Zombies and Dualism Philosophy Essay Example

A philosophical zombie is an imaginary creature that looks exactly like a normal human being since the physical features are the same. However, a philosophical zombie does not have consciousness. Philosophers such as David Chalmers used the p-zombies argument to oppose physicalism. Physicalism is the school of thought that believes that physical characteristics are what make people human. However, according to the philosophical zombie argument is that it is possible to have a human being that goes through all the motions of a normal human being yet have no consciousness. In this paper I will reject the possibility of philosophical zombies because such a world is not conceivable, it is not possible, and the logic states nothing about reality.

Is your time best spent reading someone else’s essay? Get a 100% original essay FROM A CERTIFIED WRITER!

Save 25%

The initial premise of the argument regarding philosophical zombies is that it is imaginable or conceivable that zombies exist. Using the principles of physicalism, it is impossible to imagine that the internal angles of a triangle could add up to a number greater than 180 degrees. Therefore, it is inconceivable that there could be a human being that is physically identical to me but have no consciousness. Zombies are not conceivable when thinking about their existence in more detail. If physicalism is true, an object's or humans physical properties determine its functionality. It follows that if a zombie has similar characteristics as a human being, it also functions like a normal human being. Physicalism cannot be false since it is what the zombie argument is trying to prove. Further, phenomenal consciousness can be assessed in regards to physical and functional features. In that situation, a physical and functional being that is duplicate of me would also have consciousness. Imagining a human being that has identical properties with no consciousness is confused since because it is compared to accepting a premise of a deductive argument while rejecting its confusion. a zombie that has the same physical properties just like me should be able to carry out identical functions. The possibility that a zombie can act in highly complex ways like a normal person means that they are conscious. Therefore, zombies that are physically identical but non-conscious are inconceivable. This objection is only applicable when there is a comprehensive physical and functional analysis of consciousness (Michael 67).

Another objection to the existence of philosophical zombies is that the argument may be imaginable but impossible. What is imaginable is not often an accurate director of what is possible. According to Saul Kripke, if A is identical to B, then they are the same. If A is B, then B is A in any possible world. An environment is considered to be a contingent property which does not affect or change the properties of an object, animal or human being. If a person were to be born in another country, he or she would have the same physical and functional properties because a country does not contribute to a person's characteristics. Even though zombies are imaginable, it does not prove that they are metaphysically probable. If physicalism is true, it is impossible for zombies to exist. If something else has the same physical features as a human being, it has to have consciousness as well (Kirk 43).

Even though the zombie argument is possible it does not agree with the reality. The claim that zombies can exist and that property dualism is true does not reflect reality. The zombie argument indicates that it in another world it is possible for physical and phenomenal characteristics to be different. Following this argument, it means that in one world physicalism could be true in one world and different in another. Assuming that the argument is true, property dualism could be false and true in another world. There is a problem with this claim in that it is impossible to have physical properties that exist in one world and are inexistent in another world. It is not possible for a dog to be something else in another world. If physical properties exist in this world, then they are physical properties in every world possible. The physical characteristics of the two identical paintings indicate that their aesthetic features are not dissimilar. The same properties apply to consciousness. According to physicalism once physical properties are finalized there is no opportunity of changing or adding something else. It is therefore difficult to add consciousness if zombies do not have it. It is their nature, and therefore they cannot be changed. Physicalism argues about what is possible. According to the zombie argument, it is possible to have two worlds that are identical but have differing phenomenal features. According to the argument, it is possible to add consciousness even if the physical features have been concluded. This argument does not agree with reality and what is possible.

The imagination of zombies means that people do not positively conceive of a creature which is non-phenomenally conscious yet identical to human beings. Rather, people choose to positively and perceptually imagine something that is matching their physical features yet they desist from imagining it conscious capability. Consciousness is a subjective experience and imagining it as its absence is only possible if we refrain from conceiving it. It is, therefore, impossible to imagine zombies positively. To positively imagine the absence of a subjective experience it is important to imagine the situation sympathetically. However, it is impossible to imagine the zombie's experience since we would need to have our mental states in the same mental state as that of the zombies. This is impossible to imagine such a mental state since only Zombies can experience it. Those who imagine the existence of zombies end up imagining something goes against their definition. The difference between zombies and conscious beings is illusory.

If zombies can be able to distinguish between the taste of coffee and tea and also speak English, it is difficult for them to be unconscious. If zombies have real beliefs, then they have qualitative states of consciousness. It is therefore impossible for zombies to experience qualitative consciousness if they have a complete lack of consciousness. The idea that a zombie can behave like a person feeling pain yet it does not experience the pain is something incoherent. The internal state of a person is expressed externally through their behavior (Michael 23).

Conclusion

The zombie argument is therefore inconceivable because some of its premises are incoherent, unreal and not reliable. If a zombie that has the same physical characteristics exists in another world, then it ought to be conscious since human beings are created that way. The environment does not determine the physical characteristics; rather, the genetic makeup, personality and other body's composition play a great role in determining the nature of people. Therefore, objects or people ought to be the same even if they may exist in a different environment. Zombies that have physical characteristics that resemble humans but have no consciousness cannot exist.

Works Cited

Kirk, Robert. Zombies and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007. Print.

Michael, L A. The Principles of Existence & Beyond: Revelation of Enigma of the Existence. England?: Visual Memes, 2007. Print.