Introduction
One of the reasons as to why small countries may contribute troop's deployment to United Nations peacekeeping missions stems from their need to profit financially from the whole operation. The security departments in these nations might use the chance to increase their budgets from the reimbursement they will get after the operation (Bellamy, 2012). Individual troops in the small nations might be attracted by a good salary package ($1,030 per soldier every month) from the UN once they commit to their peacekeeping operations (Tardy, 2011). Perhaps the most important incentive that is driving small nations to engage in peacekeeping operations is the extent of apparent threat modeled by specific conflict. Hence their ulterior motive is for threat mitigation against a bad outcome.
Other incentives to peacekeeping troop deployment emanates from motives concerned with the nation's security sector, administrative subtleties, and paramilitary forces. For instance, Latin American nations decided to engage in UN operations due to civil-military associations mainly as a result of doctrinal strategies, and administrative wrangles. Some of the key factors for troop deployment are:
Support for local reconstruction and development
Scholarly research highlights that support for development is a significant determinant factor of small European countries as well as other regions troop deployment for UN peacekeeping operations (Fortna & Howard, 2008). It is reasonably effective to deploy their troops so that they can benefit from support for local reconstruction and development incentives. Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin (2010) assert that economic reconstruction is an important tenet in state building and development and this can be achieved by the UN missions shaping the quality of peace in various deployment countries.
Fear to lose information flows
This factor is a key determinant for troop deployment particularly between the government and rebel leaders. Bove and Ruggeri (2016), denounce that information flows is crucial for small European countries and other regions to interact and protect their civilians. Since it is the role of the peacekeepers to assist in information flows and frequent interactions, the small countries had no choice other than involving their troops in UN peacekeeping missions. Information flows is also a vital incentive for the fact that it allows proactive protection of the civilians and the entire country at large. Further, information flow is an effective monitoring mechanism of a country from its enemies (Diehl & Druckman, 2010). Therefore, this factor helped spur corporation thus reducing uncertainty in areas stationed by the UN.
The hostility of losing both enforcement and reassurance mechanisms
This determinant factor plays an important role in shaping whether small European countries and other regions should deploy their troops. Enforcement and reassurance mechanisms help to coerce and provide proactive stances between conflicting countries not to use violence. However, this is done by the UN peacekeepers who explain the credible threat to use force other than deterrent measures (Costalli, 2014). Consequently, reassurance is done by security guarantees, which is an option only offered by the UN. Enforcement and reassurance is the best incentive, which if these small countries fail to utilize they may be salient to lack of control in their constituents and therefore prone to attacks by rebel countries.
Fear of losing support for planning, decision making, and policy
Small European countries always seek for support in planning, policy, and decision making processes from the UN (Bove & Elia, 2011). This remains their primary asset for institutional support and function. Failure to deploy their troops will, therefore, be a threat to their success for the fact that there will be interference with civil affairs and operations in the local authorities. Proving support for the policy, planning, and in decision making is an important incentive provided by the UN to these small countries and it is effective for the functioning of the citizens.
Part 2:
Solidarity is one of the reasons why Belgium contributes its troop to UN peacekeeping missions ("Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Belgium | Providing for Peacekeeping", 2019). The nation wants to bring a political balancing act especially between the Socialist Party of the southern part of the nation and those in the northern part. This would help to bring unity between the political parties and the citizens, which will help to resolve any challenges of injustice or oppression caused by the warring faction. Additionally, the need of safeguarding of civilians and even foster good relations with France and Lebanese nations living in Belgium ("Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Belgium | Providing for Peacekeeping", 2019) The state stands solid on multilateralism, regional and global security for the sake of bringing unity to the citizens living in the nation.
The clandestine motive for Belgium's contribution to UNIFIL is linked to the desire of the government to restore peace and unity in the "Southern Neighborhood." Belgium needs to solidify their prestige and influence compelled them to contribute their troops in UN peacekeeping missions (Mattelaer, 2009). The nation wanted to have greater influence and control during Council Membership by being directly involved in UNFIL. They wanted to enhance their solidarity in terms of power and control over other states in the Council Membership. As a means of solidarity, Belgium decided to engage in peacekeeping missions to benefit from the Millennium Development Goals which will help to address issues of wage inequality (presence of strikes), environment issues, and terrorism which is a major detriment to peace and unity of the nation.
References
Bellamy, A. J., & Williams, P. D. (2012). Broadening the Base of United Nations Troop-and Police-Contributing Countries.
Bellamy, A. J., Williams, P. D., & Griffin, S. (2010). Understanding peacekeeping. Polity.
Bove, V., & Elia, L. (2011). Supplying peace: Participation in and troop contribution to peacekeeping missions. Journal of Peace Research, 48(6), 699-714.
Bove, V., & Ruggeri, A. (2016). Kinds of blue: Diversity in UN peacekeeping missions and civilian protection. British Journal of Political Science, 46(3), 681-700.
Costalli, S. (2014). Does peacekeeping work? A disaggregated analysis of deployment and violence reduction in the Bosnian war. British Journal of Political Science, 44(2), 357-380.
Diehl, P. F., & Druckman, D. (2010). Evaluating peace operations. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Fortna, V. P., & Howard, L. M. (2008). Pitfalls and prospects in the peacekeeping literature. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 11, 283-301.
Mattelaer, A. (2009). Europe rediscovers peacekeeping? Political and military logics in the 2006 UNIFIL enhancement. Egmont Paper No. 34, October 2009.
Peacekeeping Contributor Profile: Belgium | Providing for Peacekeeping. (2019). Retrieved from http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/2014/04/03/contributor-profile-belgium/
Tardy, T., & Geneva Centre for Security Policy.(2011: New York). (2011). For a renewed consensus on UN peacekeeping operations. GCSP.
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