Introduction
The Name Anaconda refers to a boa family snake that attacks its victim by coiling and crushing them. Anaconda operation, therefore, borrowed its techniques from the perilous snake. In operation, the military confronted targets with several concentric rings. Mission command is a philosophy or scheme developed to aid practice in command and act as a foundation unifying the land operations. The doctrine of mission command issued in 2012 based on six principles, which were; establishing cohesive squads through mutual trust, creating shared understanding, having distinct commander's intent, exercising disciplined initiative, using mission orders and accepting prudent risk. The scheme was later updated to consist of seven principles that saw competence added to the list. The paper presents an analysis and evaluation of the 'operation Anaconda' concerning the seven principles of Mission command.
Operation Anaconda was reportedly one of the first modern style, the military used in operating lasting freedom (Caruso, 2012). The US army applied the strategy to flush out the Al Qaeda fighters and Taliban in 2001 from Washington DC, and New York City. Later in 2002, the rebels were reported to be converging at Knowst-Gardez and were hiding in the Shahi-Kot valley. The army used the idea of surround the Shahi-Kot valley with numerous concentric rings, with the skill they blocked the entrance and exit of the militia from the area. In the inner ring, the forces took the form of typical anvil and hammer destroying the al Qaeda within. Mission command stems from combined warfare experiences. The unfolding of the operation Anaconda in 2002 made the official arrival of the United States military's conventional forces into worldwide war against terror. Several lessons can be drawn from the Anaconda for mutual operations. The United States forces should improve the seven principles. It clear from the operation anaconda that combined efforts are important; it should work towards creating a unity of command, share command structures and planning together for expeditionary operations. The operation Anaconda in Shahi-Kot came with the utilization of the mission command.
There were mission orders, the squads allowed to use the imitative best suited to see it through. Lead by lieutenant Blaber he stated his responsibility as the leader was only to provide a suitable environment for his teams and not to tell them what to do. The plan engaged two five-person bands and a single three-person group on foot into the target area for oversight for the operation in Shahi-Kot. The three Advanced Force Operations teams that were set out to observation points which indicated they accepted the risks. The team was set with a clear understanding of their commander's intent and with the necessary leeway to accomplish it. Three primary tasks were given, that is to deny or confirm the presence of rebels, clear out there landing zones for helicopter and destroy enemy targets.
The three teams were divided in such a way that would occupy the high ground on the eastern side of Shahi-Kot, the other team would occupy the high ground on the southwest while the third ground was supposed to occupy the 'the finger location that was a raised point on the southern edge that would give a clear view of the entire valley to locate the enemies. Later before the attack, the Teams discovered that one of the high ends was covered by the enemies and in a larger number than they had expected. The air attacks began later with helicopters.
Just as their leader had warned, they faced a well-organized and rigid nemesis. Earlier, Hammer, encompassed of US Special Forces headed by Afghan, engaged the retaliators under heavy fire. With the whole operation leading into a huge counter to communication, the mutual trust enjoyed between the groups ensured the teams could continue to manage the rebels in the valley. Blaber's bold plan to embrace risk and penetrate his squads over land protected many lives on the initial day of Anaconda; the plan also saved more. The Advanced Force Operations managed to control key terrains successfully. Their triumph leads to many rival deaths and eventually made it easy to maneuver for sociable armies. Though the incidences of communication failures among the groups in contact, their numerous supporting aircraft and leadership are well-documented, the contact between the Advanced Force Operations, the several Tactical Operations points and Blaber still allowed vital leadership to uphold some degree of situational consciousness (Daniel Patryk, 2017). Several intelligent reports mechanism and reporting shaped the activities taken by sociable forces throughout the fight, but since leaders are flexible in deciding on the ground and exercise well-organized initiative without orders helped ensure mission success. The leaders that led teams were skeptical of the need to penetrate the valley under the supposition that the rival controlled the area floor when they controlled the high ground and main terrain. Flawed bits of intelligence, poor coordination, and communication between corresponding directives and lack of command by General Hagenbeck over the Afghan forces or the U.S. Special Operations army all contributed to the hostile conditions that the coalition forces met in the Valley. While varying amounts of failure were inescapable in the early phases of Anaconda, Blaber's exercise of mission command guaranteed that these losses wouldn't be disastrous (Daniel Patryk, 2017). Before the mission planning, he was sure that his bands had a common understanding of the working set and he trusted them with the liberty to make a decision and to work based on the need on the ground. He gave clear intent to his people; through response from his crews, it was easy for him to constantly assess the condition and decide plans that would ultimately save many American lives. The application of the principles of mission command enables the forces to defeat and kills several enemies while ensuring the safe return of every infantry involved in the fight.
Conclusion
In summary, The event that Blaber is just an example of several such scenarios; this scenario has recurred in several areas of Afghanistan that leadership decided to slow the military drawdown. The missteps in Zhawar were due to lack of application of the principles of mission command, in specific building unified squads, creating mutual understanding, having clear commander's intent, and accepting prudent risk. As indicated by varying perspectives in 2002 and 1986, these concerns all appear to have been cracked in the implementation of Lieutenant Blaber's operations in the Shahi-Kot. Though not much efforts have put general, Afghan militaries currently are still not strong enough as they are supposed to be.
References
Caruso, D. (2012). Operation Anaconda: America's First Major Battle in Afghanistan. Oral History Review, 39(2), 334-336. doi:10.1093/ohr/ohs065
Daniel Patryk, M. (2017). MISSION COMMAND PRINCIPLES IN THE BATTLE OF CHIPYONG-NI. Safety & Defense, 3, 37-40. doi:10.37105/sd.23
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Essay Sample on Anaconda Ops: Mission Command & 6 Principles of Warfare. (2023, Mar 26). Retrieved from https://proessays.net/essays/essay-sample-on-anaconda-ops-mission-command-6-principles-of-warfare
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