Hume Moral Judgments and Self-Love Theories Essay

The concept of morality is one that has plagued the mind of philosophers and mankind for decades, and Countless number of questions surround the mystery of morality and moral judgments because we choose our actions based on its rightness and wrongness, but how do we determine what is right or wrong? What determines right or wrong? Our reason? Sentiments? If our sentiment is the basis for morality, do we act moral solely for our self-interest? Where does moral approval come from? David Hume spent a long time pondering on these questions. Hume in his work "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751)." Provides us with hundreds of pages in which he looks into and informs his readers of the nature of moral judgments, sentimentalism, and rationalism among others "For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to discover the true origins of morals, it will then easily appear how far either sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature" (Epm I.1 10). In this paper I would begin by explaining in my understanding the concept of moral judgment, how moral judgment work, then I would examine and explain Hume's meta-ethical view of moral judgments, and this would lead to a transition to the Self-love theory and how it poses a challenge to Hume's accounts of moral approval.

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Moral judgments can refer to a virtue, activity or a content. It is a judgment that evaluates if our actions, intention, motives, or a character trait is good or bad, and this is measured against some upstanding standards of what is good. Moral judgments can only be applied if the agent has free will, an agent, who did not have a choice would not be subjected to moral judgments. In analyzing the activities in moral judgments we must have a subject (a rational self) which would judge, an object (maybe an attribute) whose actions will be judged, a standard or set of rules by which the action of the subject would be judged, and the power (knowledge) to judge an action. Moral judgment involves an evaluative judging of value, which deals with the normativity of ethics: "what ought to be" and not descriptive facts "what is". When we judge an action right we feel of approval towards it, and when we judge an action wrong we feel disapproval towards the action. The feeling of rightness, wrongness, approval, or disapproval among others are referred to as moral sentiments. The term sentiments would lead us to Hume's meta-ethical account of moral judgments.

Hume's theory of moral judgments arose from his belief that reason cannot be the sole motive of the will, but rather reason is a slave of the passion. He believed that reason alone cannot cause action, it can be used to learn the causes of pleasure or pain, but reason alone cannot motivate an action "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of passions" (T II.3.3 415). In Hume's view, moral actions are derived from sentiments or a feeling within humans: feelings of praise, esteem, approval, disapproval. "But though reason, when fully assisted and improved, be sufficient to instruct us in the pernicious or useful tendency of qualities and actions; it is not alone sufficient to produce any moral blame or approbation... it is requisite a sentiment should here display itself, in order to give a preference to the useful above the pernicious tendencies... Here, therefore, reason instructs us in the several tendencies of actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favor to those which are useful and beneficial" (Epm. II.1 3). Hume believes that our reason apprehends the facts in a situation while our sentiment is the motive for our actions, that reason is something that assists sentiments in matters concerning morality. He believes that sentiments are the foundation in which morality is built in, and reasons are a means to sentiments, but without reasons, sentiments can still exist, reason cannot be the sole motivation because they can only make statements but cannot explain human sentiments or emotions.

Considering Hume's account of how sentiments are the sole motivation of moral judgments. It is no wonder that philosophers would try to examine if our moral judgments are based on the utilities we derive from our self-interest or other regarding motive. During this Inquiry, a self-love theory emerged, it states "that, whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the liberty and happiness of mankind" (Epm II.2 1). This theory poses a threat to Hume's account of moral judgment, because if moral judgments are motivated by sympathy or feelings, what proves that we do not act or make moral judgments for our self-interest. In response to this Hume acknowledged that self-love is a principle in the nature of humans, but it does not qualify to be a moral principle. Hume gave some examples to back up his critique against self-love. One of his strong arguments, is the objection that "We frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty of imagination would not discover any appearance of self-interest, or find any connexion between our present happiness and security with events so widely separated from us" (Epm 1.V 6). He is arguing that self-love cannot make the idea of other's be agreeable to us, because there is no utility derived from the approval in this instance. Hume claims that we praise these actions rather because of sympathy and humanity, and the existence of sympathy is what qualifies a good moral evaluation.

Another Strong objection he presented was "What interest can a fond mother have in her view, who loses her health by the assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterward languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the slavery of that attendance?". Hume argued that in this situation it is not in the mother's personal interest to take care of the child but still her sentiments direct her to her child's interest.

Hume did not succeed in his critique against self-love because one could argue that the mother putting her child's interest first, still has a connection to self-love because in this case, the mother's interest is in the welfare of her child. Not to say that she does not have a genuine concern for her child, but that her actions might not have been independent of self-love. For the approval described in the first example, it can be argued that, we approve of this action because some way or another it influences us and our moral rules; virtues in distant ages and countries would commend our approval because if those virtues were instilled in our society it would ensure security and the security would ultimately influence our happiness.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think Hume has a strong argument that our passion and sentiments determine our moral judgment, his examples are detailed and should convince anyone with an open mind that, sentiments is the sole motivation of moral actions. However, his critique of self-love theories has good points but does not have substantial examples or evidence that we do not act, and make moral judgments separate from our self-interest. Rather his theories should be a normative one, wherein benevolence and sympathy should be the leading motives for our actions.

Work cited

Hume, David. "An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals." 1983 Hackett Publishing Co.