The analysis of the Space Challenger Disasters offers an exposition of deadly engineering and management risks. While it is evident that engineers at the Morton Thiokol had the entire responsibility of determining whether the Space Challenger could be launched or not, they failed to do so. Excluding Robert Lund, I believe that engineers were unable to fulfill their ethical responsibility to protect the public and the astronauts, and hence the reason for the disaster. Robert Lund's recommendation for the postponement of the launch was not received well in the company. Noting NASA's adverse reaction to the recommendation not to launch, the Morton Thiokol managers requested to meet privately with the engineers. Within that private caucus, the management was pleased with their clients, NASA. This caucus led to the decision to launch the challenger, unless the engineers could comprehensively prove that it was unsafe. The typical principle of safety first was supposed to be prioritized in this case.
Broadly, the engineers were instructed that the company need to make the management decision. Amid all the politics and points of contention, Robert Lund initially demonstrated reluctance, agreed to the launch along others such Jerry Mason. While other engineers further argued against the launch, Joe Kilminster further provided declaration to the NASA that the available data was completely inconclusive and thus did not recommend the launch. At this point, Larry Mulloy and George Hardy who were the lead NASA officers at the deal informed the MTI they were only to make the recommendation and thus were willing to initiate the launch. This was a huge act of ignoring the engineering concerns that were raised. Everyone knows what happened afterwards.
Despite the best intentions, the engineers also contributed to the fault, as they went ahead to accept the recommendation after being pressured. Fundamentally, the central concept on the relationship between the O-ring failure and temperature were solely based on engineering knowledge and not management. Both NASA and Morton Thiokol engineers were only involved in the examination of the seven launches that presented the O-ring problem. No one bothered or even asked to observe the launch date for the previous starts, especially where the O-ring failure had taken place.
The engineering codes of ethics suggest that engineers should hold paramount the safety, health and the welfare of the public. In the cases whereby the judgments are overruled under the circumstances that endanger the life and property, they shall inform their employers or clients and authority as may be necessary. While it is evident that Robert Lund had informed their client about the unsuitability of the launch, other engineers were unable to support him, but their opinions were overruled by the managers' pressure. The engineers were aware that the pressure of the launch would make the cylindrical containers to bend away from each other to create huge openings. From the engineering point of view, the O-rings were expected to shift to enclose the gap created. Due to the low temperatures below the glass transition that Robert Lund has predicted and warned about, the O-rings were unable to play this role, but ended up behaving glassy and brittle manner. Engineers were also aware that when the temperatures are high, the O-rings would become extremely elastic and flexible. In this sense, thus, it would take longer for the O-rings to shift out of the place and establish an enclosure. The vaporization of the O-rings across the 70 arc would thus offer an opportunity for the gas leakage through a hole that would now increase in size. This prediction came true as the disintegration of the external tank at the 73rd second led to shuttle to sheer from its altitude.
The rules of ethics require the engineers to demonstrate integrity and remain strong so that they are professional duties are not influenced by the conflicting interests. An engineering profession does not society's recognition in order to be recognized as a profession. Ideally, it only needs a practice among its members of cooperative to serve certain deals. Just like any other occupation, once an occupation becomes a profession, the society must give it special privileges. These privileges involve provision of the sole work to perform their work. Speaking from the case, it is critical to understand a code of professional ethics as a convention between professionals. With this information, it is therefore possible to explain why the engineers are not able to depend on the simple private conscience when choosing the manner in which their professions should be practiced. The engineers must take into account what an organization has to suggest about their obligations. The Engineers at the MTI were therefore supposed to understand that the launch of the Space Challenger was not all about pleasing their clients, but protecting the lives of the public and the astronaut. The safety first policy was supposed was supposed to be the major priority in this case. Additionally, the engineering was supposed to lead as the management follows. The reluctance, failure to be strong and inability to compel the MTI and NASA management to postpone the launch led to this disaster.
Conclusion
I believe that the Space Challenger accident is one engineering mistake that could have been prevented through the fulfillment of the ethical responsibility pertaining to the profession. The engineering codes of ethics suggest that engineers should hold paramount the safety, health and the welfare of the public. In the cases whereby the judgments are overruled under the circumstances that endanger the life and property, they shall inform their employers or clients and authority as may be necessary. The fundamental concept on the relationship between the O-ring failure and temperature were mainly based on the engineering knowledge and not the management. Additionally, the engineers were not supposed to depend on the simple private conscience when choosing the manner in which they were supposed to practice their profession. This is based on the fact that they were aware that the pressure of the launch would make the cylindrical containers to bend away from each other to create huge openings. It was supposed to be known that Space Challenger launch was not all about pleasing their clients, but protecting the lives of the public and the astronaut. The safety first policy was supposed was supposed to be the major priority in this case. It is therefore right to conclude that excluding Robert Lund, the MTI engineers were unable to fulfill their ethical responsibility to protect the public and the astronauts, and hence the reason for the disaster.
Cite this page
Essay Example on Space Challenger Disaster: Engineers' Ethical Failure.. (2023, Jul 02). Retrieved from https://proessays.net/essays/essay-example-on-space-challenger-disaster-engineers-ethical-failure
If you are the original author of this essay and no longer wish to have it published on the ProEssays website, please click below to request its removal:
- Ethical Evaluation of Fortune 500 Company: Advance Auto Parts
- Research Paper on Goal-Setting Framework
- NIKE Company Management - Paper Example
- Paper Example on Clinical Decisions: Management Issues and Challenges
- Leadership in Healthcare: The Need for Quality Care in Hospitals - Essay Sample
- Essay Example on Leadership and Career Development in Businesses
- Essay Example on Organizational Success: Culture, Leadership, and Employee Engagement