The Rationality of Voting: An Analysis of Anthony Downs' Theory

Introduction

While many theorists have come up with explanations on why people vote, no other has been influential than Anthony Downs. In his 1957 book "An Economic Theory of Democracy," Downs explained that participation in elections is a function of cost and benefits. When considering the costs of voting in a given election, then the voter will not vote (Downs 260a). However, if the cost of voting is high, then he or she will abstain from participating. Thus, it may be rational or irrational to participate in elections depending on the costs and benefits (Sigelman and Berry 419). It would be illogical to vote if the costs of voting exceed the benefits. This paper examines Downs's theory, arguing that the model explains why people by including the self-interest axiom.

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Downs' Calculus of Voting

Downs (38-45a) contends that in any given election, a prospective candidate will calculate the expected party differential by comparing the future utility and accrued benefit of electing either one party or another. Simply, if the utility and benefits for voting in party A is more significant than voting for party B, then the voter will vote for the candidate that is selected by party A. If the expected party differential for the second party is greater than for the first party, then the voter will vote in the candidate selected by the second party. If the differential is zero, the voter may abstain. Downs further argues that the voter may also consider the performance of the party that forms the government when determining the utility of electing either of the parties. The voter will decide on whether to vote either of the parties depending on whether he is well off or not compared to what the elected party promised him in the last elections (Sigelman and Berry 420). Through these comparisons, the vote can arrive on a rational decision on whether to participate or abstain.

According to Downs (265a), some benefits and costs accrue to voters when they participate in an election. He categorizes benefits into two. First, the moral benefits that a citizen places in democratic participation. In this participation in the voting process is not due to the potential of influencing the outcome, but instead in the form of assurance that comes with participating in the electing public officials -which is insurance against the breakdown of the democratic system. Down refers to this benefit as "long-run participation value of voting (Sigelman and Berry, 419)." Second, the citizen is concerned about the outcome of a specific election. If the citizen feels that the differences between the benefits that candidates or parties offer are greater, it becomes imperative for the citizen to participate in the elections, as it would provide significant returns if the party that provides the most considerable benefits wins. This is what Downs calls party differential. If the differential is small, then there is no need to vote.

Furthermore, he introduces the concept of selfishness in the rationality equation, when talking about the benefits of voting. In his model, Downs argues that people act in self-interest. By combining the concept of selfishness and rationality, Downs contends that even in the political realm, men with act out of selfishness when assessing the cost and benefits of voting or abstaining from voting (Downs 28a). Importantly, he also equates self-interest with selfishness. However, he does also consider that people may also vote for altruistic reasons, other than selfish reasons (27-28a). For example, a person may vote for a specific party as they consider it socially rational although the party or the candidate holds beliefs that may cause them harm.

Downs (265a) maintains that the cost of voting includes costs that include more than direct costs of participation. A voter will take time to go and vote, which may cost them money. However, it is the prime time of preparing to vote that makes up for the majority of the costs. A voter will take time to deliberate after collecting information on various policies or the interests of individuals and registering to participate in the election. When considering the costs, Down argues that it is irrational for a voter to participate in elections as the cost of gathering information or influencing the decision is too high, and no single vote can muster the financial power to persuade others or change the electorate outcome (Downs 139).

Is Voting Irrational

Downs recognizes that voting is irrational because often, the cost of voting exceed those of abstaining. Every voter is aware they cannot influence the decision of others, and in elections that involve many people, voters are aware that their influence on the outcome of the elections is marginally small. However, Downs's models hold for several reasons. First, the model notes that the cost and benefits of participating go beyond direct expenses, such as traveling or time that it takes to deliberate on which candidate to vote. Second, it recognizes the rational thinking of evaluating candidates and parties based on previous mandate or performance.

In his model, Down recognizes that benefits such as subjective 'feeling good' or the moral value of participating in elections is a benefit to many voters, and may explain why people participate. While the party or candidate differential maybe zero, people often participate in elections. The morality of voting or participating in elections may explain the phenomenon, even if the voters cannot change mandate or influence the elections. Mackie (8-9) reports that the majority of voters feel that they need to voter due to the belief that they have a moral obligation to vote. Other scholars such as Campbell, Gurin, and Mill (195) suggests that people vote, even when they rightly believe that their preferred party or candidate is unlikely to win. Voting is moral, and therefore, it is their duty to turn out to vote, regardless of whether they will influence the outcome of the election or not. Some may vote in one way or vote blank. Thus, 'good-feeling' that arises from participation may be considered a benefit, regardless of whether the costs outweigh the benefits of abstaining.

Voters may also come out to vote to change 'mandate' or change the 'mandate' that the elected candidate receives. A fundamental assumption of this thinking is that voters may come out to vote because the presence of a majority or a minority will determine how effective a candidate will able to fulfill his mandate to the elected. By 'mandate,' I do not refer to the winning percentage, but the number of people who tow a specific party line that possesses a majority in the government. Unlike the traditional mandate hypothesis, this view takes into consideration how new governments operate, where a clear majority of specific candidates from a given party provide political and voting support to those of their fellow party members to increase efficacy.

While Downs's theory focused on party differential, there is always another aspect that is often overlooked, the number of party members in elected positions. While a member from another party may win party elections and therefore receive the mandate to govern, policies occur at different levels where voters participate in the elections. If for example, Republicans win the presidential elections and their performance is poor, the voters may be willing to vote in candidates from the Democratic Party to act as a bulwark against the Republic president, in an aim to protect their benefits. Thus, even when they do not hold the most powerful seat, voters may feel that oversight is essential, which introduces a new advantage to voting.

The only limitation of the model is that it does not explain the relationship between turnout and social and economic indicators. If voters were rational and were likely to vote during adversity, then it is expected that during times of economic and social deprivation, then the costs of not voting would be higher than those of not voting. By changing the mandate or removing an incumbent government, voters would accrue more benefits and would be more willing to vote for another party. However, this is not the case. A time series of elections from 1890-1980 showed higher poverty and social deprivation was associated with lower political participation and turnout (Rosenstone 29). It seems that even when potential benefits of voting are higher, voters may abstain. There may be a need for other theories that explain these discrepancies in voting patterns to determine the key factors that influence voters, in addition to costs and benefits.

Conclusion

Downs's theory of voter participation has been influential and continues to be debated to this day. Overall, the principles of the model are strong and could be used to explain why people vote while others abstain. According to the theory, people conduct a cost-benefit analysis when deliberating whether to vote for a specific candidate or a party. The party that is perceived to provide the most considerable benefits as compared to costs is elected. If the perceived differences between the parties are small, then the voters will abstain. The only limitation of the theory is that it cannot explain why people abstain, especially in economic deprivation.

Works Cited

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin and Warren Miller. The voter decides. Row, Peterson, and Co: Evanston, ILL, 1952. Print.

Downs, Anthony. An economic theory of democracy. New York: HarperCollins, 1957. Print.

-. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy." The Journal of Political Economy 65.2 (1957a): 135-150. Print.

Gerry, Mackie. Why Its Rational to Vote. Los Angeles: University of California, 2010.

Rosenstone, S. "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout." American Journal of Political Science 26.1 (1982): 25-46. Print.

Sigelman, L and W Berry. "Cost and the Calculus of Voting." Political Behaviour 4.4 (1982): 419-428. Print.