Mumbai Terror Attack: A Case Study of Terrorism - Paper Sample

Introduction

On 26th November 2008, ten Pakistani men affiliated with the terror group Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) went on a rampage across Mumbai, killing 164 people (CNN Editorial Research, 2019). The Mumbai terror attacks are one of the worst terrorist attacks in India because of the scale and impact of the assaults. According to CNN Editorial Research (2019), the terrorists performed coordinated attacks in six different locations within Mumbai. The Mumbai attack makes for a good case study of terrorism response by law enforcement agencies because it was a high-profile attack that attracted much attention from the media and scholars interested in security matters. A critical analysis of the response to the Mumbai attacks would reveal that the law enforcement agencies lacked preparation and essential intelligence due to financial challenges, inefficient laws and institutions, and the need to balance security and democratic rights such as the freedom of the press.

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Law Enforcement Capability Failures

Inadequate Preparation

Lack of clearly defined roles among the enforcement agencies. According to Dew (2012), the Mumbai attacks exposed the institutional layers between the Coast Guard, Indian police, and Indian Navy. That is because the terrorist gained entry to Mumbai via the sea. The attackers had sailed from Karachi to Mumbai using a cargo vessel. Four days before the attack, they had hijacked an Indian fishing trawler and killed all the crew except the captain whom they decapitated on reaching the shores of Mumbai (Rabasa et al., 2009). According to Rabasa et al., (2009), the use of the maritime environment enabled them to avoid the checkpoints and security checkpoints that would have been present at the airports or land borders. The Indian vessel that they hijacked was less likely to attract suspicion from the Indian Coast Guard. Therefore, it was not clear which agency was tasked with the inspection of Indian vessels that approach the country’s territorial waters.

There were blind spots created by the tangible seams in terms of responsibility. Security around Mumbai had been split into two layers, with the Navy being in charge of deep-sea while the littorals and close to ports and beaches was the mandate of the Cost Guard (Dew, 2012). The layers in between the agencies created blind spots that were exploited by the terrorists to launch an attack on Mumbai. Since these lines were artificial, the hijacked vessel was able to move from the Indian Navy’s jurisdiction to the Coast guard’s jurisdiction without being intercepted. The maritime is probably the last point in which the attack could have been intercepted, but the lack of blind spots prevented that from happening.

Lack of a coordinated response. According to Livingston (2009), some Indian police showed commendable bravery, but most of their actions were uncoordinated and, in some cases, counterproductive. The scale of the attack meant warranted a coordinated response because of the large area to cover. It needed a multiagency approach to ensure that the attack in various public spaces is addressed simultaneously. The response required coordination from intelligence agencies and law enforcement in both sea and land. Also, the agencies involved had not conducted multi-agency operations. According to Dew (2012), the Navy nor the Coast Guard had practiced working together in joint operations. That means that both agencies had little understanding of their joint capabilities and limits that would typically be reflected in join training sessions. The two institutions had halted joint operations back in 2005. These failures caused poor coordination among the response teams in both preventing and responding to the terror attacks. Furthermore, Indian intelligence had issued a warning to the management of two principles targets; Taj Mahal Palace and Oberoi, but the security apparatus had failed to respond accordingly hence proving the lack of coordination between institutions (Livingston, 2009).

The local and federal governments also exhibited poor coordination. Livingston (2009) argues that the Indian national government responded tentatively without coordination between the Mumbai police and the national government security forces. Mumbai relied on the federal government, Marine Commando Force (MCF), as their primary rapid response terrorism team. Such an arrangement complicated the response because the MCF is based in India’s capital New Delhi that is three hours away from Mumbai by air (Livingston, 2009). Furthermore, reports indicate that the Indian Navy demanded written requests from the government so that they can release the commandos. However, even after getting the green light, it took the commandos a total of nine hours to get to the scenes of the attack because of transport complications

The law enforcement had received inadequate training on terrorism response and kidnapping situations. According to Livingston (2009), the local police had not been trained in clearing, operations, and hostage situations. Unfortunately, that happened to be the exact situation in which they were subjected when the attackers stormed the Jewish center Nariman House, Trident Oberoi, and the Taj Mahal Palace taking hostages in the process. Opportunity theory in criminology posits that attackers make rational choices would, therefore, select targets that provide the most reward with as little effort as possible (Lynch, 2011). Law enforcement agencies should have anticipated an attack on such places because of their vulnerability, and the opportunity they present to would-be terrorists. Furthermore, conducting security drills would have allowed them to anticipate the weak areas in the security of the three locations and take security measures accordingly to reinforce the safety of the civilians in such places.

