Why Democracies Do Not Fight Each Other Paper Example

The debate regarding why democracies do not engage each other in war has been one of the major discussion in the field of politics and war studies. The current debate over the war behavior of the democratic nations and particularly the democratic peace profoundly revolves around whether a normative or an institutional explanation best accounts for the facts that exist. It is important to note that the normative accounts put more emphasis on several presumptions regarding democracies and as part of such presumption, they share a common value system that includes respect for the individual liberties and competition. According to De Mesquita et al., (1999), the international disputes of the democratic nations are in the hands of people who possess vast experience in the politics of competing values and interests. These people have further consistently responded within the normative guidelines of the bounded competition. In circumstances where two democracies face dispute, they would be forced to subscribe to norms in addition to being fully cognizant that the bounded competition is the norm for both. A closely related argument to support this fact is that the citizens in democracies abhor violence and therefore prevent their leaders from pursuing violent missions and foreign policies.

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A deeper look to some of these reasons offers a great explanation as to why the United States under the leadership of Donald Trump will unlikely be able to launch a preemptive strike against North Korea. It follows the suggestion by Duncan Hunter to the U.S to launch such an attack. In as much many people have shown that a preemptive attack is one of the best ways of responding to North Korea, it is unlikely that such an idea can ever be implemented. The rivalry and hostility between the United States and North Korea is a known issue in the world. Over the past few years, North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un has speeded his nation's rush towards the nuclear weapons and the intercontinental missiles, which has ultimately presented President Donald Trump with a looming crisis. Recent reports by the New York Time have shown that North Korea's isolated dictators have long viewed that the development of nuclear weapons will ensure the survival of the regime against the U.S military power. In this way, any attempt to plan for a preemptive attack would face greater opposition from the Congress. Ordinarily, the process of lawmaking and policy implementation in the United States requires approval from various institutions. The institutional constraints arguments hold that democracies are more deliberate in their decision making based on the fact that their procedures profoundly precludes the unilateral actions by its leaders. This is even thought to raise the costs of violence or war. Further, the complexity involved in the democratic process and the requirements of securing a broad base of support for risky policies will likely make President Trump reluctant of securing a broad base of support for the risky policies of attacking North Korea. Except in the cases whereby the war seems necessary, or the war aims to justify the mobilization costs, the chances of launching an attack are minimal.

Further, President Trumps fully understands that America, just like any other democracies is characterized by the institutional rules. Fundamentally, these rules pertain to the role that citizen play or have in influencing the selection of the government leaders, including the President (De Mesquita et al. 1999). The democracy is fundamentally a government of the people, for the people and by the people. This implies that the American citizens will play a crucial part in making the decisions regarding engaging North Korea in a war and consequently Trump's re-election. President Trump further knows that any blunder made in the process of decision-making on the North Korean issue will cost him a fortune, massive internal accusation, opposition and ultimately his presidency. He will be labeled an irrational person who decides to satisfy his self-ego. Undeniably, the majority of the citizens are fully aware of how devastating a preemptive attack on Kim Jong Un's regime would be on America. It will be calamitous, catastrophic and dangerous, based on the potential counter-attack that Kim is likely to launch. One golden rule of the authoritarian regime is that they never bend to any public and visible threat. This is based on the fact that any move to do so would profoundly invite internal accusations of the leadership and the weaknesses by its citizens (Kim & Chang, 2007). As an authoritarian leader, Kim Jong Un is tremendously allergic to such accusations and is likely to launch a devastating counter-attack that would ensure that his regime emerges victorious. It means that in any case, Trump's administration wants to respond to North Korea, then negotiation is the most appropriate and adoptable method. Washington should present its grievances in a manner that gives Kim an opportunity to move towards dialogue without appearing to capitulate to America's pressure. The move to make loud and hollow threats will irrefutably impose the different impacts as it is a diplomatic commensurate of the con and therefore cannot work in any way.

Conclusion

As a democratic leader, therefore, Trump should instead try hard to win his wars compared to the autocrats (De Mesquita et al. 1999). If he does not expect to win, then he should avoid it by all means. He should pick and choose his fights very carefully as any decision related to war have great consequences. America should, therefore, rededicate itself to a thorough policy process that aims at identifying the objectives and disciplined in the strategy implementation.

References

De Mesquita, B. B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M., & Smith, A. (1999). An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. American Political Science Review, 93(4), 791-807.

Kim, S. H., & Chang, S. (2007). Economic sanctions against a nuclear North Korea: An analysis of United States and United Nations actions since 1950. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland.