and east, an area measuring 75,000 square kilometers. (The Accidental Statesman, 2006). Because he did not know his enemy situation at the time, he sent Colonel Anderson to do a Reconnaissance of Mosul and give a situation report.

Operational Approach

General Petraeus strongly believed that forming a flat organization and applying an operational approach of hands-off leadership could effectively help achieve the mission objective (Selhorst, 2014). His recommendation for a non- hierarchical and flatten organizations would allow the troops to make vital decisions in the manner of executing the projected plan. Petraeus's leadership approach develops a significant driver of self-belonging, making the soldiers more motivated towards the course.

During the early strategic advancement process, General Petraeus precluded a sanction to use more U.S. militaries to reinforce the advisory troops surrounded by the Iraqi forces (Chesham, Clarke & Nugent, 2017). He instead opted to upsurge the number and speed of the United States military troop operations. However, he later found himself in the dilemma of whether to select a population-centric or an enemy-centric approach. The General believed in conspicuous ideas and the correct intellectual concepts to guide these operational approaches (Chesham, Clarke & Nugent, 2017). He added that the strategic leadership approach is primarily founded on immense ideas and connected four responsibilities with those enormous ideas (Lee, 2015). Firstly, he recommended that these ideas must be accurately drafted and planned. Secondly, he believed that for these ideas to be effectively executed, there should be effective communication between the commanders and the troops (Selhorst, 2014).

Thirdly, the operational approach of execution must be well outlined to ensure that these ideas are appropriately executed. Lastly, apprehending, distributing, and institutionalizing learned lessons to identify best practices suitable for these ideas. General Petraeus later devoted copious effort on the "bottom-up" operational method of using the territorial gains to drive national resolution. The best illustration of the bottom-up approach was exhibited outside Baghdad in the Anbar region (Chesham, Clarke & Nugent, 2017). An almost solely Sunni part, Anbar was one of the whole violent areas of Iraq, the clamp of the rebellion until the brutality of Al Qaeda against Iraqis gaggles the Sunni tribes to begin fighting and rebelling against the al Qaeda (Lee, 2015). The uprising was an advantage in disguise to the U.S. forces since informed a partnership with the Sunni tribe. The operational approach led to a company that was recognized as the Anbar Awakening in 2006 (Selhorst, 2014). However, the partnership did work until 2007 because U.S. commanders realized that ethnic leaders actively took part in the rebellion and were the leading power brokers within the province (Saramifar, 2018).

Command

In February 2007, when Major General Petraeus went back to Iraq, he was broadly assumed to be undertaking a desperate mission (Lee, 2015). For example, Linda Robinson portrayed that interpretation when she wrote that "the president had asked him to rescue a failing war." A small number of citizens believed in his competency to influence such a rescue mission. When he arrived in Iraq, already 2,000 people to 3,000 people had been killed in the previous month, many of them by the sectarian war (Lee, 2015). The General was surprised by how deteriorated the situation has become. Robinson confirmed that for the following months, he termed to Iraq as a torn societal fabric and contemplated whether it was late to provide a resolution to it. The immediate impact executed by General Petraeus was changing the MNF-I operation tempo. Everywhere he procured Command, and the projected pace appeared to pick up, therefore MNF remarkably-I was not an exception (Chesham, Clarke &Nugent, 2017). A portion of the desired modification in tempo resulted from his extraordinary personal energy drive; thus, he inclines to permeate any given union with significant energy.

General Petraeus considers energizing subordinates and fellow commanders are a unique mandate of every commander. He was enthusiastic about the drastic change of occurrences, and operations were to be conducted quickly. Also, he believed in inaccurate reflection and planning when making vital decisions (Selhorst, 2014). In MNF-I, he thought that the prompter the operation speed was, the immediate deceptive in the quotidian battleground update evaluation. There was a daily briefing for General Petraeus and the MNF-I workforce and high-ranking commanders, which involved high detailed intelligence evaluation and that directed their day-to-day priorities and operations (Chesham & Nugent, 2017). The briefing was joined by several MNF-I commanders and staff and announced to other troops within Iraq through a secure line of video teleconference (VTC). The General used these daily conferences both to update himself and make a significant impact in directing and guiding what was transpiring throughout Iraq.

Conclusion

General Petraeus's mission was to take control of the Nineveh Province. The sector for which Petraeus would be responsible stretched from the Syrian border in the west to Kurdish territory in the north and east, an area measuring 75,000 square kilometers. His unique grasp of understanding of the Art of War/Science enabled his subordinate commanders to gain a shared understanding of the vision of the Common Operational Picture (COP). All-knowing, Mosul was the center of gravity in reassuring the mission was a success. He had to make a command decision in reestablishing operation sustainability to the Iraqi people. Steps that aid his achievement in his visualization operation process were developing situational understanding, analyzing operational and mission variables.

References

Selhorst, A. J. (2014). Operating in the Human Domain Lessons of a Decade of War for the Dutch Army. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KS. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/16620249/Operating_in_the_human_domain_lessons_of_a_decade_of_war_for_the_Dutch_Army

Lee, C. A. (2015). The Politics of Military Operations. doi: 10.4324/9780429282010

Chesham, B., Clarke, R., & Nugent, N. (2017). The beginning of the end-The cost of liberation. doi: 10.15761/NPC.1000166

Saramifar, Y. (2018). Pursuing the allure of combat: ethnography of violence amongst Iraqi Shi' I combatants fighting ISIS. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 1-18. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2018.1498216