Essay Example on Russell's Contributions to Proper Nouns and Definite Descriptions

Introduction

Russel contributed significantly in the definite descriptions theory in relation to proper nouns. Many philosophers had thought about the same issue in the logical sense and since such assigning of the definite determiners transcend language mainly since it brought about many divisions on the subject of precise descriptions. The differences that arose among philosophers concerning definite determiners were in the use and treatment of quantificational or referential expressions (Antonelli 2018). Moreover, a section of philosophers still holds that the determiners 'a' and 'the' have a pragmatic contribution and not a semantical in the way people communicate. According to Russell, the proper names did not consist of common names. He referred to regular names as representing definite descriptions in their abbreviation's form (Kroeger 2017).

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Moreover, he posited that they were quantifiers and not singular terms. He viewed proper names as lacking describing content. Various works in linguistics have further questioned the use of indefinite and definite determiners, and how they relate to logical features and their exploration in the natural language. Even though there exist differences concerning determiners among philosophers, there is still consensus among others like Fege who agreed with Russel on proper names and descriptions (Macleod and Miller 2018). Mostly the disputes arise from whether some of the expressions are quantificational or referential (Kemp 2018). They both held that proper names had a reference together with a sense and that there was no considerable variation between definite descriptions and proper names. Besides, they concurred on the illustration of names as being identical to the meaning of their defining components (Costa 2020). Kripke, on the other hand, differed significantly with them and thus came up with various arguments to support his divergent views. It is therefore essential to look at the multiple issues associated with proper names and their consequent descriptions together with how such descriptions are equivalent to the names in different situations where Kripke noted on the possibility of different worlds.

Necessity and Possibility

Kripke uses the possibility of different worlds in determining the lack of an identical nature among proper nouns. A statement being genuine in all possible worlds arises from the fact that it is necessary regardless of the circumstances. A true proposition in another universe could have been right. Possibility shows that such a proposition becomes in a possible world. Philosophy as a result with the term of possibility does not point out an epistemological notion but a metaphysical one (Ninan 2018). As such, a proposition, in this case, could not have been false. As such, something that might not have been true could have been so in another possible world. Kripke, as a result, uses the notion of possibility in guiding his arguments about the same nature of things and their descriptions adopted in Russell's theory.

He further expanded on the determiner 'the" in both the plural and singular form of definite descriptions. Definite descriptions take the form either of 'the F' or as indefinite descriptions, which make the form of 'an F' with their corresponding words in other languages. Most of the arguments against such descriptions are that many may have the kind of such terms but still may not be descriptions. Russel contributed to the theory of definite descriptions further focusing on the proper names and their place in the sentences, particularly in alluding to pronouns and using definite articles in the process. Moreover, a more straightforward way to understand a sentence containing a definite description will require considering sentences with different forms regarding property possessed by various names. Thus, according to Russel for every name of a person t, repertoire, there is a property that is associated with the name by S where the property is possessed by a single object only. For example, an inventor's name relates to the work the inventor did. Thus, the property is what the inventor initiated. Only the inventor has the property, starting, or coming up with something not done before. Using these methods according to Russel names of things out of the environment can be conceived more clearly. Such names of objects may involve those that had been there in the past. Saul Kripke further initiated various arguments against the theory of definitive description regarding determiners and their use in expressions in the logic and language of philosophy.

Kripke concentrated on descriptions of multiple terms while contemplating how things could have been indifferent possible worlds. As such, in Kripke's thought, identity was quite different from the way determiners in the theory of definite descriptions put it. Since something identifies with what makes its composition, its description would be similar to its name. In this case, it would be like saying charcoal is made up of carbon then charcoal is carbon in the sense of definite descriptions. Kripke, as a result, clarifies on the flaw in identical objects being equal concerning various designators and the statements between them. Kripke put forth various objections that included the modal, epistemological and semantic arguments.

Modal Argument

Kripke further noted the modal objection that dealt with naming and corresponding descriptions by Russell. In opposition, he notes that descriptions are not proper names. Kripke, as a result, came up with rigid designator (Senderowicz 2010). A rigid designator, in this case, defines the same thing in a possible world. Names mostly show a person in a different situation as being the same, which descriptions cannot. The rigidity of descriptions, as a result, arises from their different meanings in various statements. The description and the name should designate the same thing to satisfy the theory of definite descriptions. Some examples to show this: 'the tallest individual in the country', the addition of 2 and 4.' in such definitions people may be defined by their behaviour and regarded as not being themselves or their names, which further brings about confusion. The person referred to as not being the person, in this case, is either behaving strangely and not generally as would be expected.

