Moral Saints: The Attractive, Contradictory Figure Explored by Susan Wolf - Essay Sample

Introduction

Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints" underscores what a moral saint would be like and how a moral saint can be an attractive individual. Susan even questions the significance of the moral philosophy behind the contradictory figure portrayed by a moral saint. Her dimensions of moral sainthood in the realms of ethics juxtaposes moral sainthood from the concussions of asserted by the utilitarianism and Kantian theories (Wolf 419). With those in consideration, Wolf speculates on the implications of righteous saints on moral philosophy. Wolf, therefore on the realms of moral saints underlies the unattractiveness and undesirable nature of portrayed in the life of a moral saint with rationalization and distinguishment of a Loving saint and a Rationale saint concerning Utilitarian and Kantian theories.

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The American philosopher Wolf begins her book with powerful remarks "I am glad that neither I nor those about whom I care most are moral philosophers" (Wolf 419). That is a declaration that presents the onset of a landscape essay in which Wolf imagines what it would feel like to be a moral perfectionist. An examination of such drawings from Wolf juxtaposes her liberation from the moral perfectionism trap. Her definition of a moral saint underlies a person whose actions are as morally go as possible or as worthy as it can be. The necessary condition of that moral sainthood would delve on one's commitments to improving the social welfare of others, which may be domineering (Wolf 420).

Wolf's essay encompasses two models of moral sainthood stemming from the Loving Saint and the Rationale Saint. She describes a Loving Saint as the one whose aim is doing whatever I morally best in a joyful spirit and cheerfully sells all her possessions in the quest of donating the famine relief proceeds. Rationale Saint, she underscores that is equally devoted to the course of morality and is not motivated by a loving spirit that is loving but instead geared by a sense of duty. Wolf goes ahead and asserts that moral considerations above others customarily elevate a Loving Saint as compared to a Rationale Saint, who may be aimed at pursuance of non-moral ends. However, Rational Saint recognizes the superiority of ethical consideration standings and prefers them for the same reason. Wolf distinction of a Loving Saint t and Rationale Saint disambiguates both theories of Utilitarianism and Kantianism versions in the spheres of moral sainthood.

Wolf's arguments on moral perfectionists in the reams of moral Saintness does not juxtapose a personal wellbeing model that is a desirable strive for human wellbeing. She asserts that for one to be an amoral Saint, one should desist from the pursuance of non-moral interests and cultivate the traits that are admired by people like excellence in various fields and artistic creativity. Wolf adds that the moral aspiration of being a moral saint may make someone a nightmare in living and being around. Perhaps being a true saint entails decency and not feeling bad all that time. Wolf asserts that that would mean that moral Saint has to hide their thoughts on the degree of their moral; commitment. Wolf's imagination of a Loving Saint is a perfectly happy life in which there is no part of the non-moral good. That, according to Wolf, means ultra- ascetic moral life which underscores no hobbies, no distractions, and no friendships as a result of contentment.

Moral wonders how that can be possible and whether the Loving Saint can realize the things that he is missing out and how he can missing all those not affect his happiness. Perhaps that Loving Saint, according to Wolf, is missing perpetual equipment, abilities in realizing that there is more to life than commitments, no wonder they can stay happy, albeit missing out in life. Wolf, in contrast, does not suggest the Rationale Saint as fails to see the areas in life that he is missing. Instead, Wolf explains that the Rationale Saint is persistent in his barren life as a sense of duty. However, the questions that Rationale Saints' motive of living life exclusively and entirely in the moral cause of devotion, and he suggests that it could be due to the loathing and pathological fear of damnation.

Wolf's two models of moral Sainthood are modeled on two modern Western philosophies, which entail utilitarianism that inspires Wolf's Loving Saint and Kantianism that delves on his Rational Saint. Here, Wolf raises a question on what would one rather be, given a chance to live the worldviews to the maximum. In answering that, Wolf asserts that none of the world views, even if comprehensively lived would deliver an appealing life. That is since, in each, there is a vision of a good life consisting of complete devotion to the needs of others hence no time for a persona; enjoyment of the non-moral good things in life more one's time.

Similarly, Wolf asserts that much appreciation is given to people whose moral achievements are in conjunction with the traits of low honest tones, and there is a limit on how much morality one can take (Wolf 423). However, Wolf does not imply that moral value is not a vital value in evaluating oneself. She, however, suggests that the moral value is one of its kind that cannot be comprehended by our values on the hierarchical system of morality (Wolf 438). She juxtaposes that morality should never be superior to other benefits, especially in the spheres of the unquestionable aesthetic values that should be considered. Righteousness should, however, be accounted in the realms of making moral deliberations yet does not necessarily veto non-moral deliberations. Wolf adds that how morality is dominating is alarming, and there is a need for its absence or the denial of its existence, especially at a personal level (Wolf 424). Wolf's conclusion underscores the fact it is morally right to be a moral saint, and it is vital for a person to be a moral saint and for one to be a moral saint, his self-interests may drive him. However, she insists that a moral saint is neither a suitable type of a person and nor a god life to lead. Here, good is understood in the bigger picture than morally good and less subjective to the sim0lification of sound for a person; therefore, it is never good to be potentially useful.

Concurrence With Wolf's Philosophy

Incoherence with Wolf's philosophy, sainthood is not the problem but rather the general single-mindedness since moral Saint is never worse than the one who is focused on single-mindedness. That means that the obsession with moral Saint may be encompassing as one needs to have certain personality flaws as the loving Saint may be incapable of any other types of joy as the rational Saint is unduly afraid and, at times, self-hating. Additionally, it might be beyond any reasonable doubt that is indeed pouring faults to find that moral saints admirable as it is in the Kantian thought as the separation of reasoning underscores the verifiability of good life indicates the best kind of life that we need to emulate and when that is taken away, we would only be left with the rational philosophy. In the utilitarianism of moral sainthood, which underscores that the moral Saint does not preclude the cultivation of virtues or pursuit of other interests since one's pursuit of interests and passions seems conducive for one's happiness and an essential element in ones pursuance of moral values.

Conclusion

Wolf depicts moral saints in the spheres of unappealing terms that may result in misinterpretation of the same. His juxtaposing of moral sainthood is that ethical modernity has evolved to include extensive responsibilities on strangers since morality delves into the values and lives of strangers. She, therefore, asserts that given the terrible world state, there is a vast moral work to be done that may be consuming to one's life; hence morality does not require one to be a moral saint.

Work Cited

Wolf, Susan. "Moral Saints." The Journal of Philosophy. Vol.79.No.8.Aug.1982, pp.419-439,http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026228