The Mumbai police lacked sufficient firepower to match the attackers. Some of the weapons carried by the attackers included AK-56 Automatic rifles, even magazines of ammunition, Hecker & Koch machine guns, 9mm pistols with two ammunition clips, each carrying 8 to 10 hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (Rabasa et al., 2009). In comparison, the Indian police were armed with relatively antiquated weaponry that was in short supply. For example, the Railway Protection Force (RPF) had one weapon for every two officers (Rabasa et al., 2009). According to Livingston (2009), the local police who responded to the first attacks lacked sufficient body armor, and the available ones were improperly strapped. They possessed substandard weapons with few, if any, scopes on the rifles and no night vision (Livingston, 2009). Standard issue equipment for special units all across the world, such as flashbangs, pin-hole cameras, body heat signatures reading equipment, and robots to help with the search and detonation of explosives, were all missing among the Indian security forces (Livingston, 2009). It goes without saying that while the Indian security forces are not expected to be well equipped as their counterparts from the wealthy countries, they are not expected to be outgunned by a third-tier terror group such as LeT. The lack of proper equipment prevented the first responders from dealing a significant blow to the attackers and reducing the chances of success for the terrorist plan.

Insufficient Intelligent

The agencies had poor intelligence gathering and information about the terror attack. According to Trindal (2009), the Indian law enforcement agencies and military responding to the attack lacked intelligence regarding the scope of the attack, targets, and weapons involved. Intelligence gathering is an essential part of terrorism response. Gathering intelligence requires understanding the motivations behind terrorist events. The Mumbai attacks could have been prevented if the law enforcement, along with the security agencies had information about the attacks in real-time, as they unfolded. Such intelligence and knowledge would have enabled them to plan their response accordingly and adjust their activities accordingly. According to Trindal (2009), some responding units were disorganized, and others were paralyzed because they had little information about the areas of attack. The lack of knowledge prevented them from catching the terrorist with the only exception being a roadblock set up by Senior Police Commander Nagappa Mahale, which led to the interception of one of the terrorist teams (Trindal, 2009).

The Indian government was oblivious to the underlying reasons behind the attack. The rational choice theory, as prepared by Nobel-Prize-winning economist Gary Becker applies in the Mumbai attack as well. According to Becker, criminal behavior is similar to non-criminal behavior in that it is an activity in which people willingly participate because they are convinced that the crime will be less costly and more rewarding than non-criminal behavior (Anderson & Carter, 2005). In that respect, the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack thought that taking part in such activities would have been more rewarding than not taking part in them. The issues surrounding the attack stem India's rivalry with its Northern neighbor Pakistan. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba outfit, which was responsible for the attacks, had used Pakistan as a launching pad for carrying out attacks in India. Whether Pakistan was right to allow such an outfit to operate within its borders is a topic for another discussion, but the Indian government and security outfits were well aware of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba(LeT) activities and intentions against India. Better relations with the Pakistani government could have prevented the attack or even eradicated the LeT because LeT was as much of a problem to the Pakistani government as it was to India (Rabasa et al., 2009).

Challenges for Law Enforcement in Preventing, Responding, and Prosecuting Terrorism

Lack of Resources due to Poor Funding

Inadequate financial support is probably the biggest, if not one of the biggest challenges that these law enforcement agencies have when it comes to responding to terrorism. According to Swami (2018), all the Indian states and territories spent slightly over 12.1 billion dollars in the year 2016-2017 budget year. As impressive as that might sound, one only needs to consider that the United Kingdom, a country of approximately 65 million people, spent some 16.2 billion dollars on policing alone, during the same year (Swami, 2018). India’s population is more than twenty times that of the UK. It is, therefore, evident that Indian law enforcement agencies are underfunded, and that makes it challenging for them to respond to terror threats and attacks as it happened with the Mumbai incident.

The low funding of law enforcement institutions creates a situation of understaffing. As of 2006, a police force of 1.6 civil and armed personnel served a population of over 1.1 billion people (Swami, 2018). That translates to the police to the civilian ratio of 145 police officers for every 100,000 people (Swami, 2018). According to Swami (2018), that ratio is well below the UN-recommended figure of 250 per 100,000 people. Based on the analysis of this figure, it is understandable why the law enforcement authorities were quickly overwhelmed. The law enforcement agencies did not have enough personnel to respond to the first attacks, not prevent them.

Finally, due to the lack of resources, law enforcement agencies were ill-equipped and untrained to deal with terrorist threats and attacks. As discussed earlier in the lack of coordinated response, the Mumbai local government relied on the tactical team from Delhi to provide rapid response to terrorist attacks because they did not have th...