US and Nuclear Regime (Iran and North Korea) - Research Paper

Introduction

Iran and North Korea are high-precedence targets of United States nuclear nonproliferation policy yet the U.S. is following different approaches; disavowal to Iran and engagement with North Korea. Each nuclear regime is contentious in its own capacity and when reviewed on the same perspective, they present more problems than solutions. The United States recommends a supply of light-water reactors (LWRs) to North Korea which violates the safety commitments established by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the U.S. has been proposing an international nuclear ban on Iran, a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The nuclear policy with North Korea can be termed as dangerous but unassailable nonproliferation approach (Jang, 2018). Contrariwise, the United States approach to seclude Iran and prevent it from attaining peaceful nuclear technology is not going to succeed soon. The paper evaluates the United States and the nuclear regime in the perspectives of Iran and North Korea.

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United States Role in Denuclearization

The United States has two key obligations as a nuclear supplier under the Non-Proliferation Treaty; to desist from assisting other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons and to provide signatories access to peaceful nuclear technology as long as it does not enhance nuclear proliferation. The United States strategy toward Iran and North Korea-states that the U.S. has designated as 'rogue'-is a stalemate. The stalemate reflects a continuing tension in the United States policy-whether the goal toward 'rogue' state ought to change their regime' behavior or to change the regime themselves. The United States perceives North Korea's nuclear diplomacy as a proxy for the more basic inquiry of the latter regime's relationship with the outside world. The United States demand for complete denuclearization would deny North Korea abilities required to prevent what the state's regime has long perceived as an existential external threat. However, the United States offer of incorporating autarkic North Korea into the international economy if it denuclearizes carries the regime-transforming risk of political contagion (Einhorn, 2018).

Approach to Denuclearization

The United States approach towards Iran's denuclearization is much more controversial. The scope and magnitude of changes pursued in Tehran's regime behavior would fundamentally necessitate Iran to be no longer Iran. Complying with the United States demand that Iran becomes a 'normal' state would involve transition in domestic and foreign policies that Tehran perceives as core to its identity and the sources of its legitimacy. In its effort to block the nuclear program of Iran, the United States has followed an aggressive approach of pressure and confrontation. There are even signs that some in the U.S. administration believes that the eventual objective must be regime change. To attain denuclearization in North Korea, the U.S. administration has pursued an approach of extreme and focused engagement. The United States administration efforts to inform about the difference in its approaches make little sense. During the Obama administration, the discussion about Iran nuclear deal is said to have taken numerous other controversial issues in U.S.-Iranian relations off the table. This might the reason that the current Trump administration withdrew from the allegedly flawed multilateral agreement-officially referred to as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)-to suitably follow the security goals like stopping Iran from supporting terrorist groups overseas or threatening the U.S. allies in the Middle East (Litwak, 2019).

According to McFaul (2019), the United States has been on record for disapproving the nuclear deal with Iran. The United States administration has the conviction that by withdrawing from Iran nuclear deal and re-enforcing sanctions that were deferred under the agreement could force Tehran to approve U.S.'s demands. The ultimate goal in denuclearization was regime change. Additionally, the re-enforcement of United States sanctions especially in the financial and oil sanction was likely to put pressure on Iran. Most global financial institutions and enterprises are likely to dissociate from Iran. Those who import the Iranian crude oil are likely to decrease their purchases and divest Tehran of the required revenue. These pressures are likely to worsen Tehran's already unstable economy.

There are various aspects to consider owing to the United States use different approaches in denuclearization. One of the aspects is the political system, history, economy and the complications of the process. Iran and North Korea have diverse political and economic frameworks. Though the two states appear to be similar considering their citizens live under totalitarian regimes, Iran's partial democracy permits the Iranian citizens to impact their government through presidential and parliamentary elections. However, a different case is observed in North Korea's case-the government belongs to the royal family. Sanctions are likely to work in Iran due to the nature of democracy observed in the country. In North Korea's case, the country has survived through decades of sanctions and has lived in isolation (Bunn, Chyba, and Perry, 2006). Thus, sanctions cannot work for North Korea.

The strategy pursued in Iran's denuclearization can be termed as transactional. The JCPOA can be said to be an agreement focused solely on Iran's nuclear challenge, not an impressive bargain incorporating other objectionable facets of Iranian behavior such as the regime's subverting regional policies and human rights exploitations. The U.S. administration under Obama had established pragmatic determination that noted that progressing the scope of discussions beyond the urgent nuclear challenge would not have been successful. Critics viewed JCPOA as a way of eliminating Iran's nuclear infrastructure but a failed solution for Iran's behavior. Critics also observed that Iran was likely to become an ordinary state which was unfathomable. In the current Trump administration, there are good reasons to emphasize the nonnuclear sources of tension in U.S.-Iranian relations. However, there is no proper justification of pulling out of the JCPOA and its significance in making progress in other issues facing the country (Lettow, 2014). There is also no evidence that rolling back Iranian terrorist operations, weakening theocracy and thwarting Iran's nuclear program are successful.