Moreover, Kripke used the intuitive test as the benchmark of determining the rigid designation in various situations. Kripke, together with Donnellan, indicated that there was a defect in the theory of definite descriptions epistemologically (Fitch 2014). They noted that the multiple descriptions associated with names did not describe the intended persons. In this case, Kripke and Donnellan pointed out that the description assigned to names was not enough to point out the purposed referent. As a result, according to the possibility of different worlds, there is the actual world, which is part of the possible worlds that further brings about different perspectives or ways things would have been.

Semantics and Definite Descriptions

Another argument is that of semantics. In the semantics case, Kripke focuses on the issues arising from assigning various descriptions of a thing or person according to the name given to it. Most people may not know any remarkable things to associate with a person's name. However, this does not mean that the name has no reference to a person because of a lack of unique associations to the title (Capuano 2016).

Moreover, there is a confusion in referring to the name, particularly where people attach the wrong descriptions to a person's name even though they do not have the unique descriptions that can satisfy the name. In this case, the referent gets a description that is not related to his or her name. Therefore, referring to a person for an act he did not do is mostly used in many sections of society. Kripke uses Albert Einstein, where many people wrongly think that he invented the atomic bomb. Such a description is wrong since it should correctly refer to Oppenheimer. Kripke does not use possible worlds in dealing with Albert Einstein as coming up with the atomic bomb.

Epistemic Argument

Kripke further notes on the issue of epistemology a definite description. An example would be in the form of, 'If the G exits, then the G is G. Knowable a priori results in the process of using this form. If precise the sentences take the form of knowable a priori where the G exist then G is a G. Moreover, giving a description may be to a set of names which are b for instance, and they describe G. in employing synonyms without changing the meaning, it can be substantiated that if knowable apriori exits for the G exists, then b is G. In the descriptivist theory, the case may not hold as the description, and name pairs may be false.

Kripke further notes on negative existential. Kripke also comes up with the question regarding how to analyze if something or somebody in the past existed. Therefore, we cannot ask about something while using a name and thinking that it did not exist, for example, asking if Einstein lived by using the name of such a person in the question is quite illogical. The point of view of Kripke arises from the fact that if there is a thing, then it existed. As such, in aligning with the classical theory that posits on various questions regarding someone with his works further helps in analyzing the definite descriptions. In siding with the classical theory, he further substantiates the rigidity of definite descriptions though vaguely and without the use of logical formulas to arrive at his conclusion (Moss, 2016).

According to his objections, he further notes the falsity of Russell and Frege's view regarding definite descriptions. Even notes on the falsity in the issue of the identical nature of names and their story in the necessary where things could happen regardless even when going against natural laws, he does posit an impossibility. Moreover, Kripke notes on the issue of necessity in determining various views regarding naming and their descriptions in different worlds (Sidelle 2019). Additionally, in using multiple problems associated with intuition, some of his views become irrelevant to the argument against description theory. Even though some of his statements are a posteriori, he does not take issue with them like regarding Hesperus being phosphorus also though they are apriori. As such, Kripke points out that there is not a unique association of a name even though many speakers may associate a name differently even when they are referring to proper names. Thus, while removing the issue of possible words and noting that various persons are the same then their descriptions even though different through a variation of speakers may still be referred to like the same in the actual world. In the actual world, identical names and their descriptions will apply to the same thing. If two proper names are, describing one thing in the real world while another in the possible world, the names describe different situations; then their descriptions become rigid (Capone, Carapezza and Lo Piparo 2019). As a result, the proper name of the same item may show rigidity where another adequate name for the same thing describes in another world. A mathematical relationship will require the need for a constant to relate the two proper names defining the same thing. As such, the constant stands for the unique description linking the names. Kripke further rejects the use of a mathematical treatise coming up with a unique descriptor to relate proper names in the possible worlds in the natural language.

Conclusion

Russel dramatically points out the issue of descriptions and proper names as having an identical nature, which Kripke refutes in various...