Essay on War on Terror: Common Perceptions of Iraq and its Implications

Introduction

"War on Terror," the expression used to define the U.S.-led global movement against terrorism initiated as a consequence of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The fight against terrorism seemed similar to the Cold War in its scale, intensity and effect on foreign relations and was meant as a new era of world political ties that had important implications for defence, governance, coordination, human rights, as well as international law (Dale, 2015).

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The common perceptions of Iraq are a key aspect of the current discussion on how many U.S. forces can expand into Afghanistan. Those who support an Afghanistan increase claim that what has succeeded in Iraq is going to be successful in Afghanistan; critics say that the circumstances are different. In this situation, there is a common warning about gross parallels between Afghanistan, and Iraq, as lessons may be unthinkable (Cordesman, 2017).

Comparison of the Wars

The fight against terrorism was an almost unlimited conceptual operation. The strategic aspect comprised major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, clandestine campaigns abroad and Yemen large-scale aid projects and substantial reductions in military expenditure. It has included the institutional restructuring and significant increases in financial support of US military capabilities, a global plan to capture as well as an assistant the terrorism suspects at "Guantanamo Bay", expanded collaboration with foreign intelligence services, and the follow-up of interception and terrorist finance. This political aspect involved ongoing efforts to build and sustain a multinational alliance of member organizations and states and a wide-ranging international diplomatic campaign toward Middle East anti-Americanism.

In Afghanistan, operational and policy choices, as well as early correlations of two disputes, were likely to be taken due to the overwhelming achievement of US activities in Iraq. Early comparisons are wrong and were probably a political move to try and retain US backing for the Middle East deployments. The first moves of Iraq War were a comfortable war, against the Iraqi forces, and the asymmetrical fight stretched out against defeated Iraqi troops men as well as the globe most increasingly volatile terrorists, who allied themselves with various al-Qaeda factions, continue to remain forgetful (Davids, 2016). But why did an explosion of Al-Qaeda in Iraq occur because their influence was almost non-existent? Until the U.s war declaration, the Panel found no concrete evidence of any organizational link regarding Iraq and al-Qaeda.

The population of Iraq is largely focused in the main cities across the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, as well as the essential cities for the insurgents have been in and across Baghdad. Many regions further than the river valleys are heavily populated and in an industrial counterinsurgency have little strategic significance. In contrast, Afghanistan has been physically larger; it has a greater population, a local population as well as a more scattered society. All this means that considerably more power and logistical support structures need to be built in Afghanistan than they did in Iraq (Dale, 2015).

Contrast between the Wars

No reason to take decisions in Afghanistan from the early planning stages via the current operations focused on the knowledge in Iraq. The results would probably have been different if there were some clear study and work carried out before the acceptance of the Afghanistan policy. Initially, since the situation of individual countries was different, they should also have been regarded (Cordesman, 2017). They were run by a true tyrant at the point of the Iraq invasion, but there was no instability. On the other side, Afghanistan is renowned for its instability and endless conflict. But the political environment in each nation is just the start of a long list of discrepancies which seem never to have been taken into account or ignored deliberately.

The U.s is strategically alone inexperience, and probably the most efficient way of battling militants in Afghanistan alone is American drone strikes, but in areas that are home to jihadists that hardly ever have any impact in the United States, along with Pakistan, Yemen, and Al-Qaeda's main region (Enterline, 2014). And with all the military progress, the strategic objective of stabilising Afghanistan has yet to be accomplished, though it has to be removed as a terrorist recruitment base. Many think, and justifiably so that the U.s will not completely stop these missions as it gets ready to end missions in Afghanistan.

The role of American troops in Afghanistan and Iraq was significantly extended and enlarged. The enemy attack assassination was intentionally reduced to secondary operation. The four main duties were to provide the public with safety, to help local authorities convince them to support the state, to finance tens of thousands of project development as well as to establish the Western law and order. Iraq stabilised all across Baghdad between the end of 2006 in Anbar Region and the latter of 2007, mostly since the Sunni communities moved to the Americans who made up the strongest group (Eikenberry, 2017).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the achievements of the fight against terrorism include the elimination or capture of several of Al Qaeda's prominent members, the downing of the Taliban government, the closing of the camps where terrorist were training in Afghanistan as well as many of suspected terrorists from all over the world.

References

Cordesman, Anthony H. (2017). Winning in Afghanistan. Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 15 February 2007, in Washington, DC.

Dale, Catherine. (2015). "Surge Recovery" and Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan: In Brief. CRS Report for Congress, January 6, 2012.

Davids, Christiaan, Sebastiaan, R., and Joseph Soeters. (2015). Measuring Progress in Reconstructing Afghanistan. Baltic Security and Defense Review 12, no. 1: 25-51.

Eikenberry, Karl (2017). The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan. Foreign Affairs 92, no. 5 (Sep/Oct): 59-74.

Enterline, Andrew J., Michael, J., G. (2014). Surge, Escalate, Withdraw and Shinseki: Forecasting and Retro-casting American Force Strategies and Insurgency in Iraq. International Studies Perspectives: 245-52