Compatibilism: Resolving the Dilemma of Determinism & Free Will - Essay Sample

Introduction

Compatibilism tends to be the belief that assumes that determinism and free will are usually compatible with each other. Compatibilism also makes it very possible to believe in both determination and free will without developing logical inconsistency. Compatibilism was initially championed by various traditional stoics and several medieval scholastics, for instance, Thomas Aquinas and Domingo Banez (Vihvelin, Sider, Hawthorne, & Zimmerman, 2008). The compatibilist usually believe that freedom can either be absent or present in situations or areas that are not related to metaphysics. Scientists believe that casual determinism often does not eliminate the reality of any probable future outcome (Fara, 2008). Most compatibilist usually try to assert the reality that exists between causal determinism and free will. Some of these compatibilists generally uphold the existence of the free will and deny or object the universal casual determinism while others try to support the universal causal determinism and also deny the existence of free will (Fara, 2008). Since free will is perceived to be a necessary requirement for moral responsibility, then compatibilism is on various occasions expressed as a statement that talks about the existing compatibility between moral determination and moral responsibility. This paper intends to raise an augment against compatibilism mainly by reviewing the factors that hinder its support.

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An Argument Against Compatabilism

If Causal Determinism is Considered to Be, True, then All he Events Are Not Necessitated.This argument tends to illustrate the reason why free will is perceived to be problematic under determinism. In most cases, determinism tends to introduce several necessities in its argument and perspective. We usually find articulations of determinism such as these necessities in various authorities who highly speak of determinism to show that every event or state is generally necessitated by various preceding events or states. These authorities also usually say that a particular event is usually determined if the conditions in place are not sufficient enough to confirm the occurrence of such an event. We are usually aware that there are several accounts of determinism that tend not to have specific causation like their triggers. This makes us assume that perhaps there is a specific determinism, which is not actually causal determinism. Surveys usually articulate determinism depending on the possibility of there being a particular failure. The most significant concern that is generally illustrated by determinism does not just focus on the existence of one future but also on the past necessities and determines. This component usually does not make it clear how determinism can be differentiated from fatalism. For example, we usually assume that the challenge of free will often exist in our concern on how the past usually fix the future and the present situations (Vihvelin et al., 2008). The determinism that is usually understood based on the Lewisian perspective is considered conducive to a group of human metaphysics that most realists of casual powers might reject (Vihvelin et al., 2008). Therefore it usually seems rather plausible and, in contrast, that the power theorist may have had determinism in their mind being located in an all-encompassing network of causation.

If the Events are Necessitated in Compatibilism, There are Usually No Powers

This argument of events being necessitated incompatibilism is likely to be very controversial among power theorists. However, it is usually assumed that those people who base their free will on the power of specific agents do not see its incompatibility mainly with determinism, this is because they do not seem to appreciate the special modal and character of power referred to as the dispositional modality. The main characteristic of dispositional modality that is related to our argument on compatibilism usually indicates that if a state or event of affair appears to be an issue of necessity, then it cannot be assumed to be a clear manifestation of power (Feltz & Cokely, 2009). In most cases, dispositional modality usually tries to illustrate that the causal powers have the capability to prevent and interfere, thus clearly indicating that they do not facilitate their manifestations or effects. The most controversial thing about this idea is that it is usually against the well-established tradition of comprehending powers to involve necessity. Power is assumed to add something stronger and of great impact to the entire world than just the simple, pure contingency of humanism. Powers may be hidden and restricted from manifesting themselves despite receiving the needed stimuli. This is usually the feature that causes problems when the conditional disposition analysis is given based on their consequent manifestations and stimuli. The mistaken theory that shows powers usually involve necessities may appear to be what usually convinces people to assume that dispositions are usually similar to determinism. This, however, tends not to be true, particularly considering our initial idea that indicates casual determinism mainly involves necessity. This also makes us realize that some dispositional free will accounts usually appear very close to dispositional modality without realizing it.

Free Will Existence in the Exercise of the Agent Causal Powers

Although this idea is capable of creating different formulations, it is considered to be the least controversial, particularly considering that the argument is usually based on the prevailing powers based solution to the problem of the prevailing free will. The solution to this problem is usually based on the fact that there are various agents are empowered by a set of psychological powers that enable them to choose, deliberate, plan, intend, and imagine. Even in areas where the power language is not applied, it is also possible to claim natural support to any account that focuses on the special abilities that various agents use to make choices. Although we tend to think that a positive account of free will is essential, it is usually enough to indicate that determinism so that people can create or develop the existence of the free will. The free will debate is usually presented like a simple decision between three key options that include compatibilism, libertarianism, and determinism. The world can be considered to be deterministic but freewill does not exist; that is the main reason why people usually think it is appropriate to the right power metaphysics in use. Particularly the one that allows dispositional modality to enable us creates a clear path between the perils o0f modal dualism. In most cases, when people are allowed to choose between the urgency and absolute humanism, contingency freedom tends to seem problematic. When addressing nature, there are usually several reliable tendencies at play, such as cases of causal powers. These powers are considered to be incredible but not purely contingent, thus helping to avoid hopelessness. However, if the world has a certain level of determinism, then the world is open for any form of libertarianism as long as we prove that there is a clear theory of free will.

Response to the Objection

People should try to oppose compatibilism based on some of the key factors that hinder its support. Some of these facts include, first, free will exist in the exercise of the agent-causal powers. Secondly, if the events are necessitated incompatibilism, there are usually no powers. Thirdly, if causal determinism is considered to be true, then all the events are not necessitated. These arguments or facts have provided a new direction on what is considered to be a genuine dispositional power-based approach of free will (McKenna, 2012). With this approach at hand, people can now argue that the needed solution has to be an incompatibilist. Free will involves total excise of power; therefore, people should not be affected by the idea or the fact that someone has been requested to exercise those powers. Compatibilism is considered to be an option of the power-based theory. However, based on this argument, it is clear that genuine power approaches should follow or abide by the dispositional modality seriously. When this idea is adhered to, we can effectively claim that there is a strong reason why we should be against incompatibilism.

References

Fara, M. (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind, 117(468), 843-865. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4426/d30bf5928eafb654e59ed169f567b964f0a4.pdf

Feltz, A., & Cokely, E. T. (2009). Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 342-350. https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.174.5175&rep=rep1&type=pdf

McKenna, M. S. (2012). Contemporary compatibilism: Mesh theories and reasons-responsive theories. In The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition. Oxford University Press. https://arizona.pure.elsevier.com/en/publications/contemporary-compatibilism-mesh-theories-and-reasons-responsive-t

Vihvelin, K., Sider, T., Hawthorne, J., & Zimmerman, D. (2008). Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Contemporary debates in metaphysics, 303-318. https://dorshon.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Contemporary-Debates-in-Metaphysics.pdf#page=315