There is an optional theory about the United States nonproliferation approaches that resolve these apparently controversial denuclearization policies. Maybe full and confirmable denuclearization is not the objective in Iran's and North Korea's cases. In Iran, it may be that the actual goal is regime change, with the inclusion of the option of the United States military action. If the United States is pushing a policy of regime change, then there is no need in negotiations or diplomacy; it will be a matter of demonizing the autocrats in power to vindicate overthrowing them. In the case of North Korea, it can be said that the objective is not complete denuclearization, but a result that permits the Korean regime to maintain part of its nuclear weapons while maybe disintegrating the state's ICBM program to decrease the direct threat to United States national security (Ansari, 2006). This latter objective could help explain the reason the United States administration is oddly cooperative toward North Korea and not keen to increase the pressure even when Pyongyang has shown no dedication to denuclearize completely.

Iran and North Korea are the leading destabilizing actors in their regions and rank among the world's most repressive administrations. The threats posed by North Korea and Iran to the United States and its allies are extensive and complex. The Iranian-North Korean threat is compounded by the two countries' collaboration, particularly in the domain of nuclear and ballistic nuclear advancement. To address the issue of nuclear proliferation, the United States have to focus more on a transactional approach instead of transformational. The existing transformational strategy depends on the maximalist objective that cannot be achieved short of regime transformation; what is more essential and more reasonable is transactional approach with discrete, constrained goals (Kim and Cohen, 2017). This would decouple the urgent nuclear challenge from the insolvable inquiry of changing the regime.

Nuclear negotiations with both Iran and North Korea are at an inflection point, at which the restrictions of the transformational strategy is eminent. The North Korean has warned that it will pursue 'new ways' to safeguard its interests if the United States continues its 'sanctions and sanctions' to impose its concept of denuclearization. In Iran's case, the U.S. intimidating threat to enforce extraterritorial bans on overseas commercial entities doing business has resulted in hatred from the European Union which enacted a blacking statute necessitating EU firms not to comply. In case the unearthing United States policy of 'maximum pressure' does not bring economic benefits to Iran from the nuclear agreement, then the Tehran administration is likely to re-assess its progressive observance of the JCPOA (Moore, 2013). However, there is no immediate significance to withdraw and instead, Iran staying in the deal means that the United States is facing global criticism for putting pressure on Tehran.

Suggestions for Approaches to be Used

In North Korea's case, having 20 nuclear weapons are not as risky as 200. The bigger the nuclear equipment, the larger the possible risk. It does not matter whether the international ban will be applied in North Korea, nuclear weapons can be sold to countries like Pakistan and Iran or even to a non-state terrorist group. The most applicable U.S. negotiation goal ought to be preventing North Korea's qualitative and quantitative breakout by categorizing Pyongyang's current moratorium on nuclear and missile testing. This form of freezing is likely to frustrate extra testing by North Korea and thus reducing the threat of U.S homeland attack. Although North Korea has claimed that there is no production of nuclear weapons, a verifiable cessation would go a long way in casting away the doubts. Disregard of the U.S-North Korea agreement shows that the relationship of the United States, Japan, and South Korea will be complicated 9Moore, 2013). The countries are likely to survive under the Pyongyang nuclear shadow.

In Iran's case, the United States focus on the transactional negotiations means that various priorities such as full termination of uranium enrichment will be considered. The United States foreign advisories emphasized on a deal that would not end in nuclear cessation; instead, it was a precedent of negotiations for other discrete issues. For instance, there was a suggestion that Iran would open a negotiation for range restrictions on ballistic missiles which would limit their global capacity. The current diplomatic discussions pursued by the United States are not likely to be approved by North Korea or Iran because they are equivalent to regime change. Suggestions like unrestricted access of International Atomic Energy Agency in North Korea and Iran are likely to be met with complete disapproval. The current North Korean administration does not take economic embargoes seriously. A ban on the development of flight-testing of nuclear-capable missiles cannot work in the two countries. Iran feigns cooperation with the nuclear agreements but in the real sense, nuclear weapons are being developed. On the other hand, North Korea runs nuclear tests for the world to see (Lettow, 2...